[imText1]The conflict between the US and DPRK on the North Korean nuclear issue is heading to an end. In April, when the nuclear testing was addressed as a real possibility, it is known that some interesting talks have been exchanged among the North Korean cadres. Although sources cannot be revealed, the main contents are as the following.
① “Something really good will happen in our country (North Korea) in June”
② “Nuclear testing is only a bait, in reality, it will be a ballistic missile testing.”
③ “Recently Kim Jong Il sent down an unprecedented document complimenting on the hard work of the (nuclear) development team”
The sources of the above information are not transparent and such internal rumors are unreliable.
If, however, in reality North Korea does not have capacity or desire to conduct a nuclear testing, then it cannot be anything else but North Korean strategy to create fear with false threats in order to manipulate the six party talks or negotiations with the US. We can just ignore it.
About the second information, if the missile testing is true, then North Korean “whining” will be much more elevated.
However, if the third information is true, that the small nuclear weapon production was successfully achieved, then we must understand Kim Jong Il’s persistent nuclear pursuant as his “new survival strategy.”
Kim Jong Il is Likely to Make a Subjective Decision
Which of them will be the right answer? Among the North Korea experts, the optimistic beliefs of either that there is zero possibility of nuclear testing or it is “a new bargaining strategy” are dominantly pervasive.
Such optimists argue, “If the decision is made subjectively, there is nothing North Korean can gain from the nuclear testing.” Even if North Korea had capacity to conduct a nuclear testing, they argue, “if North Korea enforces nuclear testing, it will be self destructed with the nuclear” (Ban Ki Mun, ROK minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade). From this perspective, the “something good” that can happen to North Korea in June would mean its return to the six party talks.
In reality, if we look at the matter in an objective and unemotional, we could make such kind of analysis. However, the important point here is whether Kim Jong Il is capable of making an unemotional and objective decision. I have a great doubt on Kim Jong Il’s decision making ability from what I have studied of him. It is highly likely that Kim Jong Il will be driven by the internal atmosphere, in other words North Korea’s internal political forces, and lose objectivity and make a subjective decision.
Taking such an assumption as the premise, we are more drawn to believe that the first information (something good to happen in June) refers to the nuclear testing. If North Korea conducts a nuclear testing, then the nuclear becomes something beyond negotiating tool. This is because North Korea will only conduct nuclear testing in a clear calculation that it has more to lose than to gain.
The present goal of North Korea is development of Nuclear Warheads and Missile for Launch
In that case, what would be the reason Kim Jong Il will choose nuclear testing? I think it is right to believe that their ultimate goal is development of small-scale nuclear deployment and means to launch it (modern missile) which will include Japan in the range.
Unless this goals is clearly set, nuclear testing will do no good for Kim Jong Il. Actually, the members of the six party talks who each tend to have different perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue, are leaning more towards the US side. Even South Korea who have been criticized for playing the “translator” for North Korea is also changing its positions.
The South Korean broadcasters have been reporting on North Korean nuclear problem everyday and the popular consciousness on the nuclear crisis is now increasing more than ever. According to the survey done by “Se Gye Ilbo,” more than half of the North Korea experts criticize “the failure of the appeasement policy with the North” and 70% are demand for “(South Korea’s) increase of cooperation with the members of the six party countries.”
Even China, the supporter of North Korea, officially stated (by Wang Jiarui, head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee), “If North Korea conducts nuclear testing, we will take a hard-line diplomatic means.” It seems as though Kim Jong Il is expecting the UN economic sanction.
Change from “Brinkmanship Strategy” to “Off the Brink Strategy”
If Kim Jong Il persists nuclear testing, it means North Korea successfully built “small nuclear warheads.” Development from the “self destructive” very short range nuclear weapons to nuclear warhead that can be launched to other countries (mainly Japan), there is a possibility for Kim Jong Il to come up with new survival strategies. It will overcome disadvantages of up until now, by far crossing the reline called nuclear testing, and will be to take “you die and I die, you live and I live” approach.
In other words, it will change its previous brinkmanship strategy to “off the brink strategy.” In this case, taking Japan as hostage, North Korea will come back to the six party talks as a prominent “nuclear state” and achieve “mass scale aid” through Japan-DPRK alliance and US-DPRK alliance.
In this case, it is not only Japan’s security that is taken as hostage. The East Asian economy will be held as hostage as well. The US government foresees the ROK stock market to plummet to less than half of its current price after the North’s nuclear testing. Its influence will reach to Chin and Japan as well. In that case, we can predict that each nations’ popular sentiment will be drawn to pursue “peace theory in the midst of nuclear threat.”
There are many who still do not know Kim Jong Il
Kim Dea Jung who has aggravated the nuclear crisis up to this point with his “Sunshine Policy,” still says, “The present period is a stage of exchanging adequate compensation for North Korea to dismantle the nuclear but regardless of that, there is a need of food and fertilizer aid to North Korea.” (Munhwa Ilbo, May 13, 2005) This is same as arguing we are facing a crisis today because the present to Kim Jong Il was too small.
