The United States of America needs to state categorically that it will not use nuclear weapons in any conflict with North Korea if it wants to bring about both the denuclearization of the North and President Barack Obama’s stated aim; the “Global Abolition” of nuclear weapons, according to the Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, Peter Hayes, in an essay entitled “Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea.”

Hayes’ essay explains how North Korea has managed to break out of the global non-proliferation structure set up after China tested its own nuclear bomb on October 16th, 1964. As a result of so doing, Hayes believes, Pyongyang has proven to any would-be nuclear weapons state that the U.S. has no strength to stop them joining the nuclear club, and that any apparent restraints are mere paper tigers.

Furthermore, continued reliance on “Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END)” as the U.S.’ means of containing North Korea is apt to legitimize North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the eyes of third parties, Hayes believes.

As it is put in the essay, “U.S. nuclear hegemony based on END in East Asia has begun to unravel due to the havoc wrought by the North Korean nuclear breakout on the NPT-IAEA (Non-Proliferation Treaty-International Atomic Energy Agency) system as a whole, by its rejection of the authority of the UN Security Council as enforcer of the NPT-IAEA system, as a spoiler state for cooperative security institution building in the region, and by its direct challenge to U.S. hegemony in its alliance relationships.”

These days, as Hayes also points out, President Obama makes much of his ambition for the global abolition of nuclear weapons. The real world situation, on the other hand, is one where the U.S. has reflexively reverted to END in its alliances with Japan and South Korea, a situation which neither alliance partner has seriously considered disputing, and indeed for the most part both encourage wholeheartedly.

Therefore, Hayes asserts, “I propose that security analysts and leaders-especially in South Korea and Japan-revisit the relative risk-benefits of continuing to rely on extended nuclear deterrence. They should compare END strategies with the alternative strategy based fully on non-nuclear military power. The latter would include a declaratory posture that specifically excludes nuclear threat as a tool of deterrence or, after a deterrence failure (that is, DPRK attack or US pre-emption thereof), of compellence.”

The reasons for an American move to conventional deterrence in East Asia are; that it removes any legitimacy behind North Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal; that in the case of first-use by North Korea “it is highly likely that all the nuclear weapons states would stand behind the attacked party to hold the aggressor to account, and conventional force would suffice for this purpose;” that “because conventional force takes more time to mobilize and deliver, it provides a built-in escalation brake that would enable the United States to conduct forensic analysis, intelligence operations,” with the absolute opposite being true in the case of nuclear war; and that, finally, not to mention practically, the U.S. has based its plans for victory in a war with North Korea on conventional means since at least 1992 anyway, and arguably since long before that.

To this collection of positives, Hayes believes, one can add a far greater chance that North Korea will denuclearize following such a move by the U.S.

Naturally, however, Hayes sees problems. The political leadership in Seoul is unlikely to follow this path, given its leanings, while both South Korea and Japan have an addiction to the U.S. nuclear umbrella that will be hard to break. Furthermore, most of the high level political and military leaders in the U.S. are firmly wedded to the status quo, and seem keen to contain North Korea with nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, presumably on the basis that, like the Soviet Union before it, they think North Korea will eventually collapse all by itself.

Nevertheless, in conclusion Hayes calls for a “detailed examination of such a shift to purely conventional deterrence in the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances,” because, “Until this investigation and subsequent debate takes place, in the region and in the United States, many of the key tradeoffs will remain undefined and key policy issues unresolved, left to erupt in the political and military ambushes that characterize security affairs in this region.”

Chris Green, Leiden University
Christopher Green is a researcher in Korean Studies based at Leiden University in the Netherlands. Chris has published widely on North Korean political messaging strategies, contemporary South Korean broadcast media, and the socio-politics of Korean peninsula migration. He is the former Manager of International Affairs for Daily NK. His X handle is: @Dest_Pyongyang.