While the six party talks reconvene on the 18th in Beijing, there are some views suggesting that the U.S. will take a step back from the second phase of the February 13 Agreement, raising the issue of “HEU (high enriched uranium)” and “uranium enrichment.”

On the day, U.S. Assistant Secretary and head delegate to the six party talks, Christopher Hill urged the North to permanently disable Yongbyun and give a full account of its nuclear programs, which Washington has said included efforts to “enrich uranium” — another route to making the explosive core of nuclear weapons.(The Washington post)

In an interview held in Seoul on the 16th, Secretary Hill commented that the phrase “HEU” was used to indicate the manufacture of nuclear weapons whereas ‘uranium enrichment’ could mean either high or low enriched uranium and stressed the important in clarifying these terms for a complete detailed report.

At the time of North Korea’s second nuclear threat, the U.S. Assistant Secretary at the time, James Kelly visited North Korea in October 2002 and reported that there were suggestions of HEU possession as well as concentrated raw uranium and HEU that could be used for nuclear processing or nuclear weapons. As a result, the word HEU has been used as the keyword throughout the history of abolishing North Korea’s nukes.

Meanwhile, with Assistant Secretary Hill’s negating the term HEU with “uranium enrichment,” analysts speculate that concessions may be considered and an escape route opened for North Korea.

In the case the term “enriched uranium” is used, the capability of “HEU” to manufacture nuclear weapons and the prospect of researching “LEU (low enriched uranium)” is left to open. Some claim this could provide a gap for comprises between the U.S. who has shown antagonisms towards the HEU issue and North Korea who has continued to deny any such possession.

Advancements to North Korea’s HEU program are extremely secretive. Since the mid-90s, North Korea received centrifuges from Pakistan for uranium enrichment (statements by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist widely known as the found of Pakistan’s nuclear program) and was also known to have secretly received high impact aluminum tubes for the centrifugal separators.

In the past, U.S. intelligence authorities reported that North Korea had acquired centrifuges from Pakistan in 1998 and began operations in July and August 2004. What’s certain is that since around 1998, North Korea had been steadily importing high impact aluminum tubes from Pakistan needed to manufacture centrifuges.

In addition, Secretary Hill was known to have met with North Korea’s foreign minister Kim Kye Gwan on the 17th, prior to the reconvention of the six party talks to discuss issues related to the uranium enrichment program (UEP).

The proposal offered by the U.S. regarding the UEP was based on North Korea possessing centrifuges but there was no evidence for HEU. Rather, North Korea further delayed submitting information with a response that it would make claims after the U.S. provided evidence and an explanation for HEU.

Some argue that the U.S. strategically made a proposal regarding UEP to hasten a resolution to the North Korea issue after receiving bitter criticisms in regards to Iraq. It is argued that this is an attempt to minimize the lost time and a political maneuver to acheive disablement within the year.

If the U.S. continues to target the HEU issue without providing any evidence, there are concerns that this only gives North Korea an excuse to break the framework of the February 13 Agreement, let alone an inappropriate compromise to maximize political gain.