Will South Korea Pay the Most for North Korea’s Energy?

[imText1]The most significant part of the fifth round of six-party talks, 5 megawatt Yongbyon nuclear reactor, is agreed to be “shutdown.”

U.S. chief delegate Christopher Hill said on Sunday that both the U.S. and North Korea agreed to use the term “shutdown” instead of “freeze.”

Washington’s insistence upon shutting down nuclear facilities during the first phase of the denuclearization process seemed to have originated by the failed 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework.

In the Framework, North Korea promised to “freeze” its nuclear reactor and related facilities that could produce plutonium and eventually dismantle them, allowing the Pyongyang regime to restart the nuke program anytime before final shutdown.

In October 2002, when US delegate James Kelly visited Pyongyang and declared the North “admitted highly-enriched uranium program,” which resulted in terminating US fuel aid to the country. North Korea reacted with an announcement of revocation to freeze its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and resumed its nuclear weapons program in mid-2003.

Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that North Korea accepted without deliberation. Some analysts interpret NK’s docility as a reluctant strategic choice to receive energy reward, critical to its struggling economy.

On energy aid, the Asahi Shimbun of Japan reported North Korea’s demand of 2 million KW worth energy in return for shutting down the Yongbyun facilities. 2 million KW of energy is equivalent to 2 million ton of heavy oil; in the 1994 agreement, the US promised half a million tons of heavy oil per year as compensation.

South Korean delegate Chun Yong Woo denied the Japanese newspaper’s report. “Although North Korea has been asking for 2 million KW worth of energy for the last thirteen years, this is the first time that they don’t do so.”

A diplomatic source in Beijing said that North Korea was asking for a “huge amount” of energy as reward for following the scheduled deadline of the first phase of denuclearization (60 days).

Meanwhile, despite the South Korean government’s denial, speculation regarding the huge burden in energy aid by South Korea is rising. If this is what is to happen next, the South Korean public opinion might react negatively.

Also, it is argued that for North Korea, the Yongbyon reactor has already produced 5 to 10 nuclear warheads and the country has nothing to lose by shutting down the facilities.

Finally, even if some form of agreement is reached this time, issues like building light water reactors, financial sanctions, previously built nukes and the highly enriched uranium programs still remain to be solved.