Of course, nuclear possession is not a security assurance for the North Korean regime maintenance. We could count South Korea and Japan’s opposition and Russia’s disinterest into account. However, reactions of China and the US are unpredictable. According to situation, not only the Security Council but North Korea must be also prepared for an aggressive military response as well.
Would Kim Jong Il still choose the reckless “off the brink strategy”? Does Kim Jong Il know his destination or he will get to his destination safely?
It seems as though Kim Jong Il does not know. In the objective perspective, it is “a peak of foolishness.” Actually, it looks like the return to the six party talks is much better and security assuring decision.
However, that is merely the third person’s perspective. If Kim Jong Il believes the threat to his regime is greater inside North Korea rather than through the outside pressure, then his decision may differ.
Kim Jong Il’s indecisiveness at the crucial moments
During his visit to the related countries (of the six party talks), Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said, “There is a need to study more about why he (Kim Jong Il) is unable to make a strategic decision (about the six party talks).” That was right before the satellite pictures of North Korea’s nuclear testing preparation were caught. In the eyes of Secretary Hill, Kim Jong Il’s big nuclear fuss is nothing more than a “foolish thing to do.”
Whether nuclear test will happen or not is easy to find out with the satellite information. However, unfortunately, we are cannot find out about the basis of Kim Jong Il’s decision makings with satellites, which are more important.
I have been consistent in providing answers to what Secretary Hill said through the RENK homepage.
In other words, the answers to Hill’s statement are the conflict between the People’s Army and the Worker’s Party on the Military First politics (or three party conflict between the Military-Party-Cabinet) and the indecisiveness of Kim Jong Il who sees this political instability with his own eyes. Although unexpected, Kim Jong Il was indecisive at the crucial moments in the past too.
Kim Jong Il did not take the path of Vietnamese style liberalization and reformation after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, he could not even make the simple decision to abide by the US-DPRK Geneva Agreement in 1994. The current nuclear crisis is the third time. He did not even choose to take the “artistic path” like Israel to be recognized as a nuclear state with nuclear declaration. I wonder if he really deserved to be called a art genius.
Military Repulsion, Nuclear Abandonment Impossible
Studying various sources which RENK collected this his February, the North Korean internal politics was leaning toward returning to the six party talks. The analysis indicated possibility of North Korea moving toward closing off the decade long military first politics and rebuilding the collapsed economy.
Rodong Sinmun of March 5 articulates, “In socialism construction, the key to victory depends on the reformation of the economic guidance management. However, as have proven through the delay of the Supreme People’s Meeting, this policy was almost gone by the end of March. This was due to the foreseeable military repulsion which demands the continuance of the military first politics.
The problem lies in the “military repulsion.” That was enough to change Kim Jong Il’s decision. This means that North Korea will stick to its nuclear development.
In short, it means North Korea’s development of small nuclear warheads and “moderns intermediate range missile development.” (Lawrence Di Rita, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs) If it is to include Japan in its missile range, North Korea already has Rodong Missile and Daepo Missile. Its pursuance of developing modern missiles could only be understood as missile development for the nuclear warheads.
In fact, in the Supreme People’s Meeting which was held much later than originally scheduled, a new policy was proclaimed which was of neither enforcement of the military politics nor the economic reform.
“All the national effort is to be put into agricultural production,” was that policy. Furthermore, it said, by developing military industry to a higher lever, it “will actively stimulate economic activities and pursue practical economic cooperating activities with other countries.” Although the policy was complimented here and there as it was praised to be “the great idea of the Party,” but we are dumbfounded. It is a nonsense to talk about “economic cooperation activities with other countries” while it declares itself as a nuclear state and make a fuss about nuclear testing.
Therefore, the new policy did not aim for economic reconstruction. This must be interpreted as Kim Jong Il’s straddling between the military and the Party, in between the conflict between the military first politics and economic reform. This is Kim Jong Il’s strategy to kill two birds with one stone; while it shows off the fruit of the military first politics by nuclear testing, and make economic reform depend on the nuclear possession.
If there was anything that made such an “extraordinary” idea to be realized, it was not the economic activities, but only the “threatening activities to the foreign countries” with its nuclear development. The anachronistic agriculture-centered policy is justifiable to a certain degree if North Korea is expecting an economic sanction from the international society.
International Society Must Induce North Korea’s Internal Conflict
However, it is doubtful whether Kim Jong Il’s Straddling Strategy will be accepted by the international society. Perhaps China understood North Korea’s plan, since it is preparing to send a special envoy to Pyongyang in close days. It is said that China will drive Kim Jong Il to make a decision between “maintenance of regime through nuclear possession and maintenance of relations with China for economic reform.” (TBS, May 14).
If North Korea holds Japan as a hostage with its nuclear missiles and force the international society to choose between North Korean and Japan, the answer is too obvious. Unless Japan and South Korea are tricked again, Kim Jong Il’s stretched straddling policy will not work.
The only path that Japan and Korea, who do not possess nuclear weapons, must walk is not be intimidated by the nuclear threats but cooperate and come up with a policy to stimulate collapse of the regime by amplifying the internal conflict in North Korea of military-Party-cabinet.
