On the 15th of August, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol made a bold and audacious proposal to exchange economic assistance with North Korea in return for the renunciation of their nuclear weapon program. The step-by-step approach was fiercely rejected by the DPRK. Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister, slammed Seoul’s offer, calling it the “height of absurdity” and stating that “no-one barters their destiny for a corn cake”.
Many experts on North Korean issues expressed that President Yoon’s proposal would not be accepted by Pyongyang and have explained why it would be rejected outright. One representative expert is Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, who made his case in an article titled “Why North Korea might reject Yoon Suk-Yeol’s Audacious Initiative” published in Forbes on August 17.
According to Snyder there are three primary justifications for the DPRK’s rejection of Yoon’s bold initiative. Firstly, after the failure of summit meetings with President Trump in 2018, Kim Jong Un shifted from Byungjin, a policy of building simultaneous military and economic development, to a new approach prioritizing military force as a primary means of preserving the integrity of the DPRK’s regime. Moreover, any attempt to rebuild the economy with largesse from South Korea will undermine Kim Jong Un’s legitimacy. Secondly, economic development through integration of the South and North Korean economies will lead to the absorption of the North Korean economy by the South, which is 55 times larger. Thirdly, Snyder writes that Kim envisions the state’s means of survival as being based upon the nuclear weapon program. It is therefore not tradable.
While these statements may be correct, he does not grasp the core points and the rationale explaining Pyongyang’s rejection of the offer. In order to apprehend why the DPRK rejected Yoon’s initiative, one has to understand clearly the fundamental nature and intrinsic attributes of its nuclear weapon program. The nuclear program is directly linked to the existence of the state; it is perceived by the regime as a strategic asset, essential for survival. However, it should be noted that the nuclear weapon program is not an end unto itself, but an essential means for survival. Therefore, in order for Chairman Kim to accept any offer, the deal’s clauses must ensure a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear state.
What does the nuclear program mean to the DPRK? Firstly, the nuclear weapon program is a credible means of deterrence against a real or imagined U.S. military invasion of North Korea. Secondly, the nuclear weapon program is a cost effective way to achieve military superiority over South Korea. Thirdly, the program is a pillar of the Byungjin policy, simultaneously pursuing a militarily powerful state and economic development. Fourthly, as the nuclear weapon program is a monumental achievement for Kim Jong-Un, it legitimizes his reign. Finally, because of the intrinsic nature of North Korea, its nuclear program enables the waging of belligerent foreign policy. The 31 missile tests of the last six months underscore such a confrontational policy.
In view of these facts, any future deal which is to be acceptable must entail a set of provisions able to more than compensate for all of the attributes stated above.
Such a package deal will require: number one – security guarantees in place of their deterrence against the US military threat. Security measures will entail a) normalization of the relationship and formal diplomatic recognition between the US and the DPRK; b) diplomatic recognition and the normalization of a relationship with Japan; c) reconfirmation of the friendship treaty between China and the DPRK, as well as with Russia; d) the military threats and unilateral sanctions or sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council must be lifted. Joint military exercises must cease.
Number two – there must be a peace treaty between South and North Korea, which will replace their present armistice.
Number three – to make up for the break up of Byungjin policy and the legitimacy it provides, North Korea has to achieve rapid and sustained economic development. It must achieve a minimum average of 10% GDP growth per annum for at least 10 years, so as to establish a basis for economic modernization.
Number four – in order to enable the achievement of economic development, there are three additional requirements: a) the implementation of radical market oriented reform, as well as opening; b) the provision of sufficient amounts of financial resources to carry out their economic reform and modernization; c) a radical revision of the ruling ideology, namely removal of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship.
Number five – their belligerent policy must be replaced by an amicable one. That requires implementing political reform and changing their hostile ideology.
It should be noted that neither South Korea nor the United States are alone able to make such an offer. In order to provide such a package deal, they will need the support of Russia and China.
There are two underlying implications within the package deal. Firstly, the deal cannot only constitute a transaction, but must also entail transformation from a socialist state to market socialism. Secondly, it must be a one-shot package deal involving all stakeholder states, with a 10-year duration, rather than engaging a step-by-step approach. Furthermore, in order to be successfully fulfilled, the package deal must clearly enunciate all parties’ obligations, including the provision of the development fund and allowing unlimited nuclear site inspections by the IAEA.
Even if we make an offer, there is no objective guarantee that North Korea will accept it. In order to make sure Kim will accept it, the stakeholders need collectively to make an offer he cannot refuse. It goes without saying that should Kim decide to seek survival as a nuclear state, the cost he will have to bear and the impact of punitive measures against the DPRK should be so severe that they will lead to the regime’s collapse. On the other hand, acceptance of the deal will provide a genuine chance of survival. For the DPRK, this means the trade of the nuclear weapon program in return for a bright future.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
