[imText1]The United New Democratic Party and the Grand National Party agreed not to abolish the Ministry of Unification. The agreement is clearly a simple product of compromise to ensure passage by the National Assembly, but when considering the special situation of the division of the Korean Peninsula, we think that the continued existence of the ministry, whose goal is to adopt a plan to open and reform North Korea and prepare for national reunification, is a worthwhile endeavor.
The Ministry of Unification, under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations reigned as a symbol of appeasement of North Korea. As voices demanding the revision of the Sunshine Policy rose as a result of North Korea’s nuclear experiments, the ministry remained tenacious to their “code” to continue economic support. Under the pretext of expanding North-South relations, the ministry had spent a massive amount of money for economic cooperation, humanitarian aid, talks, and the organization of information and manpower.
The ministry’s logic was based on the idea that only through unconditional giving can North-South relations be maintained. Their biggest fear was pushing too hard for opening and reform, which might bring about the collapse of the regime.
Ultimately, 10 years of Sunshine Policy have raised the citizens’ indignation of “spoonfeeding the North” and the Ministry, which had spearheaded the Sunshine Policy, became wrapped up in the criticism. Calls for the abolishment of the ministry rose immediately after the presidential election.
As long as the ministry remains, even if some of its functions are transferred to another office, the ministry should still conduct the majority of North Korea-related policies. It is not pragmatic to maintain a separate center of control for North Korea policy while maintaining the ministry, nor does such a proposal fit with the “slimming-down” theme of the new administration. However, it would be difficult for the organizational structure and manpower reared under the Sunshine Policy to be dismissed so easily.
The discussion of the boundaries of the ministry’s political powers should continue, but a restructuring that reforms the ill practices of the North Korea policy during these last 10 years is inevitable. The abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, assurance of human rights for North Korean citizens and defectors, and the threat of foreign opening should be transferred to another office, so that they can be pursued with the strength of international cooperation. The ministry, while conducting practical affairs such as North-South talks, should take a leading role to outline a plan for North Korea’s opening and reform. In other words, the duties of the Ministry of Unification should be reduced.
Overcoming 10 years of Sunshine Policy is not as easy as it sounds. As long as the ministry, which became the object of political controversy, is heading in the direction of being retained, a reasonable restructuring can begin now.










