One of the major impacts of the purge of Jang Sung Taek is
the way it has focused speculation on the future stability of the North Korean regime. Though the purge is thought to have buttressed the country’s political system over the short term, it also reinforced the perception that, with
the exception of Kim Jong Eun himself, no one is safe. This means that in the
long term it could lead to cracks in elite cohesion.
Seeing the bruised and battered Jang Sung Taek at December’s special
military tribunal, it is difficult to believe that he had actually plotted to
overthrow the state, one thing of which he was accused. Rather, judging by the way he clapped half-heartedly and slumped in his chair at formal
events in the presence of Kim Jong Eun, it looks like what lead to Jang’s premature death was refusal to implement
decisions handed down to him. In this respect, the purge shows the limits to Kim Jong Eun’s leadership. If he had been a wilier
leader, he would have served Jang with a warning and won him around. That way, he would still have been able to
use his uncle’s political skills. However,
Kim lacks that kind of masterful
leadership.
That’s not all that is lacking: looking back on the two years since Kim seized
power, one can see a number of incidents that lend his regime an air of
improvisation and immaturity. In April 2012, at the time of the long-range missile launch, the North called foreign reporters in to show them around the launch site and watch the rocket launch, but then on the day of the actual launch seemingly went back on the plan. Then, having raised tensions as if he really were going to start a war at the
beginning of last year, Kim completely switched directions in May and, in the end, Pyongyang was dragged around by South Korea. Finally, the North agreed to a round of separated family reunions in
September last year, but canceled the whole event just four days before it
was set to take place. It is these events that have led the United
States’ intelligence community to conclude that the uncertainty level is getting
higher where North Korea is concerned.
▲ Excessive Expectations of Collapse
However, this does not mean that the precariousness of the
Kim Jong Eun regime should be overstated.
Despite many moments of incoherence, it is still the prevailing view that the country
is under thoroughgoing control. The
Party Organization and Guidance Department monitors all areas of elite organizational life, and the People’s Army General
Political Bureau keeps the actions of every military unit under very close
surveillance. Even though it is said that societal control has eased in comparison with times past, the tools of coercion,
namely state and public security organs, remain effective.
Therefore, it is difficult to see where the seeds
of an anti-regime faction could come from. Although outside information is flowing into North Korea these days, it is not
yet sufficient to shake the system, and standalone tools for information
circulation, which would be essential for mass demonstrations, are absent. In North Korea’s case there are also limited outside
variables, quite unlike the Soviet Union, which was
undermined by the sudden collapse of Eastern European state socialism.
▲ Take
a Step Back
For the most part, analysts see things from their own point
of view, and interpret the information they receive within the paradigms they acquire via education and research. Yet while such paradigms do help to categorize complicated social phenomena via the application of logic, they lead to errors, too. In short, fixed
paradigmatic interpretations militate against recognizing paradigm shifts.
Here, in February 2014, it seems we need to become a little
humbler in our assessments of North Korea. The tendency base predictions upon past experiences places
limits on our capacity to forecast the future, when that future is sure to harbor
many unpredictable elements. We cannot say that the Kim Jong Il system survived the death of Kim
Il Sung so the Kim Jong Eun regime will surely stay sturdy, nor can we make the
assumption that the regime of Kim Jong Eun is on the brink of dissolution.
We must break away from these fixed dichotomous viewpoints, and
observe North Korea with an open mind. For only one thing is certain in the
midst of all this unpredictability, and that is this: the remainder of the Park Geun Hye administration is
going to be an important time, one during which the viability
of the Kim Jong Eun system will become clear.
* This Guest Column is an
abridged version of one that appeared in Korean on February 7th. Opinions
expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
