A recent proposal for a “minerals-for-security” deal with North Korea fundamentally misunderstands both the nature of Kim Jong Un’s regime and the lessons of past diplomatic failures. Rather than offering a path to peace, such an agreement would reward nuclear blackmail, undermine regional allies, and provide Pyongyang with resources to further strengthen its military capabilities.
The core assumption that economic incentives can moderate North Korea’s behavior has been repeatedly disproven. Kim Jong Un’s regime views nuclear weapons not as bargaining chips but as essential guarantees of survival. The dictator has witnessed what happened to Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi after he abandoned his nuclear program, and he has no intention of following that path. Any deal that leaves North Korea’s nuclear arsenal intact—as the proposal acknowledges may be necessary—essentially accepts a nuclear-armed North Korea as permanent reality while rewarding it with economic benefits.
Moreover, the suggestion that mineral revenues could be “funneled into a fund used to modernize its economy” ignores how authoritarian regimes actually function. North Korea has consistently diverted resources meant for economic development toward military programs. The regime’s highest priority remains regime survival, not citizen welfare. Additional revenue streams would almost certainly strengthen the military-industrial complex that keeps the Kim family in power rather than improve ordinary North Koreans’ lives.
The timing argument is equally flawed. While the author celebrates Lee Jae-myung’s expected presidency in South Korea as an opportunity, this misreads South Korean public sentiment. Polling consistently shows that South Koreans have grown increasingly skeptical of engagement with the North following years of provocations, missile tests, and broken promises. Lee would face enormous domestic pressure against any deal that appears to reward North Korean aggression without concrete denuclearization steps.
Strategic myopia and dangerous precedents
The proposal also overlooks the broader strategic implications. China has deliberately maintained North Korea as a buffer state and strategic irritant to the United States. Beijing has little interest in seeing North Korea develop alternative economic partnerships that might reduce Chinese leverage. Russia, meanwhile, is actively using North Korea as a proxy against Western interests, including reportedly receiving North Korean artillery shells and missiles for use in Ukraine. Both powers benefit from regional tensions and would likely work to undermine any U.S.-North Korea rapprochement.
Perhaps most troubling is the precedent such a deal would set globally. If North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, threaten regional stability, and then be rewarded with lucrative economic agreements, what message does this send to other potential proliferators? Iran, already watching these dynamics closely, would see confirmation that nuclear brinkmanship pays dividends.
The comparison to Ukraine is particularly misguided. Ukraine is a democratic ally fighting for its survival against Russian aggression. North Korea is an authoritarian state that has consistently violated international law and threatened its neighbors. Equating these situations fundamentally mischaracterizes the moral and strategic considerations at stake.
Instead of pursuing deals that legitimize and reward nuclear proliferation, the United States should focus on strengthening deterrence through enhanced cooperation with South Korea and Japan, maintaining robust sanctions that isolate North Korea economically, and working with allies to counter North Korean weapons transfers to Russia and other bad actors.
The author of the minerals deal proposal correctly identifies the growing dangers on the Korean Peninsula, but the solution lies not in appeasing an aggressive dictatorship with economic incentives. History teaches us that authoritarian regimes interpret such overtures as weakness to be exploited rather than opportunities for genuine cooperation. A minerals deal with North Korea would not reduce tensions—it would reward the very behavior that created them in the first place.
True security on the Korean Peninsula will come through strength, deterrence, and or transformation of the North Korean regime, not through deals that help subsidize its continued existence.
