[imText1]Washington D.C. — The chance of the Kim Jong Eun regime thriving is very low for a number of reasons, with only the connivance of the existing elite offering it a chance of staying the course, a range of experts concluded in one of the key discussions at an international conference yesterday.
As part of the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet) and National Endowment for Democracy co-sponsored “North Korea’s Shifting Political Landscape” conference in Washington D.C., the event saw the participation of NKnet researcher Kim Young Hwan, Sejong Institute researcher Oh Gyeung Seob, Professor Andrei Lankov and Scott Snyder, the director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation.
Looking in detail at the prospective Kim Jong Eun regime, Kim Young Hwan began by saying he sees three key weak points in the regime, adding that in the current circumstances it will be hard for him to overcome them.
First, Kim reiterated that Kim Jong Il’s third son is extremely young, reminding the audience, “Kim Jong Il’s succession occurred with Kim in his late 30s, while core cadres were in their 50s and 60s, so there was discord with them.” Worse still, he went on, “Kim Jong Eun is now in his late 20s, but his core cadres are in their 60s and 70s. Therefore, there is a higher possibility of conflict and constraints coming up, and I have my doubts as to whether Kim Jong Eun will be able to control these well.”
Secondly, Kim pointed out that there are almost no cadres around Kim Jong Eun able to advise him on power matters. Kim explained, “Kim Jong Eun is more powerful than a crown prince in a dynasty, so he has few cadres who can step up to advise him with sincerity,” and went on, “Kim Kyung Hee is the only one, but she lacks political experience. Therefore, he is likely to be surrounded by people whose only work is to flatter him, and this situation could be poisonous for Kim, who is not accustomed to wielding power.”
Lastly, Kim noted the young man’s lack of personal relationships as another weak point, saying, “When he was young, he was educated by tutors, then studied abroad, and then reportedly at Kim Il Sung University, but it is not actually certain that he attended the university.”
Therefore, Sejong Institute researcher Oh, who analyzes scenarios for the North Korean power succession through analysis of leadership models, added to the debate the urgent need to prepare for the growing risk of both failure and success, saying, “We need to prepare measures via close examination of 3rd generation succession success and failure scenarios.”
Oh said, “In terms of preparation for success, the U.S. and South Korean administrations need to find ways by which to weaken the North Korean regime such as by disrupting the power of the elite, sapping the ability of North Korea to keep watch over the people etc.”
Turning to failure scenarios, Oh continued, “Both sides should prepare for problems caused by possible civil wars or power struggles and, additionally, later on they need to find ways to cooperate with a new North Korean regime after the power struggles have cooled down.”
Oh also moved to remind the audience, however, that the appearance of a new regime within North Korea represents a golden opportunity to lead it to denuclearize and open its economy.
However, Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University explained that the reason why he sees the possibility of such change in the North’s regime as lower than some other experts is that he believes cadres are likely to continue to cooperate with the leadership for the sake of stability and, in turn, their own security.
Offering a caveat to Professor Lankov’s comments, Kim Young Hwan added, however, “Even though North Korean cadres look like they support the regime, they tend to express anxieties about the future in private. There have been cases of cadres asking whether their security can be guaranteed after the regime changes. With such a feeble degree of loyalty, they don’t seem likely to try hard to overcome any possible power crisis.”
Meanwhile, Scott Snyder concluded with some dark comments on the hope for change in the current situation, saying that he believes the real opinion of the Obama administration is that North Korean denuclearization is impossible without fundamental changes to the regime.
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