We’re now two weeks into March. More than two months have passed since Kim Jong Un announced his shocking “two state” narrative and intent to completely occupy South Korea if necessary. North Korea’s provocative words and actions have fostered heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, tensions which are likely to grow further still with the US-ROK joint military exercises (Mar. 4-14) and South Korean general election (Apr. 10) on the horizon.
After the Supreme People’s Assembly amends North Korea’s constitution to include a new territorial clause (expected in mid-May), there will be an risk of small disputes, such as civic groups launching anti-regime leaflets across the border or patrols near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, might spiral into armed conflict between the two Koreas.
In the midst of all this, the U.S. presidential elections are also likely to significantly impact the world order and Kim Jong Un’s own mid- to long-term policymaking. Tensions are likely to only grow greater in the run-up to the Nov. 5 presidential election.
A level-headed, long-term approach
Many other new outlets have published articles addressing the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. However, I personally have faith in South Korea’s well-developed civic consciousness and our government’s crisis management capabilities. We do not need to work ourselves up worrying about Kim Jong Un’s nuclear provocations or threats about occupying South Korea.
I feel certain in this judgment because there are simply too many factors at play. This includes the regime’s calculations about whether launching an all out war would inevitably lead to the destruction of the Kim Jong Un regime, Kim’s focus on resolving domestic issues, and the state of Chinese and Russian affairs. What we need is a proactive, preventative mindset and a warrior’s spirit of “those who seek to live shall die, those who seek to die shall live.” If South Korea is thorough in building up cooperation with the United States and our other allies, we will be able to handle whatever conflict or issues arise following the anticipated revision to North Korea’s constitution in mid-May.
What is important is what comes after that. International wars, new-age security crises, and the elections of a world hegemon like the United States are likely to cause further structural conflicts and increase political fluidity over time. In response, Kim’s foreign policies aimed at South Korea and the rest of the world will likely also grow increasingly aggressive.
The Yoon Suk Yeol government is also certain to make short-term responses to North Korea’s on and offline attacks, as well as in response to the ever-present battle of public opinion. However, the Yoon government needs to take a structural, long-term approach to anticipate and proactively prepare for events in North Korea or on the peninsula in 2025 and onwards.
What 2025 means for North Korea
There are a number of important events set to take place in North Korea in 2025. First, next year will mark the 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea (Oct. 10). Next year is also the final year of the five-year plan put in place by the Eighth Party Congress (Jan. 2021). This will be a time for the regime to evaluate its economic and military progress, as well as nuclear weapons development, in the lead up to the Ninth Party Congress slated for January 2026 and the subsequent beginning of “Phase 4” of the Kim Jong Un era:
*Phase 1 of the Kim Jong Un Era: April 2012, Kim Jong Un appointed as head of both the party and military;
Phase 2: May 2016, Seventh Party Congress;
Phase 3: January 2021, Eighth Party Congress;
Phase 4: Second half of 2025 (we will have to wait and see)
In other words, 2025 is likely to be a year in which North Korea simultaneously cements its status as a nuclear armed state while looking for ways to cast off sanctions and revitalize its economy. After the elections in November, the new U.S. administration is unlikely to give up on denuclearization, but might be more receptive to the prospect of “grand bargain” as a way to differentiate itself from the previous administration and clinch a concrete policy win.
The Trump variable
In 2025, the two most powerful influences on Korean affairs are likely to be a conclusion to the war in Ukraine (or lack thereof) and the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. When we consider the intimate relationship between Trump and Putin, as well as some of Trump’s other remarks along the lines of “If I were president.. I will end that war [in Ukraine] in one day” (May 3, 2023) and “[Kim Jong Un] likes me” (Dec. 2, 2023), it becomes clear that the critical factor will be whether or not Trump reclaims the White House.
“[Biden] can’t put two sentences together and he’s negotiating our nuclear package with Kim Jong Un, who won’t talk to him, by the way. He won’t even talk to him. North Korea won’t talk to him, but he likes me. He likes me, you know, for four years you had no trouble with North Korea… It’s good to have a good relationship with people that have nuclear weapons and lots of other things.” (Trump campaign rally in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Dec. 2, 2023)
After South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol came into office, the chemistry between the Biden and Yoon administrations could not have been better. The joint US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) is in operation, and the two countries are building off shared values and a sense of solidarity to put up a united front in responding to various recent events. Considering this smooth partnership, a second term for Biden is unlikely to cause any major issues.
However, considering Biden is now in his 80s (he was born in 1942) and that he has often been weak in his responses to economic issues and growing international conflict, there is a chance that he will fail to secure a second term. By contrast, Trump has seized on Biden’s North Korea policy as a weak link and bills himself as “the perfect person” to solve the North Korean nuclear problem on the basis of the special rapport he has built through exchanging twenty seven “love letters” with Kim Jong Un. It seems Trump has not yet given up on his dream of receiving the Nobel Prize for solving the North Korean nuclear issue.
