The important things to bear in mind for any future U.S. official handed the unenviable task of negotiating with North Korea have been outlined in a new report from “Center for a New American Security” entitled, “Hard Lessons: Navigating Negotiations with the DPRK.”
In their report, the Center’s authors discuss the range of pitfalls that have regularly emerged over the past 20 years of negotiating with the Kim Jong Il regime, and suggest some ways to fix or minimize the chances of future failure at this time of what the report calls a “historic opportunity to reverse a harmful trend toward further militarization in North Korea and further isolation of the regime in Pyongyang.”
The report’s authors agree with the basic premise of President Lee Myung Bak’s so-called “Grand Bargain” settlement, a comprehensive peace and security roadmap covering the full range of issues pertaining to North Korea, from nuclear weapons and regime security, through economic instability and all the way to human rights improvements.
According the report, a comprehensive, front-loaded plan such as this would recalibrate North Korea’s strategic calculations, making it more beneficial for them to give up their nuclear programs than to keep them. This fundamental realignment of North Korean national interests is necessary, the report explains, since North Korea cannot simply be tricked into denuclearizing, it actually has to be in their fundamental interest to do so.
The front-loading of the plan, so that big things happen on both sides in the initial phases, would build confidence among the parties and provide some measure of irreversibility to the actions undertaken. As a former U.S. negotiator told the report’s authors, “so far our position has put all of the North Korean performance up front and all of our performance way at the back end. The North Koreans have noticed…… it’s not going to work.”
If North Korea refuses to accept the notion of a comprehensive settlement, which they have no viable reason to do unless they don’t intend to give up their nuclear weapons anyway, then the report suggests that the U.S. should “strongly consider walking away.”
Meanwhile, many of the other issues which the report outlines relate to trust. Noting that neither party trusts the other to be an honest negotiating partner, the report suggests the need for a lead U.S. negotiator with clout, a person whom the North Koreans see as having friends in positions of the utmost power, and the need to listen carefully to what the North Koreans want, since their desires are not always as one might expect. Additionally, the report asserts that the U.S. must ensure that any agreement not end up being derailed by congressional votes. To this end, it advocates interaction with a sufficiently strong, bipartisan congressional caucus which will be able to marshal the passage of any agreement through U.S. democratic processes, for “Americans can only retain the high ground in negotiations by vigilantly following through on any commitment made to the North.”
On the U.S. side, and also to avoid confusion, a written summary of the results of negotiations at every meeting should be insisted upon, the report claims, to ensure that the meaning of what is being discussed is handed up the chain of command in its original form. This should be done in Korean. By way of an explanation, the report quotes one high level U.S. official as saying that it is often impossible due to constraints born of age and hierarchy for a lower-ranked Korean negotiator to be completely honest with his superiors.
Naturally, the report concludes, negotiations will not be easy. Hostile negotiating partners rarely make rapid or linear progress. However, as the report states, “A nuclear North Korea is inimical to America’s interests and those of the international community. Progress or failure with North Korea will set a critical precedent for how to handle proliferation and will directly impact Washington’s approach to other countries pursuing nuclear weapons.”
Center for a New American Security is a Washington-based national security think tank founded by serving Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific and East Asian Affairs Kurt Campbell and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy in 2007.









