During his New Year’s speech at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea held from Dec. 26-30, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un emphasized the “two states” narrative along with the legitimacy of his “strength-against-strength frontal confrontation” line.
Achievements and goals
Describing 2023 as the “year of great transition and great transformation,” North Korea emphasized the importance of enshrining Kim’s nuclear-armament policy in the constitution (in September 2023), while touting achievements beyond the party’s goals in food production, missile development, and reconnaissance satellites.
The main “struggle goals” outlined for 2024 include fighting against the Biden administration in the U.S. and the Yoon administration in South Korea, “seizing the heights” in food supply and 12 other areas, eliminating anti-socialism through stronger ideological indoctrination, and advancing nuclear capabilities by launching three more reconnaissance satellites under the key approach of “strength-against-strength frontal confrontation”.
Points to note
Notably, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations not as a national concept but as “relations between two states” (or relations between belligerents). This amounts to a sophisticated form of psychological warfare that brands South Korea as a separate, hostile, belligerent state that is not part of the same nation, with the goal of preventing resistance to the preemptive use of nuclear weapons while instilling a high level of fear and discord in South Korean society. At the same time, it preserves Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s ideal and framework of reunification through a federation of one nation in one state under two systems.
Kim’s emphasis on “preparing for a great event to oppress the entire territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces in case of emergency” can be seen in the same context and is believed to be part of the North’s strategy to gain supremacy in inter-Korean relations and in its “reunification front” against South Korea.
Another notable development was a meeting of related departments chaired by Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui on Jan. 1 to “accomplish the tasks of abolishing and liquidating the bodies responsible for dealing with our enemy South Korea and changing the basic direction and principles of our struggle.”
Conclusion
The above moves by North Korea suggest that the party leadership’s channels for negotiations with South Korea, including the United Front Department, may be transferred to the foreign ministry. As such, any conclusions reached by the ministry would be reported to Kim Jong Un after receiving approval from his sister, Kim Yo Jong, who has overall authority over relations with South Korea and other countries. Also noteworthy is the possibility that this will go beyond the mere transfer of functions from one organization to another and lead to the establishment of a supreme security body along the lines of South Korea’s National Security Council to underscore North Korea’s status as a “separate state.”
In light of all these indications, North Korea appears to view 2024 as a “stepping stone” to 2025, during which it will focus on strengthening its nuclear arsenal and strengthening the home front by increasing control over its citizens. At the same time, it is expected to employ the strategy and tactics of fomenting conflict within South Korea and strengthening its status through various online and offline provocations, including a seventh nuclear test, and promoting a coalition against the U.S.
Therefore, the Yoon administration must thoroughly prepare for the possibility that North Korea will drastically worsen inter-Korean and foreign relations. In the meantime, it should take preventive measures to ensure that the “two Koreas” doctrine officially adopted by Kim Jong Un (namely, the doctrine of the reunification of Korea by nuclear means in the event of war) cannot be used to sow division in South Korean society during the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in March, the parliamentary elections in April, the ROK-U.S. nuclear contingency drills in August and the U.S. presidential election in November.
In the long term, the Yoon administration must develop countermeasures for the possibility that North Korea will convene the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea earlier than expected in 2025, which will mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the party and the completion of its five-year plan for national defense and economic development. This could allow Pyongyang to get a head start on the U.S. after the outcome of the presidential election in November.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
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