Expanding on Dr. Chan Young Bang’s recent analysis of strategic scenarios – particularly the “wedge scenario,” in which the United States and China exploit alliance asymmetries in their struggle for hegemony on the Korean Peninsula – this article explores how China could gain a decisive advantage by employing a wedge strategy to exploit rifts within the U.S.-led trilateral alliance, and by courting traditional U.S. partners such as South Korea.
A wedging strategy is a form of geopolitical maneuvering in which a major power seeks to weaken the cohesion of its rival’s alliances by pulling one partner away or creating friction within the group. This can be done through various means – either by offering inducements or applying pressure. Reward-based wedging uses incentives such as economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, or cultural exchange to appeal to the target state’s interests and encourage more independent decision-making. Coercive wedging, by contrast, relies on punitive tools like economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, or military threats to pressure the target into distancing itself from its allies. Often, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. When a power holds strong leverage over the target—such as trade dependence or strategic location—it may combine both strategies, offering benefits while quietly signaling costs for remaining too close to the rival alliance. The goal is not necessarily to break alliances outright, but to encourage the target to adopt a more neutral and balanced position, reducing its alignment with the rival and increasing its openness to engagement.
If China doubles down on its alliance with North Korea in opposition to the U.S., this will almost certainly push South Korea further into the U.S. camp, reinforcing the existing U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral alliance. This would strengthen Washington’s containment strategy, increasing defense cooperation among the three allies, including more frequent joint military exercises, tighter security coordination, and possibly even discussions about nuclear sharing arrangements or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the region. In the long term, this path could result in an even more polarized Northeast Asia, with hardened blocs and heightened risks of miscalculation.
Alternatively, China could recognize that the DPRK’s belligerence and nuclear ambitions are undermining its broader strategic goals, namely, preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula and fostering a regional environment conducive to its long-term goal of reunifying with Taiwan. From this perspective, Beijing might pursue a wedge strategy, aimed at creating a rift between South Korea and its partners – the U.S. and Japan – by courting closer ties with Seoul.
With President Lee’s inauguration, there is now a more conducive environment for greater alignment of foreign policy objectives between South Korea and China. China welcomes this shift as it aligns with its own goals: a) ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, b) weakening the cohesion of the U.S.-led anti-China alliance, and c) achieving unification with Taiwan through the “one country, two systems” model.
In contrast, the strategic objectives of the U.S. appear less synchronized with Seoul’s new approach. The U.S. would like South Korea to take a more active stance in joining its China containment efforts, economically and politically. For instance, recognizing the U.S.-RoK-Japan alliance as a “one theater” military alliance, which entails treating the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Korean Peninsula equally. With Seoul’s new administration seeking greater strategic autonomy, China has a window of opportunity to counterbalance U.S. influence and deepen regional ties by leveraging existing mechanisms and offering new incentives:
- Supporting South Korea’s independent foreign policy. China’s reward-based wedge strategy may build upon supporting South Korea’s independent agency. President Lee is not interested in increasing military cost burdens, such as increased deployment of U.S. strategic assets in the region. China calls for limiting the scale and frequency of joint military exercises with the United States and refraining from militarization of the region, and South Korea under new leadership is likely to share this objective.
- Improving inter-Korean relations. China and South Korea share a common interest in promoting peace, stability, and joint economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. By working together to offer coordinated, sanctions-compliant economic assistance to North Korea, they can play a constructive role in shaping a more stable regional environment.
- Advancing trilateral economic cooperation. During the 9th China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit held in Seoul in May 2024, the three nations agreed to institutionalize regular consultations and identified six priority areas for cooperation, including economic and trade relations. They emphasized the importance of accelerating negotiations for a trilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and enhancing supply chain connectivity. China is offering economic incentives and market access through this platform, while the Trump administration has imposed tariffs on South Korea and Japan.
- Increasing soft power linkages with South Korea. To strengthen ties and counterbalance U.S. influence, Beijing has expanded cultural and people-to-people exchanges with Seoul. A key step was China’s unilateral decision to grant visa-free entry to South Korean citizens from November 2024 to December 2025, aimed at boosting tourism, business, and cultural visits. In a reciprocal gesture, South Korea plans to allow visa-free entry for Chinese group tourists starting in the third quarter of 2025.
- Managing strategic ambiguity in Taiwan. China’s wedge strategy also leverages South Korea’s cautious stance on the Taiwan issue under President Lee Jae-myung. During his campaign, Lee emphasized that Taiwan is a matter between China and Taiwan, asserting that South Korea should keep its distance from a China-Taiwan contingency to maintain amicable relations with both sides.
In sum, China’s reward-based wedge strategy offers a plausible path to recalibrate regional alignments in its favor – if it can skillfully exploit alliance frictions and capitalize on South Korea’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. While the current approach emphasizes inducements, Beijing can always signal the possibility of coercive measures, such as economic retaliation or diplomatic downgrading, to reinforce its message. Whether this approach succeeds will hinge on China’s ability to offer incentives more attractive than the security guarantees Washington provides.