As a result, South Korea should work with the Biden administration to solidify America’s extended deterrence policy that protects South Korea. However, we must also prepare for the possibility that Biden will be a “Carter 2.0” and fail to be re-elected, leaving us with a president bent on revenge and an all-encompassing America-first (MAGA) policy.
Kim Jong Un’s plans for diplomacy with the US
Kim Jong Un is likewise operating under a “new cold war” mindset and focusing his efforts on rejecting dialogue with the Yoon and Biden administrations while strengthening ties with China and Russia. In a situation in which Biden is re-elected and the Ukraine war drags on, Kim will continue his current tactics of foregoing dialogue with the U.S. in favor of strengthening the North Korean economy through diplomacy with the North’s traditional allies, China, and Russia.
However, Kim is also preparing for a completely different scenario in which Trump is elected and makes a grand deal with Putin to end the war in Ukraine. If the war in Ukraine comes to an end, it is obvious that Russia’s interest in and support for North Korea will diminish significantly.
In this situation, it is quite likely that Kim will make a strategic pivot and use his strengthened nuclear capabilities and close ties with Russia and China to engage in dialogue with the U.S. for arms control negotiations. Of course, given North Korea’s increasingly close relationships with Russia and China, Kim is in no particular hurry to adopt this strategy.
We can also think of another scenario in which Kim leverages advancements in North Korea’s nuclear development to undermine Biden’s position going into the November elections (thus indirectly supporting Trump). In this situation, the North would likely approach Trump about disarmament talks soon after he takes office in January 2025, allowing Kim to announce a new foreign policy direction in time for the 80th anniversary of the WPK in October and effectively kick off the “total independence” Phase 4 of his regime.
Entering into 2024, North Korea began pouring its energy into a new “20×10 regional development policy.” The North also made overtures to Japan, albeit with some conditions, hinting at the possibility of a summit meeting. These plans are also backed by Kim’s support.
*January 5, 2024: Kim Jong Un sent condolences to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida following a major earthquake that hit Japan. / February 15, 2024: Kim Yo Jong floated the possibility of a Kishida visit to North Korea or establishment of Japan-DPRK relations, with some conditions related to kidnappings of Japanese citizens and nuclear issues.
How to Respond
The forecast for the Korean Peninsula this year is a very cloudy one. There is a chance that all of this lightning and thunder could give way to a downpour at a moment’s notice. As such, this is a critical time to establish a firm, strategic security arrangement and secure South Korea’s place as the leader of unification.
To this end, strengthening the trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan early warning system and getting a joint nuclear response system firmly in place are urgent priorities. We will also need to simultaneously undertake diplomatic action on a variety of fronts, including targeting China as the weak link in the Russia-China-DPRK trilateral alliance, pressuring Russia as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council about its illegal arms trade with North Korea, cooperation with Japan to thoughtfully engage with North Korea, and working together with the U.N. and EU to improve human rights in North Korea.
Moreover, should North Korea ignore the international community’s warnings and cross the “red line” with a seventh nuclear test, we will also need to seriously consider applying maximum pressure by expelling North Korea from the United Nations.
Looking at the longer term, we will need to devise a strategy that accounts for a “post-Biden” framework. South Korea should look for ways to take Trump’s disregard for America’s allies and his demands for South Korea to increase its proportion of burden sharing and work these obstacles into a strategy for strengthening South Korea’s own national defense capabilities (e.g. conditional relocation of tactical nuclear weapons, South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons).
An estimated 90% of South Koreans believe that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, and more than 70% are in favor of South Korea possessing its own nuclear weapons. The harsh circumstances reflected by these numbers cannot be simply ignored. This message about the need for South Korean nuclear armament can be spread through the press and academic circles, but we must fully utilize behind-the-scenes diplomacy and civic channels to firmly convey our message to use as leverage in explaining the ROK government’s stance on expanding South Korea’s nuclear sovereignty.
To sum up: The path forward for addressing Kim’s irrational, anti-Korean “two state” narrative, war rhetoric, and “post-Biden” policies is to 1) maintain South Korea’s position that a “one minjok (people), one state” policy is the foundation to peaceful unification, and 2) to make clear that North Korea’s nuclear status is not tolerated now and will not be in the future either. As President Yoon emphasized in his Mar. 1 address, the path to unification lies in securing universal values of freedom and human rights under a robust national security system.
Next, in the short term, it will be important for South Korea to cooperate with Biden to further solidify the U.S.-ROK joint nuclear response system. In other words, South Korea must institutionalize the “Washington Declaration” (adopted April 2023) so that it cannot be reversed later on. In the longer-term, we must not simply play defense about a possible Trump presidency but rather use it as a turning point and opportunity to strengthen South Korea’s own nuclear capabilities. When we look to the long-term, Trump’s policies may well present us with a “window of opportunity.” The year ahead of us is important, but we must look beyond it to ten, twenty, or a hundred years into the future.
Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
