[imText1]Washington D.C. — If North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan, then it should be regarded as an “act of war”, according to a leading overseas Korea expert. If it is not so-defined, the risk of even more damaging acts emanating from Pyongyang will only grow.
Jack Pritchard, President of the Korea Economic Institute, was speaking at a forum on Thursday in Washington D.C. The event was hosted by the Korea Economic Institute to explore the implications and responses required should North Korea be to blame for the sinking of the Cheonan last month.
Mike Finnegan of the National Bureau of Asian Research speculated about a range of possible motivations behind the North Korean attack. He posited that the attack might have resulted from an effort to deflect attention from domestic problems, an attempt to ‘even the score’ for last November’s naval skirmish, the possible testing of the new General Reconnaissance Bureau, another attempt to draw attention from the international community or a combination of a number of factors.
Either way, Pritchard added that North Korea probably calculated there would be no consequence for the attack, having learnt from its previous unpunished nuclear proliferation with Syria in 2007. As such, he speculated that Pyongyang made the calculation that there would not be “a military option, and whatever does come their way, they can handle.”
Panelist Michael O’Hanlan of the Brookings Institute agreed, suggesting that North Korea correctly assumed that the attack would have little consequence, with the military response being “quickly jettisoned” and the prospect of any further sanctions being only “token, symbolic, or relatively minor”. As such, he recommended that it was time now to look beyond these two ideas and consider the idea of seeking reparations from North Korea.
He explained, “One response is a simple decision by the international community to set a price of reparations and impose that on the economic interactions we have with North Korea…or impose trade restrictions with the financial impact that we had calculated was appropriate to the offense.’
Admitting that the proposal would not go down well with North Korea, O’Hanlan pointed to the precedent of the compensation paid by Libya in response to the Lockerbie bombing in 1989, noting though that similar reparations would be inappropriate in the North Korean context.
O’Hanlan noted that for reparations to work in this way Chinese support would be essential – otherwise the economic pain intended could be mitigated by increased trade with Beijing. He thus appealed to the Chinese, stating, “If China is concerned about deescalating the problem, the best thing they can do is help us enforce a proportionate response. The North Koreans will be tempted to take reprisal steps of their own north of the DMZ. They will feel more confident in doing that if they think that the Chinese will support them. If we can get everyone to agree that North Korea must be punished, then I would hope the Chinese would see this as the most stabilizing way out of this. China should recognize that the U.S. and ROK will have to do something. Trying to talk us out of it is not a viable approach.”
Michael Finnegan instead advocated a military response, although “not military action against North Korea per se.” He recommended South Korea show resolve by accelerating its 2020 defense reform plans and by investing in new capabilities such as missiles and missile defense. He stated that these actions should be explained as being direct consequences of the attack.
Offering a different perspective, Jack Pritchard said the estimated $1.6 billion of inter-Korean commercial trade must now be used as leverage against North Korea.
He noted, “If there are not consequences to lower this in some meaningful way… then what you’ve done is go back on a business-as-usual relationship with North Korea for commercial and economic activities.”
Citing the fact that Seoul will already be assessing options to respond to the Mount Kumgang freeze, he suggested that one reaction could be a reduction in payments for the Kaesong industrial complex. Accepting that these actions could hurt South Korea economically more than North Korea, he nonetheless advocated their pursuit due to the far larger negative impact on the North overall.
He then added that a no submarine zone could also be devised, extending from the Northern Limit Line on both sides – provided of course the U.S and South Korea were prepared to enforce it.
Moderator Glenn Kessler concluded the event by dwelling momentarily on the Obama administration’s North Korea policy since it took office, noting in effect that it was the equivalent of waiting until “the North Koreans come back crawling and begin to engage.” He added, “You could raise a question as to whether this latest incident demonstrates that you ignore North Korea at your peril. You actually have to have a proactive policy of some sort that deals with all the questions that the North Korean government raises month by month by its actions. I find it hard to see what the [current] policy is except that we’re waiting for them, and maybe this was North Korea’s answer.”
