All eyes have been on this week’s shock currency revaluation and replacement in North Korea, and a number of experts have been explaining why the reasons are underhand and the results are not likely to be pretty.
As Marcus Noland, the deputy director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, points out in his piece for today’s Wall Street Journal, currency reform is not a bad thing in and of itself. He looks to Ghana and Turkey as examples of countries which have succeeded in drawing a line under poor economic policies of the past by issuing new currency, “perhaps at approximate parity to major currencies such as the dollar or the euro to make it easier for citizens to hold their government accountable for macroeconomic performance.”
As a result, such countries have been able to bring hyperinflation under control and reestablish a measure of faith in domestic currency.
And, indeed, North Korea is clearly suffering from high levels of inflation, for as Dong Yong Seung of the Samsung Research Institute notes in The New York Times on the 1st, “With the government stores unable to provide enough supplies, unofficial markets have fueled inflation.”
However, Noland and The Daily NK are not alone in believing that North Korea’s measures are not just about inflationary control. As The Financial Times put it, “North Korea has launched a bold strike against inflation and those parts of the black economy it does not control,” with the latter being at least as important as the former.
The fact, as Korea researcher and director of the Cranfield Institute Hazel Smith writes in The Independent, is that since the appearance of the jangmadang in North Korea, “The state has never recovered its ability to be a provider of first resort. Its battle to control and regulate the non-official market has been utterly unsuccessful.”
What experts agree is happening now is that the state is trying to claw back control, and in addition claw back some of the money that has accumulated in the hands of persons not in the direct employ of the state, persons with less incentive to stay loyal to Kim Jong Il.
To this end, the government is limiting the amount of currency which can be exchanged. This, as Noland points out, “renders excess holdings worthless, and has set off the frenzy this week to get out of old won and into anything else—dollars, Chinese Yuan, physical goods—that will maintain value.”
By allowing only a limited sum to be exchanged, North Korea may be hoping to not only take money from private traders, the primary objective, but also to keep it. According to The Financial Times, any amounts of money above the permitted limit can be deposited while an investigation into its providence is undertaken, but the honesty of any such investigation is questionable, to say the least.
“Many North Koreans will think they are not likely to see that money again,” one diplomat is quoted in the Financial Times piece as saying.
This would not be without precedent, for as The Daily NK reported yesterday, during the 1992 currency reforms citizens were permitted to deposit 20,000 won in banks, but subsequently allowed to withdraw only 4,000 as the rest went to the government in the wake of banks’ later claimed “insolvency.”
Last but not least, writing on the blog of the American Enterprise Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt notes, “The timing of this “currency reform” should not go unmentioned: it has taken place on the eve of what is to be the Obama administration’s first high-level mission to Pyongyang for bilateral talks. North Korea’s rulers have just signaled that their economy is caught in the grip of an unusually severe economic crisis. Look for a big payout from Uncle Sam to figure prominently on their agenda in the upcoming meetings.”
Regardless, as Hazel Smith asserts, the present currency exchange is a “disaster;” people will not be able to spend their savings in the jangmadang, and will be unwilling “to expose private savings to scrutiny at the state-controlled banks where they are supposed to exchange their money.” Thus, those without foreign currency or other assets will find themselves back at the bottom of the economic ladder, a position they not long ago vacated and a dangerous place to be after this year’s poor harvest.
However, Smith wonders whether the government may not get more than it has bargained for. “Whatever the economic impact of this action, the political consequences may be greater still,” she notes in conclusion.









