North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivered a policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on Sept. 21, right after strengthening his international support with his multilateral diplomacy debut at China’s Victory Day celebrations on Sept. 3. If images of Kim stepping off the train in Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, standing atop the viewing platform at Tiananmen Square alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, and displaying his global leadership through summit meetings amounted to a dramatic “visual show,” his policy speech was a vivid “vocal message.”
In the speech, Kim outlined results in various sectors, including the five-year plan for developing basic industries, improving people’s lives and strengthening defense, as well as policy directions. He particularly emphasized the 80th anniversary of the ruling party’s foundation in October and the Ninth Party Congress set for around the new year.
However, the most important aspect was Kim’s documented response to calls by U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to return to the negotiating table — namely, his refusal to abandon either his “two hostile states” doctrine or his nuclear weapons.
First, he justified his policy to bolster his nuclear arsenal based on the two hostile states doctrine, saying he would never waver. This represents a strategic choice to achieve absolute dominance in potential negotiations with the United States by developing nuclear capabilities based on direct and indirect support from China and Russia, which he strengthened by sending North Korean troops to the Russia-Ukraine war and participating in China’s Victory Day celebrations.
Second, to realize this hardline strategy, Kim emphasized his close personal relationship with Trump while making clear there would be no more “denuclearization” negotiations and drawing a line in the sand — he said the only solution was for Trump to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state and participate in disarmament talks. We could sense Kim’s calculations when he emphasized in his policy speech that “time was on North Korea’s side.”
Psychological warfare against S. Korea
Third, Kim brought more into the open his cognitive warfare against South Korea aimed at bringing the current South Korean government to heel, generating tensions within South Korean society and igniting anti-Americanism by continuing to ignore the Lee Jae Myung government’s preemptive olive branches toward Pyongyang and its three-stage plan to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue (freeze, reduction, denuclearization) while demanding foundational changes in South Korea, including constitutional revisions, scrapping the National Security Law and suspending combined military exercises with the United States. Kim’s remarks about time being on North Korea’s side, about how there would be no reunification, and about the so-called second mission of nuclear weapons (moving from defensive to offensive) could be seen as hardline rhetoric to support his “two hostile states” doctrine and his refusal to abandon nuclear weapons.
In his speech, Kim justified his nuclear policy based on the “two hostile states” doctrine while demanding that North Koreans endure more austerity. To Trump and Lee, he sent this ultimatum — “Time is on my side. Don’t hope for me to change. You must change. No, you must completely surrender.”
This could be seen as an expression of his confidence that he can lead North Korea with a new blueprint, rather than simply muddling through, having succeeded in getting Russia and then China on his side. Kim will likely focus on advancing his nuclear capabilities and energizing his economy while accelerating legal, systemic and propaganda efforts to solidify his “two hostile states” doctrine, previously pursued cautiously.
The Ninth Party Congress, scheduled around the New Year, is likely to provide key momentum for this. Regarding stipulating the “two hostile states” doctrine in North Korea’s socialist constitution, I predict that following the country’s presumed addition of articles defining its territory behind closed doors last October, the authorities will use Kim’s latest speech to move beyond their cautious approach toward broad efforts to indoctrinate the public ideologically while launching diplomatic offensives abroad. Finally, during the Ninth Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting set immediately after, they will stipulate the doctrine in the ruling party rules and national constitution and make those changes public.
Through this long game, as well as his precision tactics and strategy, Kim is taking the lead. Perhaps he is already looking toward the next five years (2026 to 2030). He is likely staring intently at two politicians for whom elections are everything — Lee Jae Myung, who faces local elections in June 2026, and Donald Trump, who faces midterm elections in November 2026. We must confront reality. Kim could take the shirts right off our backs right now. If we too narrowly interpret Kim’s words, or if divisions in public opinion or tensions with the United States are exposed, the only winner will be dictator Kim Jong Un. We must think and act like a free South Korea.
