[imText1]North Korea’s 2007 would be hawkish inside and dovish outside. External and internal affairs of the country will be incongruent.

North Korean Foreign Ministry is likely to hope a diplomatic solution in the six-party talks and nuclear issue. Foreign Ministry bureaucrats would consider themselves at higher stake after the nuclear test last year. And therefore, negotiators from Pyongyang would try to be pacifist in dealing with their US counterparts.

However, inside Pyongyang, the situation seems somewhat less friendly. Decreased amount of available resources due to economic sanctions and increased corruption and disorder would pressure the Dear Leader.

Then, “analysis from North Korean perspective” is necessary to understand the country’s behavior, and in terms of perspective, it is always Kim Jong Il’s, of course.

Although it has been altered a little, North Korea is still “Suryeong-based” totalitarian state. Suryeong, which means the head in Korean, leads the party, army, government and people, while the latter do whatever the Suryeong tells them to do.

Every North Korean specialist knows about the system, but not quite well about how it works. It is impractical to view the totalitarian nation from western, rational perspective.

In such perspective, North Korea would eventually give up nuclear weapons program while retaining peaceful use of it for energy production and receiving economic aid from the rest of the six-party talks’ members. If fortunate, NK would further pursue China-like reform and open policy.

North Korean viewpoint is differed. To be accurate, it is rather Kim Jong Il’s own standpoint. North Korea cannot be run by a system but only by Kim Jong Il’s personal decision. Kim is well aware of danger of denuclearization under 9/19 Joint Communiqué and subsequent pressure to reform and open his country. Suryeong dictatorship and open society with market economy cannot cohabit with each other. .

The reason that North Korea, or Kim Jong Il, agreed on the 9/19 Joint Communiqué is the purpose of the declaration; 6 nations promised to denuclearize the “Korean Peninsula.” North Korea interpreted that as not only them giving up nuclear ambition but also removal of US troops from South Korea. Since the nuclear test, Kim’s outward demand has been changed from denuclearization of whole Korean Peninsula to become an official owner of nuclear weapon while removing US forces from the peninsula is still on his agenda.

Between KJI’s desire and reality

[imText2]If so, is it ever possible to kick the American troops out of South Korea in response to Kim’s decision to dump nuclear weapons? That is highly unlikely to happen unless both Seoul and Washington consent. Then why is KJI sticking on such unlikely scenario? Because that is Kim’s long-time desire; and desire must be treated separate from reality.

For example, Hwang Jang Yop, former International Affairs Secretary of North Korea’s KWP and highest-ranking defector from Pyongyang so far, said that Kim wanted to be the first president of reunified Korea. Everyone in South Korea would laugh at Kim Jong Il’s ambition. Whatever the reaction of South Koreans is, however, it is concrete fact that Kim Jong Il aspires to presidency of reunified Korea. So, in analyzing North Korea, we need to set rationality apart from Kim’s inner thought. And actually in North Korea, Kim himself is the only source of rationality regardless of what outsiders think.

Nonetheless, for South Koreans and westerners, it is hard to rationalize subjective desire of Kim Jong Il and forecast his next strategy. So we are inevitable to approach based on Kim Jong Il’s previous behavior, which is only possible option.

In 1994, North Korea, in Geneva Agreed Framework, promised to freeze all its nuclear activities for receiving two light-water reactors and supply of half million tons of oil per year. Since then, NK had been developing highly-enriched Uranium for military purpose, which was easier to handle than Plutonium weapons and in violation of the 1994 agreement. The covert program was caught in October 2002. So the six-party talks initiated and resulted in 9/19 Joint Communiqué. Pyongyang, however, then asked for light-water reactor and revocation of Banco Delta Asia related financial sanctions before freezing any nuclear weapons program. And then, missile launch last July and nuclear test last October.

If anyone scrutinizes North Korean nuclear crisis from early 1990s, it would be more than obvious for him/her that Kim Jong Il’s basic objective has developed to become nuclear state, rather than using nuclear warheads only as negotiation tool.

Several western analysts still conjecture that Kim Jong Il is simply betting more money by detonating his nuclear arms. Nuclear weapons are not something that Kim Jong Il can use as poker chips. There are three reasons.

Firstly, nuclear weapons provide Kim Jong Il the best security. Ironically, Saddam Hussein was doomed because he did not possess WMD, let alone nuclear weapons, against invading US forces. Secondly, giving up nuclear weapons would definitely weaken his commitment to so-called “military first policy.” North Korean armed forces will doubt Kim’s dedication if nukes are confiscated. Thirdly, only nuclear weapons can create controversy, and controversy can lead to negotiation, and negotiation could bring the regime some carrots.

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