After months of silence following South Korea’s National Intelligence Service report in October 2024 about 12,000 North Korean troops being deployed to Russia, both North Korea and Russia have suddenly acknowledged this military deployment and active participation in the war against Ukraine.
The confirmation came from Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, who stated on April 26 that North Korean officers and soldiers have been fighting alongside Russian troops against Ukrainian forces. North Korean state media, including the Rodong Sinmun, Korean Central News Agency, and Korean Central Television, have all confirmed this deployment.
This article examines the key implications of this official acknowledgment, including:
- The North Korea-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
- Complications for repatriating North Korean prisoners of war
- Potential International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against Kim Jong Un
North Korea-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Russia and North Korea claim the military deployment to Ukraine is legitimate under international law, citing their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in June 2024 and ratified in December 2024.
“The sub-units of our armed forces, which participated in the operations for liberating the Kursk areas according to the order of the head of state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, fully demonstrated their high fighting spirit and military temperament,” the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea announced on April 28.
Kim Jong Un decided that the situation “conformed to the invocation of Article 4 of the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership” and “informed the Russian side” of North Korea’s military participation.
Article 4 of the treaty states: “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”
This language effectively resurrects the mutual defense provision from the 1961 North Korea-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, reestablishing their former alliance.
Despite Russia’s insistence that the treaty is defensive, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a clear violation of the U.N. Charter and constitutes a crime of aggression under ICC definitions. North Korea’s entry into the conflict to assist Russia makes it a co-belligerent and therefore an aggressor state that has committed serious violations of international law.
Complications for repatriating North Korean POWs
A captured North Korean soldier with the surname Ri has expressed his desire to be sent to South Korea rather than North Korea. The South Korean government has been consulting with Ukraine about transferring North Korean prisoners, but the official acknowledgment of troop deployment has created significant complications.
Once North Korea is recognized as a belligerent, captured soldiers become official prisoners of war. According to Article 118 of the Geneva Convention (III) on Prisoners of War (1949), “prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”
This would require Ukraine to return prisoners to North Korea after the war ends. However, forcing repatriation against prisoners’ wishes contradicts international human rights principles.
There is precedent for exceptions. The controversy over handling prisoners who refused repatriation after the Korean War led to a 1952 U.N. General Assembly resolution acknowledging this as an exceptional situation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has evolved its position, stating in a 2020 commentary that “the obligation to repatriate must be understood as subject to an exception where the prisoners face a real risk of a violation of fundamental rights by their own country.”
This suggests that an exception could be justified when North Korean prisoners refuse repatriation and desire transfer to South Korea. However, these prisoners will likely be included in prisoner exchanges at the war’s conclusion. If Russia supports North Korea’s demand for repatriation during peace negotiations, Ukraine may prioritize recovering its own captured citizens over accommodating South Korea’s wishes.
Potential ICC charges against Kim Jong Un
North Korea’s acknowledgment of its troop deployment increases the likelihood of the ICC charging Kim Jong Un as an accomplice to Vladimir Putin’s war crimes.
The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023 for alleged war crimes. When Putin visited Mongolia in September 2024, the ICC requested his arrest, though Mongolia declined, citing head-of-state immunity.
North Korean troops deployed to Russia likely have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. By joining Russia’s illegal aggression, North Korea has positioned its troops and leadership as participants in the crime of aggression. However, prosecution faces limitations: punishment for aggression is only possible if both Russia and North Korea are ICC signatories, and Russia could seek intervention through the U.N. Security Council.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimates North Korea’s military has suffered approximately 4,700 casualties in Ukraine.
The U.N. Security Council condemned North Korea’s military deployment on April 29 in its first meeting about Ukraine after the official acknowledgment.
Conclusion
While arranging for North Korean prisoners to be sent to South Korea has become more challenging, these prisoners still face significant risks of human rights violations if returned to North Korea.
South Korea needs a bipartisan diplomatic strategy to utilize exceptions in international law to facilitate bringing North Korean prisoners to the South. Regarding potential ICC charges against Kim Jong Un as Putin’s accomplice, South Korea should explore all available measures to mobilize international pressure on Russia and North Korea through diplomatic and security channels both during peace negotiations and after the war’s conclusion.
