“Kim, have you raised children? Defector orphans are the same as our children. Those who have raised children should not disregard the defector orphan issue.”
Kim Seuk Woo, former Vice-Chief of the National Unification Board, the predecessor of the Ministry of Unification, made the remark, demonstrating his willingness to roll up his sleeves in order to resolve the issue of defector orphans residing in China.
Daily NK met with Kim, one of the co-chairpersons of the “2008 North Korean Human Rights Campaign,” to hear about the upcoming event.
The following is a transcript of the interview with Kim.
– What is the current reality for defector orphans?
“Among the defectors in China, those who are in the direst situation are the orphans. These children, who are living in an unfamiliar Chinese land, do not have any means of survival. They are caught in a situation of uncertain identity and starvation and do not have access to any education.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child states that children should be ensured the rights ‘without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.’ In the case of the U.S., even if the parents are illegal residents, a stay is permitted or extended after the consideration of a child’s health and educational issues. In order for China to become a developed country, the reality regarding children’s human rights cannot be ignored.
The 2008 Campaign includes plans regarding the defector orphans, whose numbers are estimated to exceed 2,000, and several tens of thousands of stateless children. ‘Stateless children’ refers to second-generation children born between Chinese fathers and defector women.”
– How do you treat the defector issue as a whole?
“This campaign is focused on defector children, but the forced repatriations and human trafficking that the defectors go through are not to be forgotten either. We have to help the North so that the Chinese administration can take heed of this. The role of nongovernmental organizations during this process is very important.”
– Is this task possible with just the strength of civilian organizations?
“I witnessed the strength of civil society during the negotiations with Japan. In 1991, an issue surrounding discrimination towards third-generation Korean-Japanese arose there. First and Second generation Korean-Japanese agreed to the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the renewal of residence cards every five years, and deportation to Korea in the case of criminal acts, but the third-generation issue erupted in 1991. This generation could not even receive school matriculation notifications and had to produce the entrance papers themselves.
At the time, it was determined that this issue could not be easily resolved, but when South Korean NGOs and the administration put their heads together with Japanese NGOs, the issue was smoothly resolved.
Also, is it not the reason why the North Korean human rights draft resolution was first selected at the 2003 United Nations Human Rights Committee Conference due to the leadership of NGOs such as the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights and the work of President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic?”
– What was the government’s policy towards defectors when you were the Vice-Chief of the National Unification Board?
“From 1996 until early 1998, the period during which I served as the National Unification Board Vice-Chief in the Kim Young Sam administration, the number of defectors, which had been around 10 every year, started increasing to 40~50. According to our evaluation at the time, we estimated that the number of entrants would continue to rise rapidly and the policies of the past would no longer work. So we pursued the establishment of “Hanawon.”
Also, we considered the North Korean human rights issue to be an important reunification problem. At the time, there was some opposition that this could provoke the North, but after determining that a humanitarian support division which could handle the human rights issue inside the National Unification Board was needed, I pursued this with Kwon Oh Gi, the Vice-Premier.”
– If you had to evaluate the North Korea policies of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, what would you say?
“I cannot help but evaluate their policies as fundamentally failed. Ultimately, only the administration and control agencies ended up sending aid to North Korea. The reality of the lives of North Korean citizens became a secondary issue. The North-South economic gap widened to 36 to 1 and the operations rate of North Korean factories dropped to less than 20%. The food situation of North Korean citizens has become even more difficult.
Also, in terms of inter-Korean relations, we have a situation where we are pleading for the North to receive aid. The Sunshine Policy did not garner enough support from our citizens. In the most recent Presidential elections, the crushing of the opposition reflects this.”
– The Lee administration has been criticized for the stalemate in inter-Korean relations…
“I believe that the Lee Myung Bak administration has led inter-Korean relations well. Now, rather than unconditional support for the North, we need a flexible doctrine of reciprocity. At the very least, we cannot lose our leadership. In order to accomplish this, we just need to wait and North Korea will ultimately follow our pace.
We cannot expect inter-Korean relations to improve within the short period since the change in administration, and this is not even feasible. In the past, the tension-filled relations of the present were natural. North Korea’s recent provocative statements and the Mt. Geumgang incident can also be interpreted along these lines.
Proposing the principle of “isolating South Korea while improving relations with the U.S.” when looking at the current status of U.S. and North Korean relations is groundless and only amounts to threatening the citizens. Also, the position that war will result if we do not help the North ultimately threatens the citizens as well.”
– Can we expect a change in China’s attitude with regards to the North Korean issue?
“The role of China is absolute. Currently, China has provided food, energy, and security to help sustain the North Korean regime. Even if China is not 100% satisfied with the North Korean leader, it believes that preserving the current regime is better than the alternatives.
It is natural for China to have some uncertainty regarding a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. Hypothetically, if the Kim Jong Il regime collapses, China, which cannot help but worry about how far the U.S. will cast its influence on the Korean peninsula, will not be in a comfortable position.
The U.S.-Chinese relations have to progress strategically. Further, the moving of China-Korea relations in the China-Korea normalization talks after the Olympics to the level of joint partner relations is a huge result. In particular, the area of “cooperation and dialogue on the human rights issue” is decidedly better. China’s inclusion of human rights can be evaluated as a significant milestone.
The fact that President Lee specially requested a “smooth handling of the defector issue” to Hu Jintao is very positive. China did not immediately respond nor make any promises, but having such a dialogue in the middle of China-Korea normalization talks is in itself very significant.”
