“If the U.S. is unwilling to give up the option of using nuclear weapons against North Korea, it is necessary for us to live with a nuclear North Korea,” according to Selig Harrison.
Harrison, the Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, was speaking at a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing in Washington D.C. on Wednesday subtitled “North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go from Here?”
Amidst a tendency for politicians around the world to state that a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable, Harrison asserted a position outside the general orthodoxy, claiming, “The correct goal should be to cap the North Korean nuclear arsenal at its existing level and to move towards normalized relations as the necessary precondition for progress towards eventual denuclearization.”
In Harrison’s analysis, the current U.S. policy is unsustainable and the Obama administration is not doing enough to alter it. Deliberately decoupling the issue of the two detained U.S. journalists from that of nuclear weapons is “a very unrealistic position” which is resulting in “callous disregard for the welfare of Laura Ling and Euna Lee,” he stated. Harrison’s opinion is that sending a high level emissary to Pyongyang to negotiate their release is the best way forward, one that “would signal U.S. readiness for trade-offs that lead to a reduction of tensions.”
Congressman John Boozman was unimpressed, calling Harrison’s testimony “simplistic at best” and “unhelpful,” while Ambassador Thomas Hubbard pointed out, “Freeze, disablement, cap, it’s not really valid unless you have the kind of verification that the North Koreans are loath to provide.”
Other members and panelists looked at the issue from different angles. Republican Edward Royce focused heavily on the potential that punitive financial sanctions might have on amending North Korean behavior. In his view, “You shut down everything when you shut down the hard currency.” This is not particularly hard, he said, but the Democratic leadership is failing, or refusing, to do it. He claimed, “South Korea has given the US information on between ten and twenty North Korean bank accounts in China, one in Switzerland, and that North Korea counterfeiting has been ramped up in recent months.” The fact is, he strongly asserted, “We needed to act on these accounts yesterday.”
Later in the hearing, Royce raised this issue with Harrison, asking him, “Why not cut off access to that hard currency?” and calling it “the one thing that actually worked.” Harrison agreed that it “had important effects,” but did point out, “If we go the route you’re talking about, then (the North Koreans) are simply going to enlarge their nuclear arsenal, and that is not in our interest.”
Subcommittee Chairman Brad Sherman looked to China. He was succinct, and not positive, saying, “Until China believes that either it has to change its policy towards North Korea or risk access to the U.S. market (or at least some interruption of that access), or unless China believes that its policy is going to lead to a nuclear South Korea, a nuclear Japan, or a nuclear Taiwan; unless China has that game-changing information, they are simply not going to change their policies,” implying that China’s agreement with UN Resolution 1874 was little more than a diplomatic nicety. Furthermore, he was certain that change is not going to come from the American side, “Given the overwhelming political power of importers in this country.”
Brookings Senior Fellow Richard Bush was more positive, saying that Beijing “would not have agreed to Resolution 1874 if it intended to treat it as a dead letter.” He said that while China’s role is complex, Beijing now sees North Korea, especially a nuclear North Korea, as a serious problem for its own stability. This will bring about a change in Chinese behavior, but that the world may have to wait for the end of the succession process before witnessing any resultant improvements in North Korean behavior.
Overall, it was a valid and diverse debate. All the panelists agreed on a few things. First, that the two American journalists being held in Pyongyang should be released; second, that the North Korean nuclear game has fundamentally changed in the last year or so; and finally that wherever we go from here will unquestionably take time, patience, and wisdom.









