North Korea, upon evaluating on the 16th that the BDA issue has entered the final stages, invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s working-level delegation.
Lee Jeh Sun, North Korea’s Atomic Chief General, in a draft sent to IAEA’s Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, said, “The process of transferring our funds frozen in the BDA as being in its final stages has been confirmed; thus, we are inviting the IAEA’s working-level delegation,” reported the North Korean Central News on the 16th.
Chief General Lee said, “This is related to the discussion about the steps to be taken regarding IAEA’s inspection-by-observation of the shutdown of the Yongbyun nuclear facility according to the February 13 Agreement.” However, he did not mention the invitation date of the IAEA working-level delegation.
◆ The significance of the invitation of the IAEA = At the surface level, the BDA issue which has hindered North Korea’s implementation of February 13 agreement for four months has entered the utmost stages of resolution due to cooperation of the U.S. and Russia.
North Korea requested normal international monetary transactions as well as account transfers to the third country via banks in the U.S. The U.S., through Wachovia Bank, the fourth largest asset-holder of the country’s funds, attempted mediation of North Korea’s capital, but when criticism of violation of practical laws intensified, it abandoned this method and the New York Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) happened to mediate the funds.
North Korea funds, which were transferred from Macau to the New York FRB, were immediately transferred to Russia’s Central Bank. However, due to technical problems, the remittance to Russia’s Far East Commercial Bank where North Korea’s account is set up has not been actualized yet.
The BDA issue will conclude when a related person of the North makes the final confirmation of whether or not funds have come into North Korea’s account. However, North Korea, acknowledging the voices of criticism in the international society regarding the continuance of the implementation of the February 13 agreement, invited the IAEA working-level delegation in the context where the BDA issue has not been completely resolved.
The action by North Korea to delay the implementation of the early management stages for a period as long as four months demonstrates the North’s intention to arouse the critical opinions of international society, which has already been provoked.
However, who North Korea invited this time is the working-level delegation, not the IAEA inspection delegation. They have invited the practical affairs side in order to discuss the steps regarding the activities of the IAEA inspection unit. That is, North Korea has not yet actively stepped up to carry out the February 13 agreement.
The IAEA working-level delegation will probably visit North Korea after the BDA issue is completely resolved around next week. When the delegation visits the North and agrees on the scope of activity and the authority of the IAEA inspection unit, the IAEA will dispatch the inspection unit after ratifying the discussion through convening a special council.
◆ BDA is the easiest obstacle, the real game starts now = The February 13 agreement could not be carried out for four months because of the BDA issue, but the overall forecast is that a more difficult obstacle has to be overcome in order to achieve abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
A person in authority at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the push and pull fight will continue among the related nations of the six party talks during the implementation stages of the February 13 agreement by pointing out on the 15th, “Just because the BDA issue has been resolved does not mean that the February 13th agreement will be automatically carried out and the truly difficult stage will ensue after resolution of the BDA.”
As a matter of utmost priority, the first hurdle is how the scope of activity and authority of the IAEA inspection unit will be decided on, which is vaguely written in the February 13 agreement. Most of all, whether or not the scope of activity of the IAEA is limited to the Yongbyun nuclear facility and whether the expressions “verification” and “observation” equate the “inspection” authority requested by the “IAEA Safety Standards: Management Systems” should be asked.
Further, the IAEA, according to the September 19 Joint Declaration, will quickly revert to requesting the “Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)” and “IAEA Safety Standards” of North Korea.
If North Korea does not accept such a request and significantly restrains the IAEA members’ scope of activity and authority, the situation will unfold where the light of the February 13 agreement will not be seen and the momentum completely lost.
Simultaneously, the February 13 agreement expresses in writing the initial stages that the North has to carry out: ▲ the abandonment of the Yongbyun nuclear facility, including the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility and inviting IAEA inspector ▲ the discussion on the inventory of all nuclear programs, including plutonium, which is extracted as fuel rods after use.
