North Korea’s state media has stopped referencing “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism,” the ideological framework underpinning the Kim dynasty for decades, following the ninth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). In its place, a new formulation has emerged: “Kim Jong Un’s ideology.” The shift, subtle in phrasing but sweeping in implication, points to the consolidation of a distinct ideological identity for the ruling leader and may mark the birth of what analysts are calling “Kim Jong Un-ism.”
Before the ninth party congress, North Korean state media consistently used the phrase “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology.” That language appeared as recently as Feb. 23 in a Rodong Sinmun article covering WPK Secretary Ri Il Hwan’s nomination of Kim Jong Un for re-election as general secretary. The nomination statement described “the five-point line of party building for the new era, proclaimed by Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology” as a milestone in party construction.
Even within that same document, however, the groundwork for a stronger claim was being laid. The statement repeatedly emphasized the “originality” of Kim Jong Un’s ideological contributions, describing his thinking as “the most scientific, most accessible, and most people-centered” and calling his theoretical works “great discoveries that no one else in this world could achieve.”
That framing drew a clear distinction. Whereas “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology” had long been presented as a continuation and deepening of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, the new emphasis on originality pointed toward something categorically different: an ideology that supersedes, rather than inherits, its predecessors.
The term that vanished from state media
The turning point came quickly. At a study session for ninth congress participants held Feb. 27, the phrase “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology” gave way entirely to “Kim Jong Un’s ideology.” The session, reported in Rodong Sinmun, called on participants to uphold “Kim Jong Un’s ideology and leadership” with absolute loyalty.
The distinction matters. “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideology” carried a connotation of coexistence with Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, while “Kim Jong Un’s ideology,” standing alone, asserts uniqueness. It implies replacement, not continuation.
Confirming the pattern, “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” appeared for the last time in Rodong Sinmun on Feb. 23, in the context of praising Kim Jong Un as the most faithful successor to that tradition. After Feb. 25, the day the congress closed, the phrase dropped out of state media coverage entirely. Kim Jong Un’s closing address to the congress made no mention of it. Nor did his speech at the military parade held that night.
A Feb. 26 comprehensive report on the congress, notable for its length, highlighted what it called Kim Jong Un’s “genius-level ideological theories” without once citing Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. The subsequent mass rally and study session of Feb. 27 followed the same pattern.
One partial exception appeared Feb. 27, when Rodong Sinmun covered Kim Jong Un’s visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun and described him as “the most faithful successor to the cause of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” The word “cause” attached to the phrase, however, renders it a reference to a historical legacy rather than a living governing doctrine.
By March, the trend had solidified. Coverage of the ninth congress’s ideological directives made no mention of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism whatsoever. In a March 3 glossary entry in Rodong Sinmun under the heading “party work system,” the term suryong (supreme leader) appeared five times in connection with ideology: “The party work system must be one that thoroughly guarantees the uniqueness of the suryong‘s ideology and leadership.” Given North Korea’s new ideological direction, that suryong can only refer to Kim Jong Un.
The implications of this shift extend beyond terminology. With “Kim Jong Un’s ideology” now established as the singular guiding doctrine of the WPK, the formal codification of “Kim Jong Un’s party” and the official designation of Kim Jong Un as suryong in the revised party rules appear to be a matter of when, not if. The declaration of a “great Kim Jong Un era” made during the congress makes all three designations not only logical but inevitable.
This analyst had forecast before the ninth congress that three developments were possible: the formal designation of the WPK as “Kim Jong Un’s party,” the official recognition of Kim Jong Un as suryong, and the emergence of “Kim Jong Un-ism.” Of the three, the last had seemed least likely. It has proven to be the first confirmed.
