During his speech at the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (13th Session) on Sept. 21, Kim Jong Un directly acknowledged that the two-state theory has not yet been constitutionalized.
“We will enshrine in state law that we and South Korea are clearly two heterogeneous states separated by a border that can never become one.”
This statement makes it difficult to dispute assessments that the two-state theory has not yet been codified in North Korea’s constitution. Experts who had claimed the theory was already constitutionalized now say Kim has “driven the final nail” into it—essentially admitting it hasn’t been enacted.
The media continues to focus on the fact that Kim Jong Un raised the two-state theory again, rather than on the fact that it remains unconstitutionalized. In other words, pundits keep fixating on the phrase “clearly we and South Korea are heterogeneous states separated by a border that can never become one” rather than on “will enshrine in state law.” This causes observers to overlook Kim Jong Un’s ongoing deception tactics and the lure he has revealed this time.
Kim Jong Un’s intent in emphasizing the importance of ‘state law’
In his recent speech, Kim Jong Un emphasized the importance of “state law.” This was to assert that North Korea is a nuclear-armed state and to argue against denuclearization. Kim insisted that North Korea’s status as a nuclear state is specified in state law—the constitution—making denuclearization absolutely impossible. He protested that U.S. and international demands for North Korean denuclearization are equivalent to asking him to violate state law. He then stated:
“It is sacred and absolute, unchangeable and inviolable under any circumstances, and is specified in the Republic’s supreme law.”
“We have a legal obligation to protect state law.”
Kim Jong Un heavily emphasized that North Korea’s nuclear state status has been enshrined in the constitution. By contrast, this implies that what is not state law—not enshrined in the constitution—is less absolute and remains subject to change. This helps explain why Kim Jong Un directly acknowledged that the two-state theory has not yet been constitutionalized.
‘Two-state theory’ as a changeable South Korea policy tool
This requires a new approach to Kim Jong Un’s statement: “We are clearly two heterogeneous states separated by a border that can never become one.”
Since this is not yet state law, it can be reversed at any time. Moreover, the statement “we will clearly not deal with them at all” is also North Korea’s current South Korea policy unrelated to state law, so this too can change at any time. The fact that it’s changeable allows us to assess it as South Korea deception tactics and a lure.
What about Kim Jong Un’s following statements?
“We have absolutely no intention of unifying with a country that has entrusted its politics and national defense to foreign powers.”
“Unification is absolutely unnecessary.”
Can these statements also be reversed? Probably not. While these may emerge from the two-state theory perspective, they contradict the constitutionalized state nuclear force policy.
Kim Jong Un’s unification rejection linked to ‘territorial completion’
Kim Jong Un’s following statement mixes elements of both the two-state theory and state nuclear force policy:
“Unification of two entities that are not only thoroughly heterogeneous but completely antagonistic cannot be achieved without one disappearing.”
Kim’s statement that “unification of two entities” cannot be achieved without one disappearing should be viewed from the perspective of “territorial completion”—the goal of state nuclear force policy—rather than the two-state theory. The meaning of not pursuing unification from a two-state theory perspective can be found in his remarks from Oct. 7, 2024, when he visited the National Defense University:
“Frankly, we have absolutely no intention of attacking the Republic of Korea. Even being conscious of it gives us chills, and we don’t even want to face those people. In the past, we talked a lot about liberating the South and spoke of forcible unification, but now we have no interest in this at all, and especially since declaring two states, we pay even less attention to that country.”
This represents a complete rejection of any form of unification, including “liberation of the South.” It simultaneously means no forcible unification—no territorial completion. In short, Kim is saying he will simply ignore the Republic of Korea.
However, this statement completely contradicts the “state nuclear force policy.” It directly conflicts with it. Therefore, we must recognize that Kim Jong Un’s statement in his recent Supreme People’s Assembly speech that “unification of two entities cannot be achieved without one disappearing” was made from the perspective of the state nuclear force policy being enshrined in the constitution, not the two-state theory.
‘Two-state theory’ directly conflicts with constitutionalized ‘state nuclear force policy’
In his recent speech, Kim Jong Un also mentioned “territorial completion” and connected it to the following statement:
“We have made them unable not to fear the fatal consequences that may arise in any case.”
This is a statement referencing preemptive nuclear strikes against South Korea, a core element of state nuclear force policy. Kim Jong Un called this the “second mission” in his recent speech:
“When the deterrent’s second mission is activated, South Korea, the surrounding region, and the military organizations and infrastructure of its allied countries will collapse instantly, which means annihilation.”
This statement encompasses both preemptive nuclear strikes and territorial completion. What we can understand from Kim Jong Un’s speech is that the “two-state theory” and “state nuclear force policy” conflict with each other. However, North Korea already enshrined the state nuclear force policy in its constitution in September 2023. Therefore, enshrining the two-state theory in the constitution would be problematic. Even the call to “liberate the South” is closer to “territorial completion” through forcible unification. Given these many internal and external obstacles to constitutionalizing the two-state theory, North Korea appears still unable to do so.
Kim Jong Un’s intent in revealing non-constitutionalization: A lure for South Korea
While emphasizing that North Korea’s nuclear state status has been enshrined in the constitution, Kim Jong Un intentionally revealed that the two-state theory has not yet been constitutionalized. This is a statement intended to lure South Korea. While claiming they will never deal with the South again, he cleverly dropped hints about the reasons. There were two main ones: joint ROK-U.S. military exercises and the National Security Law. He expressed great disappointment that these two things still operate even under the Lee Jae-myung government and leveled harsh criticism.
The message is: to deal with North Korea (dialogue/contact), these must be eliminated first. Coincidentally, on the same day Kim made this statement, Lee Jae-myung criticized what he called “subservient thinking,” asking whether self-reliant defense is impossible without foreign troops. This can be seen as a statement contemplating U.S. Forces Korea withdrawal, responding even more dramatically than Kim Jong Un’s demand to halt ROK-U.S. joint military exercises. The very next day, in a BBC interview, he suggested North Korea’s nuclear armament is defensive and expressed the view that Kim Jong Un will not abandon nuclear weapons. In his U.N. General Assembly speech (Sept. 23), he proposed a three-stage denuclearization theory to the international community, suggesting nuclear suspension rather than nuclear abandonment. This came as G7 foreign ministers reaffirmed the principle of complete North Korean denuclearization.
I believe that Lee has fallen into Kim Jong Un’s trap. He is probing the possibility of inter-Korean contact without immediately demanding denuclearization from North Korea. But the reality is not so simple. Kim Jong Un will shake the Lee government even more and may carry out military provocations (including trash balloons). This is because he knows this government, having already chosen “subservient diplomacy,” cannot move and will simply take it.
We must never overlook the danger of preemptive nuclear strikes against South Korea—a core element of the state nuclear force policy already enshrined in law in North Korea. When preemptive nuclear strikes have already been declared, the fixation on viewing North Korean nuclear weapons as defensive is itself extremely dangerous thinking. This is not tolerance but subservience.
