Discussion of change in North Korea is always fierce. Those in favor of engagement say that projections of a crumbling North Korea are unfounded. Chung Dong Young, a former Democratic Party presidential candidate, said recently, “The notion of the imminent collapse of North Korea is captive to an overdose of ideology and unrealistic assumptions,” and believes that the current administration of Lee Myung Bak is caught in the illusion of impending fall, and is thus failing in its policy.
However, the Grand National Party-led government believes that the three-generation hereditary succession is bound to fail, and that without Kim Jong Il the chances of North Korea changing rapidly are high. Indeed, according to a classified document released by Wikileaks, Chun Young Woo, Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, said in February last year, “Within two to three years of Kim Jong Il’s death, North Korea will crumble.”
The Ministry of Unification has stated among its aims for next year, ‘inducing favorable changes in North Korea and preparing for unification’. According to another revelation from Wikileaks, Hyun In Taek, South Korea’s Minister of Unification, told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell last July that “Kim Jong Il will not be able to live beyond 2015,” and that “If North Korea collapses, the governments of South Korea and the United States must act fast for the reunification of the Korean peninsula”.
The subject of contingency planning for rapid change scenarios comes up even more frequently at ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Walter L. Sharp, Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces, said as recently as 20th January that North Korea would tumble in case of domestic instability or turmoil, and that given the Command’s responsibility to protect North Korean civilians, the dynamics would have to play out differently from all-out war.
Kang Cheol Hwan, who leads the North Korea Strategy Center, a political research institute run by North Korean defectors, believes “North Korea has effectively lost the power to retain its regime since its currency reform efforts. The viability of the regime most likely depends on Kim Jong Il’s health.” Elsewhere, Kim Young Hwan, a research analyst for Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, concluded in his analysis of last year’s Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference that “the probability of North Korea coming to a crisis situation under the rule of Kim Jong Eun is 60 to 70 percent”.
The popular view of the circumstances surrounding North Korea is that the country has already progressed beyond any normal definition of ‘crisis’. North Korea is increasingly isolated internationally, receiving only Chinese support. Under normal circumstances, the support that North Korea receives from China seems safe, but if the regime comes under siege, Chinese support would then most likely hinge on changes North Korea makes to itself, which could add pressure.
According to Statistics Korea, South Korea’s total trade in 2009 was $686.6 billion, more than 200 times that of North Korea’s $3.4 billion, so the ideological and economic competition with South Korea is already over. While South Korea’s income per capita has reached nearly $20,000, the North’s has yet to reach a thousand. While South Korea’s GDP for 2009 was approximately 1.064 trillion won, the North’s was 28 billion. On the whole, while the South Korean economy is now well inside the world’s top fifteen, while the North’s is still comparable to the least developed countries in Africa.
The Democracy Index for 2010, based on an Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 167 countries, ranked South Korea 20th in terms of level of democracy, grading it 8.11 points out of a maximum of 10. North Korea, however, came in last. Nowadays, it is even possible for the North Korean people to compare their own standard of living with that of South Korea, through either contacts with North Korean defectors or access to South Korean radio and dramas. It cannot be pleasant.
The North Korean people’s displeasure over economic hardship has translated into a distrust of the authorities. Even in the military, lower-ranking officers and soldiers suffer from chronic malnutrition. Botched currency reform efforts by the regime have effectively strengthened the people’s assumption that they should expect nothing from their leaders.
It is worth noting that even senior officials in the Worker’s Party have lost their sense of ownership of the Party and passion for socialism. Corruption has made it hard to expect fair administrative practices. High-level officials have become no more than users of the poor, and the army no more than plunderers of the people.
The reason the current regime still stands despite such problems is because Kim Jong Il’s authority and grip on power are still intact. Although North Korea’s administrative, economic, educational and health care systems have all failed, its organs for oversight, control and punishment remain sound under his iron fist.
The entire country is limping on by way of Kim Jong Il’s hold on power and fear generated through threat of punishment. However, with Kim Jong Il suffering a stroke in August 2008 and showing no signs of regaining his past form, the regime’s future has been cast into doubt. The fact that the succession of power to Kim Jong Eun seems to be being hurried reflects the worries of Kim Jong Il, who only took on a public role 15 full years after being nominated as the successor. On the other hand, Kim Jong Eun was awarded the title of general after only two years of apprenticeship, and rose simultaneously to the office of Vice Chairman of the Party Central Military Committee.
Kim Jong Il has a strong focus on power and is a master of political maneuvering, as witnessed in his old struggle for power with uncle Kim Young Ju and stepmother Kim Sung Ae, and in the manner in which he brought Oh Jin Woo, an influential figure within the Chosun People’s Army, into his clique.
He also spent a significant amount of time in political apprenticeship under his father. The time during which he was heir to the throne was one of the more stable periods for North Korea. Layers of surveillance, combined with a brutal and cold demeanor, meant Kim Jong Il was an obvious choice for Kim Il Sung.
But while Kim Jong Il took over power in the best of circumstances, Kim Jong Eun will not be so lucky. If Kim Jong Il were to suddenly die, however great Kim Jong Eun’s political wits might be, the North Korean leadership would most likely face chaos.
Under such a scenario, Kim Jong Eun might have to share power with high-ranking officials in the military and Party. This would make it hard for him to maintain tight control and oversight over his aides, which would in turn weaken surveillance for ordinary citizens. Should such a situation last, a power struggle would be inevitable, as power normally does not sit well with more than one center of gravity.
A report produced by the Council on Foreign Relations in January 2009, “Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea” said, “How a power struggle would play out and who the eventual winner or winners might be is impossible to predict, but a prolonged, divisive, and potentially even violent succession struggle is not out of the question.”
The report goes on to say, “Much would hinge on the leadership skills of the individuals involved, their personal networks, and their organizational capacities, to say nothing of their sources of funding – foreign and domestic, including access to the Kim’s family bank accounts – that would enable them to buy support and valuable resources in any power struggle. Not surprisingly, the backing of the armed forces and also probably the State Security Department(SSD) – North Korea’s intelligence agency – is considered pivotal to the outcome of a possible power struggle.”
