◆ A limit to monitoring of aid to North Korea
The Ministry of Unification, until recently, has explained that it has faithfully monitored rice loans to the North in various ways. Every time that rice loans of 100,000 tons has been provided, four to five regions in the North have been monitored and after agreement with the North, on-site distributions were confirmed in years 2000 and 2002, 12 times in 2003, 10 times in 2004, and 20 times in 2005.
However, verifying 10,000 trucks carrying 10 tons of food each in merely 3~4 distribution offices looks useless, so the criticism has been made that the monitoring is conducted in formality. Criticisms include the fact that there is a lack of monitoring personnel and only the places previously agreed on with the North are visited.
Such criticisms have been suggested not only by domestic nongovernmental organizations, but also from international aid organization. Paul Risley, a World Food Programme (WFP) spokesperson pointed out early in the year that South Korea was providing a massive amount of rice to North Korea, so there was a need to devise a more detailed plan regarding to whom and to which regions it was providing rice, how much rice was being sent, and how observations and inspections were being carried out.
South Korea’s food aid to the North is in the form of loans, so the view has also been proposed that there can only be a limit to the monitoring. Stephan Haggard, a Professor at the University of California, San Diego, who wrote a report on the famine in North Korea, stated that “because the aids are sent as in a form of loan, the [SK government’s] right for monitoring is also limited. Of course, that does not mean that there is no monitoring. A loan form aid can create a politically friendly environment but it becomes an obstacle for the effect of humanitarian aid” through an interview with the Daily NK in September, 2005.
The WFP has been sending permanent personnel to Pyongyang under the principle of “No Access, No Food.” They have conducted high-degree monitoring by verifying the provision situation in 213 counties over a series of 450 inspections per month and holding random on-site inspections in 70-some places, but was evacuated after frictions with the North Korean authorities.
However, a special auditing report on the WFP submitted by an outside organization at the United Nations’ request revealed many flaws in the WFP monitoring system in North Korea.
The report expressed concerns regarding the WFP’s food distribution inspection capacities, such as the need to report a priori on-site inspections to the North Korean authorities and interviews that have to be conducted via translation in the presence of on-site guards even when inspections are permitted.
Further, even if the monitoring team inspects the distribution site with their own eyes, food aid is not fully distributed to the citizens. According to defectors, the North Korean authorities not only instructs the citizens on how to respond to the questions of aid organization personnel in advance, they pretend to provide rations, but recall them afterwards.
Among 250 respondents who responded to the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea’s survey regarding on-site inspections of South Korean or international organizations, 7.2% (18 people) replied that they did not actually receive rice, but replied that they had, at the request of the authorities. For instance, they had received instructions such as “Tell the UN inspection team that you had received 2kg of rice.”
◆ Even if food aid is distributed, there are regional and class-level differences
Even if food aid from international society is distributed to the citizens, there are significant differences in amount between the provinces and Pyongyang and by the different classes.
According to the Ministry of Unification documents from 2005, 21.21% of South Korean food aid went to Pyongyang and 16.72% went to South Pyongan Province, which includes Nampo which is directly under the control of the government. On the other hand, lesser amounts were distributed to Yangkang Province (4.57%) and Kangwon Province (5.76%), where food is relatively scarce.
“Good Friends,” a North Korean aid organization, maintained that the first priority in aid goes to civilians living around Pyongyang and the each level of the Party Committee members and the Party organizations in Pyongyang. The next in terms of priorities are related members of the army including the military-related workers, special-grade enterprise (large enterprise) personnel, then average civilians.
“Good Friends ” identified the 1st-priority ration recipients as 1,000,000 (4% of the population), the 2nd-priority recipients as approximately 1,500,000 (6% of the population) and the 3rd priority recipients to be approximately 4,000,000 (20% of the population). The civilians who fall into the 4th-category of priority are approximately 6,000,000 (30% of the population) and approximately 8,000,000 people (40%) of the agricultural class who are not included in the provision system.
However, citizens who are getting by entirely on provisions nowadays are virtually nonexistent, so the differences in the ration amount do not reflect the differences between the rich and the poor. Also, while receiving rations allows individuals to save money on buying food, they also have to report to work, which prevents them from selling in the jangmadang. The toughening in market regulations by the authorities has exacerbated this phenomenon, preventing citizens from selling in the jangmadang, which is their main lifeline. The ironic result is that rations do not always bring benefit to the citizens.
