Editor’s note: Read Part 1 here.
In a speech wrapping up the review of achievements at a year-end plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that inter-Korean relations are now “the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones anymore” and ordered “preparations for a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces including nuclear forces in contingency.”
I have analyzed this “two states” narrative as a strategy and tactic designed to provide North Korea with an excuse to strengthen its nuclear arsenal and tighten control over its citizens, and to provoke conflict within South Korea through various forms of online and offline provocations and psychological warfare. Now that more than 10 days have passed since Kim made his remarks about the “two states” narrative – and about achieving unification through nuclear power – I will turn to actions the regime has taken after the remarks and their implications.
Explosive language
In public activities, including an inspection of a munitions factory earlier this year, Kim has defined South Korea as the “main enemy” and made extremely bellicose remarks. “We have reached the historical moment when we must define the Republic of Korea as the most hostile state,” he said. “I have no intention of avoiding war. In the event of war, we will mobilize all means and capabilities to completely annihilate the Republic of Korea.”
Kim’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, has also issued two statements criticizing and rudely denigrating the South Korean administrations of Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol, while also attempting to spread fear of war in South Korea to divide voters before the general election in April.
Kim said in a Jan. 7 statement that the Korean People’s Army has already released the “safety” on its triggers.
“The military gangsters should bear in mind that they can ‘die immediately and violently and [meet their end]’ if they continue to rely on the so-called principle of counteraction such as ‘prompt, strong and to the end’ that they often tout,” she added.
Show of force
For three days beginning Jan. 5, North Korean coastal artillery near the Northern Limit Line conducted live-fire drills in violation of the Agreed Framework. These provocations, which follow Kim’s declaration that inter-Korean relations are “relations between two warring states,” are deliberately designed to raise tensions and create a sense that the Yoon administration’s North Korea policy has failed.
Amid these developments, North Korean media released photographs of Kim inspecting the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile and a mobile launch pad factory on Jan. 5, accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju Ae. This media coverage reinforced to domestic and international audiences that the country is working to mass-produce and deploy strategic missiles.
But during an inspection of an ammunition factory on Jan. 8-9, Kim emphasized the “principle of prioritizing current political goals” while pointing out shortcomings in the ammunition production sector. This can be seen as an indication of problems in the production of ammunition for export to Russia.
Shoring up the home front
In a group meeting on Jan. 1 with various departments responsible for “dealing with the enemy,” Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui discussed the issue of “abolishing and liquidating bodies responsible for dealing with our enemy South Korea and changing the basic direction and principles of our struggle. Her remarks suggest that the various party organs in charge of dealing with South Korea, including the United Front Department, will be incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may now be largely responsible for relations with the South.
A Daily NK report on Jan. 9 quoted a source in North Hamgyong Province as saying that the Rason branch of the party had received and disseminated the following message from Kim Jong Un: “Considering that South Korea is an enemy state opposed to us on both the political-ideological and military levels, it would be fatal to cling to the illusion that we are homogeneous nations… All preparations should be made for the possibility that the demonstrations of the South Korean people against the U.S. and its president may suddenly escalate into an internal revolt.”
A source in North Pyongyang Province was quoted in an earlier report as saying, “North Korea has called for strengthening war preparedness because of the political tension. Civil defense drills were organized and held for about 20 days in December last year.”
Conclusions and countermeasures
North Korea’s recent moves are part of its geopolitical “crisis management” strategy of creating an external enemy to strengthen internal cohesion. The tactic is twofold: Internally, it serves as “positional warfare” that creates a pretext for suppressing the positive feelings toward South Korea that are widespread among the public, especially the youth; externally, it serves as a “battle for high ground” aimed at placing the blame for the collapse of inter-Korean relations on the hardline North Korea policies of the Yoon and Biden administrations.
In other words, we can conclude that there are two reasons for North Korea’s adoption of the “two states” narrative. The first is the North Korean leadership’s fear that the series of laws it has enacted since 2020 to stop the spread of the “Korean wave” (the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Exclusion Act, the Act to Guarantee Ideological Education for Youth, the Pyongyang Dialect Protection Act, and the Inminban (Neighborhood Watch UnitNeighborhood watch units (inminban, people's units) are Nort... More) Organization and Operation Act, the latter from January 2024) and a series of restrictions and educational measures, such as stressing the need for mothers to raise their children properly, have not been very effective. The second reason involves upcoming elections, including South Korea’s parliamentary elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November.
So how should South Korea respond to North Korea’s drastic measures? In addition to carefully preparing preventive measures and our early warning system, we should also redouble our efforts to educate North Korean society about human rights issues and the truth about the outside world to encourage change from the bottom up. This should be coupled with a national movement in South Korea to counter North Korea’s psychological warfare (convincing people of North Korea’s intentions to provoke a conflict between the two Koreas and the need for the temporary tension to be resolved to achieve real peace).
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
