North Korea is making an unusual media move by including family members and children of high-ranking officials at “Kim Jong Un’s priority events” and deliberately showcasing them on state media. Korean Central Television repeatedly zoomed in on Kim Jong Un with his daughter Kim Ju Ae, his sister Kim Yo Jong with her two young children, and other elite family offspring during coverage of the launch ceremony for a new 5,000-ton destroyer at Nampo Shipyard on April 25.
North Korea functions as a “theater state” where the supreme leader (director), Workers’ Party (staff), and the masses (audience) move as one. Various media—films, dramas, poetry, music, symbols, and slogans—are mobilized to maximize theatrical effect, particularly through invented terms like “expansive politics,” “benevolent politics,” and “music politics” to glorify the leader.
Since taking power, Kim Jong Un has gone further than his predecessors by prominently featuring his royal family—something that was taboo during Kim Jong Il’s era—to achieve his political objectives. The “Ri Sol Ju phenomenon” early in his rule and the recent “Kim Ju Ae phenomenon” are prime examples, serving multiple purposes: drawing attention to his priority policies (cameo effect), establishing an image as both a relatable parent and a people-oriented leader focused on the future, and justifying the perpetual hereditary succession of the Kim family (intro effect).
North Korean propaganda always contains hidden codes and context. Kim Jong Un’s strategy includes distributing videos where he stars like a music video protagonist (featuring successful strategic missile launches or songs portraying him as a caring parent), orchestrating the Ri Sol Ju and Kim Ju Ae phenomena, and now, following the first public appearance of “Kim Yo Jong’s children” at New Year’s celebrations, showcasing elite children at the warship launch ceremony. These moves signal an expansion of Kim’s proven propaganda methods.
This trend represents the evolution of “Kim Jong Un’s visual politics,” targeting primarily younger generations for ideological transformation under the policy of “hostile two-state theory”—instilling loyalty to the trinity of Leader-Party-Masses and “Our State First” ideology. Kim’s greatest concern, while outwardly focused on nuclear and missile development, appears to be controlling young North Koreans (their version of Generation Z) who are increasingly drawn to South Korean culture and individualism. Will Kim’s carefully orchestrated strategy succeed? What should we be doing right now in response?
