Deliver Humanitarian Aid Directly to the Starving Affected Areas

[imText1]Every year when spring arrives, North Korea faces yet another food crisis. 10 years after the “march of suffering,” North Korea has still made little change.

The greatest change that has occurred is by the North Korean people. The most of North Koreans have surpassed the ‘march of suffering’ and have survived by relying on themselves

In comparison to last year, the Korea Rural Development Administration (RDA) estimated that North Korea had experienced a loss of 1.8% (60 thousands tons) in agricultural production at 4.48 million tons of cereal. The World Food Program (WFP) also predicted similar figures at 4.3 million tons.

On the other hand, a national North Korea aid organization Good Friends reported that only 2.8 million tons of agricultural production had been made and that if any less than 1.5 million tons of food aid was supported, North Korea would be faced with another severe food crisis.

In the 90’s foreign aid could block mass starvation

During the “march of suffering” that began in the mid-90’s, food distributions were suddenly terminated. Nonetheless, people went on working, starving, believing that food distributions would begin once again.

However, one month passed then two, and still the distributions did not resume. In the end, the number of deaths from starvation began to arise. Yet, North Korean authorities did not respond with any countermeasures. As a result, in 3~4 years, 3mn North Korean citizens died of starvation.

Nonetheless, the tragic mass starvation that occurred at the time could have been stooped if it weren’t for the irresponsible acts of North Korean authorities. We can view this by analyzing the figures denoting the amount of aid supplied from 1995~1999.

According to the table above, South Korea and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) aided North Korea with 2mn tons of food annually from 1995~1999.

If we consider that only 10,000 tons of food is needed to provide the whole of North Korea a day, then there would be no reason for a shortage in food distributions with a total of 3.7mn tons of food aid being supplied. According to the table above, annual aid provided to North Korea was 3.55mn tons at the minimum and 4.45mn tons maximum. This equates on average at 4.09mn tons of supplies.

However, during this period 3mn people died of starvation and 30mn people defected from North Korea. Contrary, there has never been a time where so much foreign aid was supplied to North Korea. Why then at a time where greatest aid was given to North Korea, was there the greatest number of deaths?

One of the essential reasons behind this occurrence was the fact that foreign aid never reached the provinces of North Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jagang where food was most needed. If food aid had been distributed to the areas most dire of starvation, then at the least, this incident would not have occurred.

At the time, most of the aid was distributed preferentially to soldiers, authorities and powerful ministers in Pyongyang. On the whole, aid to North Korea had been sent via ship through Nampo, Haeju and Wonsan harbor, then supplied to Pyongyang and South Pyongan province.

During the 90’s, transportation of cargo was practically immobilized due to the shortage of electricity and lack of fuel which ultimately led to the suspension of locomotives. On the whole, goods are transported via railroad, however, in the 90’s, both passenger and freight trains had come to a halt.

Basically, it takes about a fortnight to travel return, from Wonsan, Kangwon province to Najin, North Hamkyung on train 21. The Pyongyang-Tumen River train which departs from Pyongyang to Sunbong, North Hamkyung on train 1, also takes more than 10 days travel return.

Back then, it took twice as long to for a freight train to reach its destination in comparison to a passenger train. 10,000 tons of foreign aid that arrived at Wonsan harbor took 2~3 months to transport from North Hamkyung to Chongjin. In other words, it would take more than 2 years to distribute 100,000 tons of food to Wonsan in Kangwon Province to Chongjin in North Hamkyung province. Hence, it is pointless to rely on railroad to distribute goods.

Losses incurred while transporting aid

Further, 30~40% of goods go missing while being transported. Every time a cargo train stops, guards responsible for the goods sell rice to traders at wholesale prices so they can use the profits to live. Also, street kids and thieves often steal the goods so that the intial 1,000 ton of rice is often depleted to 600~700 tons upon arriving at its destination.

The problem is that North Korean authorities well aware of this fact that are unwilling to modify the routes or assert change. Ultimately, foreign aid is distributed throughout the regions of Pyongan province where the situation of food is relatively good in comparison to the rest of North Korea.

As rice only lands in the hands of people living in Pyongyang and Pyonan where influential ministers and Kim Jong Il’s elite reside, it can only be analyzed that this situation is occurring under specific motives. In the end, the majority of deaths occurred in Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jagang, and the situation has remained the same until today.

Following the missile launch and nuclear experiment, last year South Korea and the international community suspended food aid to North Korea, and in Feb 13th, the third phase of 5th round 6 Party talks ended with the South Korean government confirming that food aid would resume.

Undoubtedly international food aid is important but unless rice is distributed to the areas in most need, a similar situation to the 90’s will occur once again.

More importantly and urgently, aid must be delivered directly to the provinces of Yangkang, Hamkyung and Jangang. Thinking that North Korean authorities will wisely distribute food aid throughout the country is merely a South Korean fallacy.