Cyber Allies: North Korea and Russia’s cyber partnership in the post-treaty era

The year 2024 will be remembered as a milestone that paved the way for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) to emerge from its period of strategic reclusion. After years of lockdown during the coronavirus pandemic, the DPRK hosted a successful visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang in June 2024, where they signed a treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership, replacing the earlier 1961 and 2000 treaties, marking a drastic shift in bilateral diplomatic relations and the Northeast Asian regional order.

The treaty was not a surprise for those closely following the bilateral developments, particularly after the frequent ministerial meetings and agreements between both sides. However, the surprises from the visit were the details mentioned in the treaty, which signal that the partnership is deeper than expected, spanning across different domains. What stands out in the treaty is the focus on cooperation in science and technology, information security, countering disinformation, and collaboration between enforcement agencies, as mentioned in articles 10, 18, 20, and 15. These steps establish a strategic and legal framework within which operational, tactical, and strategic cooperation between the two sides is likely to take place in an often overlooked domain: cyberspace.

DPRK and Russia’s “Most Powerful Treaty”: Establishing a Legal Framework

Considering the trajectory of DPRK-Russia relations since last September’s meeting and the subsequent developments gives an insight into the expected cooperation in new domains such as cyberspace. The 2024 Treaty and the decisions taken by Russia in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), such as the U.N. PoE veto and its support for developing the DPRK Space program, underline a clear strategic cooperation emerging between the two sides. These steps signal Moscow’s willingness to enhance cooperation with Pyongyang beyond usual trade and commerce issues, reflected in agreements signed during the summit meeting on connectivity, medical education, and science.

After the recently signed Treaty on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership, cooperation and exchanges are expected to bring both sides closer. This is because the negotiated partnership is more expansive and detailed than the 1961 Treaty, which was more abstract. On the other hand, the 2024 partnership will be formulated in the context of developments in Northeast Asia, in particular the institutionalization of the U.S. alliance and the growing cooperation between NATO and U.S. Northeast Asian allies, particularly in areas such as information exchange, cyber security, and disinformation. Both sides perceive a strategic partnership as essential in countering any possible future threat; as a result, we should expect cooperation even in new domains such as space and cyberspace, where U.S. alliance cooperation has progressed in the last few years.

We see some interesting additions in the 2024 treaty on this front, focusing on enhancing cooperation in cyber issues. Article 4, which promises military assistance in a state of war, also states “other assistance by all of one’s means,” highlighting support by extending other capabilities, which may likely include cyber and space. Similarly, Articles 9 and 10 mention cooperation in areas such as “information security” and “exchanges and cooperation in scientific and technological fields,” especially in areas such as “artificial intelligence, information technology, and actively promoting joint research.” Most importantly, Article 18 focuses on “developing the relevant legal and normative foundation and deepening the dialogue between institutions” about information security, cooperation at the international level, and expanding cooperation in countering the use of ICTs. All these articles will likely encourage collaboration between the parties, to fulfill what Kim Jong Un iterated as “carrying out the far-reaching plan of the leaderships.” 

Post-treaty DPRK-Russia Cyber Cooperation

One important reason for greater cooperation in cyberspace is that it is less risky and difficult to track than other domains because it falls into the gray area, unlike the highly visible transfer of munitions and equipment. The second reason is that there is currently a greater incentive for both sides to coordinate their efforts in cyberspace, since they have common adversaries, i.e. the United States and its allies as a whole. Based on the treaty and the DPRK’s expectations, there are two areas where we are likely to see more cooperation in the short term.

Cyberspace cooperation between the two countries’ militaries is likely to increase as their military-technical partnership strengthens, driven by Kim Jong Un’s vision to modernize his military, which includes building up the cyber aspect of warfare, particularly by integrating cyber warfare capabilities into command operations. To this end, closer cooperation with the Russian military will be a priority for Kim Jong Un. As a result, we are likely to see more cyber military training, exercises, education, and strategic planning. For instance, in the area of military education, interaction between the two sides used to happen until 1991 when higher-level students were taught by Soviet Union military academy professors in DPRK, but it stopped after the USSR disintegration. Now with a treaty in place, we will likely see a return to cooperation between the two countries in this field. Recently, a delegation of military educationists led by Kim Kum Chol, President of Kim Il Sung Military University, departed for Moscow, signaling the fast pace of cooperation between the two sides. 

The DPRK aims to set up its own independent AI and electronic warfare command with an objective to “improve the nation’s arsenal of modernized electronic weaponry and bolster the military’s operational command capacity using AI technology. As such, cooperation would be looked at more positively in the DPRK, given its aim to build asymmetric military capabilities, which is also mentioned in article 10. Possible cooperation on information security and countering disinformation, as stated in articles 18 and 20, is another critical area where DPRK does not have much experience, unlike Russia. 

The second area would be imparting cyber skills and training to its elite students. DPRK hopes to expand its science and technology cooperation agreement, which was signed last year. Therefore, this will be one of the many areas where we will likely see more mobility from North Korea to Russia’s Far East (labor and non-labor). The treaty (Article 10) is expected to facilitate DPRK students to go to Russia. DPRK students are particularly interested in studying at Russian Far East universities, such as Far East Federal University (FEFU) and Primorsky Krai universities, where students from North Korea have traditionally enrolled for their studies. In April this year, Kim Sung Du, Minister of Education, led a delegation to Russia’s Far East to discuss increasing student quotas. Even Kim Jong Un requested the same when he visited FEFU last year, expressing his hopes for greater scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries and asking North Korean students studying there to put more effort into their education. Increased enrollment will likely lead to greater participation through joint research, academic exchanges, conferences, and seminars. Although some experts have argued that this is a ploy to send more North Korean workers to evade sanctions after signing the agreement, it would be naive to think that Russia is concerned about complying with UNSC sanctions.

Conclusion

Russia has been actively conducting targeted cyber campaigns against its Western adversaries, primarily the U.S. and European countries, in recent years. Similarly, North Korea has conducted cyber offensive operations against the U.S. and its allies, South Korea and Japan. With the treaty, the leaders have now created an opportunity for the two sides to work together on various issues, including cooperation in cyberspace. We will likely see an exchange of cyber capabilities and skills between militaries and threat actors operating from their respective regions to implement the leaders’ vision. However, the pace at which this will happen remains to be seen.

We can expect increasing cases of clandestine cooperation regarding the transfer of tools and exploits between state-affiliated cyber actors, as there already exists a history of collaboration between DPRK and Russia. It would also be interesting to observe whether the DPRK’s attacks on Russia continue as cooperation increases. If they decrease, it could signal an increase in trust between the two parties at the institutional level. The treaty has pushed Russia-DPRK relations forward, and it is expected that relations will continue on an upward trajectory as we move forward. Going forward, regional geopolitical tensions, particularly the strengthening of trilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia in cyberspace, will push Pyongyang and Moscow toward greater cyber cooperation driven by anti-Western ideology.