On balance, North Korea is likely to be blamed for the sinking of the Cheonan, and a great deal of press has been devoted to the likely South Korean-U.S. response if that turns out to be the case.
However, North Korea’s own response to such an accusation is another key focus for experts.
First of all, North Korea will almost certainly continue to claim no involvement even if the investigation results do not go their way. In addition, the general view of experts is that Pyongyang will probably choose to go on the attack.
One key variable is that, in 2006 and 2009 when North Korea conducted its nuclear tests, the South Korean government signed up to the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing sanctions but did not get directly involved in sanctioning North Korea. There is a high probability of North Korea fighting back more viciously if South Korea puts in place its own sanctions.
To date, North Korea has refrained from provoking South Korea in the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). However, some experts suspect that North Korea will block passage overland to the Kaesong Industrial Complex and seize further real estate, while the possibility of provocations within the DMZ cannot be ruled out.
If North Korea deems even that inadequate, there is always the possibility of missile firings, and we cannot ultimately exclude the possibility of a 3rd nuclear test as a last resort.
In fact, it could be said that North Korea has been in attack mode ever since the connection between it and the Cheonan incident was first drawn; freezing and seizing real estate at Mt. Geumgang and making a statement suggesting that security cannot be guaranteed on the overland route to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Also, on April 21st, North Korea asserted that it would keep making nuclear weapons for as long as they were needed, and then, on May 12th, made an improbable claim to have successfully accomplished nuclear fusion.
Expert analysis has it that this is all part of an offensive targeting South Korea, the U.S. and the international community, since North Korea is in a corner and they feel they must alter the post-Cheonan landscape.
When the international community showed movement on sanctions after the 2nd nuclear test, Pyongyang responded with bellicose rhetoric and by firing seven short ranged missiles one after the other into the East Sea.
Jang Chul Hyun, a senior research fellow with the Institute for National Security Strategy, anticipated during a phone call conversation with The Daily NK on May 17th, “Thus far North Korea has been involved in economic cooperation between the two Koreas, like that at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, so they did not issue any provocations within the DMZ. However, now there is a possibility of North Korea seizing real estate in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and making just such a provocation.”
Cho Myung Chul, a research fellow at Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, agreed, saying, “When the investigation results are announced, North Korea will claim it was ‘a South Korean fabrication to force confrontation in Inter-Korean relations.’ Not only the Six-Party Talks but also the situation for economic cooperation will get tough, and especially they might take measures to expel workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex.”
Also, there is the possibility of a third nuclear test. North Korea, which is under UN Resolution 1874 due to its two prior nuclear tests, might conduct a third nuclear test if it feels it has nowhere to go.
Since Kim Jong Il apparently did not achieve what he wanted at the North Korea-China summit a few weeks ago, and since North Korea’s international isolation is worsening due to the Cheonan incident, the possibility of a nuclear test being diplomatically aimed at China cannot be ruled out.
According to Cho, “China will not participate in Cheonan sanctions; however, the matter of a nuclear test will be decided according to China’s position. If China did not provide any actual support following Kim Jong Il’s visit, the North might conduct a nuclear test in order to make China recognize the significance of that event.”
“Since the visit to China was not so successful, there is still the possibility of North Korea conducting another test,” Jang agreed.
In addition, despite the fact that they are not currently participating in them anyway, North Korea could also choose to officially boycott the Six-Party Talks.
The aim of that would be to improve their negotiating power with the international community by stating that they will not participate in the denuclearization forum. Last year, North Korea strongly condemned UN Security Council sanctions following the second nuclear test, stating, “We will never participate again (in the Six-Party Talks).”
Whatever the route North Korea takes, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are expected increase in the future and thorough preparations to manage North Korea are needed, including preparing responses to a range of possible provocations.
