In the two years since the Kim Jong Il regime implemented the currency redenomination, the after-effects of the measure seem to have encouraged a change in public perceptions of capital and catalyzed additional public distrust of politics and the social system.

Factors which define social status are taking on new meaning with the extra influence of money, and as time goes by this is reinforcing public distrust of the leadership and fostering an indifference to state policy.

The Kim Jong Il regime originally planned to use the currency redenomination to increase its authority by controlling prices, while also providing a justification for the third-generation succession. It was also seen as a chance for the leadership to send a warning to North Korea’s new trading middle class that loyalty to the leadership is not an optional thing.

However, the move appears to have backfired, and by bankrupting those commercial traders who now set the tone of public opinion it has generated even more widespread distrust of the regime.

▲ Money is power… The emerging ruling class

Money is becoming a more and more accurate indicator of power in North Korea. In some regions of the country currency traders are branching out into new operations, while sources contend that wealthy money changers are now more influential in society than most regional administrators.

Of course, currency traders and foreign-currency earning organizations had comparatively significant power even before the currency redenomination, but their clout paled in comparison with those from the People’s Safety Agency, National Security Agency and the State Prosecutor’s Office, the so called ‘Law workers’.

But the redenomination provided a catalyst for an accidental power grab by those traders and money changers who were holding stocks of foreign currency when the value of the domestic currency was wiped out. For people with no other way to raise enough money for payments to Kim Jong Il and the Party, traders quickly became the only recourse.

In fact, sources claim that parents without powerful connections now turn to these people for help to retrieve their children from re-education camps or detention facilities when they get into trouble with the law. This is partly why defectors put them forward as ‘the new ruling class.’ During the ‘Storm Trooper’ inspections targeting anti-socialist behavior around the border regions in August, it was commonplace for people to use such connections to avoid the crackdowns.

The influence of capital has even spread to school organizations. One source from Pyongan Province claims that while key student positions were previously the preserve of the children of cadres, more recently these positions are being taken by children of well-heeled families instead.

▲ Having an effect on cadre life, expressing discontent at the leaders

The currency revaluation has had an effect of the lifestyles of many cadres. Although indiscipline was also rife before the currency redenomination, sources say there was still a common atmosphere of respect for the prevailing legal system, such as it was. Since the currency was changed, however, more and more cadres appear happy to publicly work with traders.

One source claimed that officers from the National Security Agency are happy to turn a blind eye to families of defectors making international phone calls in return for bribes. People’s Safety Agency officers help smugglers by transporting contraband for them.

Furthermore, many members of the corrupt bureaucracy do not go to any great lengths to conceal their displeasure with official policies, and this has seen an increasing trend of many officers willfully shirking their responsibilities. For example, one Pyongyang resident said that inspectors conducting market crackdowns just tell traders selling South Korean merchandise to rip off the tag so it does not ‘stand out’, but do not bother to confiscate the merchandise or punish them.

▲ A Party and military no longer interesting to the young

The after-effects of the currency revaluation are also changing the aspirations of young people. Whereas the military-first system previously meant that the typical trajectory for upward social mobility was to go into the army and later the Party, the number of young people now hoping to go into business instead is increasing rapidly.

In the ten years it would take to join the Chosun People’s Army, graduate from a military college and become an officer, younger people are now looking to raise enough capital to get into trade or smuggling activities instead.

“Many people say it’s a world where money rules now, so what good is it being a bureaucrat or a Party member?” a source from North Hamkyung Province commented.

Dissatisfaction with the regime is thus manifesting itself as general disinterest in politics.

A source from Yangkang Province explained, “The currency revaluation was a ploy to get money off the public by using their loyalty to The General and comrade General Kim Jong Eun. People who used to think it was their duty to unconditionally follow Party orders now say that it is the fault of the regime which instituted the currency redenomination that they are living in such dire circumstances.”

The fact that many people are turning off Chosun Central TV and ignoring 3rd Broadcast cable radio seems to be further proof that public displeasure with the regime is getting more serious.