This year has seen a wide range of developments in North Korean affairs. From a major shift in North Korea’s unification policy to a reported riot in China among North Korean workers, 2024 is gearing up to be a year to watch closely. Daily NK’s English Language Editor, Robert Lauler, recently caught up with Daily NK’s busy president, Lee Kwang Baek, to talk about his thoughts on developments in and around North Korea in early 2024.
Q: North Korea recently announced its biggest policy shift toward reunification in decades – do you view this announcement with concern about the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula?
In 2024, Kim Jong Un declared that the relationship between North and South Korea is not a relationship of kinship, but that of belligerents at war. He disbanded the Unification Front Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, which was in charge of negotiations with the South Korean government, and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, which was in charge of inter-Korean talks. In particular, he demolished the “Monument to the Three-Point Charter for National Reunification” erected by his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2001 and ordered his troops to “prepare to pacify the entire territory of the DPRK.”
Kim Jong Un’s attitude and actions are somewhat puzzling, but if you look closely at the North Korean government’s policy toward the South, it’s not surprising.
Q: Yes, it’s not as if the North Korean government viewed the relationship as peaceful before suddenly declaring it hostile, right?
Correct. For the past 80 years, the North has claimed outwardly that the relationship between the two Koreas is “one people,” but inwardly, the regime’s propaganda has claimed that the relationship is hostile. Rather than a fundamental change in its stance on the relationship or a demonstration of its willingness to go to war, the regime’s outward shift in unification policy appears to be a response to Yoon Suk Yeol’s policy toward North Korea. Yoon’s government has shown that it will actively work with the international community to address human rights issues in North Korea. Instead of engaging in dialogue and cooperation with Kim Jong Un’s government to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, Yoon has joined the international community in imposing sanctions and pressure. Since the Eighth Workers’ Party Congress in 2021, the Kim Jong Un government has been advocating the principle of forceful confrontation to change the policies of the Yoon Suk Yeol government.
At the end of December 2022, the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party announced the policy of realizing the reunification of the country with a strong national defense centered on nuclear weapons and the production of a large number of tactical nuclear weapons for use against South Korea. Despite this, the Yoon government did not change its policy. Then, in 2024, Kim Jong Un’s government increased the intensity of pressure on Yoon by declaring that it would “occupy” South Korea.
North Korea’s new provocative approach toward the Yoon government is likely to continue until South Korea has a new president. The problem is that the continuing intense political conflict and confrontation between the two Koreas could easily lead to an accidental military conflict.
Q: North Korea is stepping up measures to eliminate South Korean culture and language, and Daily NK recently reported that teachers in Kaesong were punished for using the “southern puppet way of speaking.” What do you think are the limits of North Korea’s efforts to eliminate South Korean culture?
In 2022, the Unification Media Group (UMG) surveyed 50 North Koreans and found that 76% had watched a foreign movie or drama at least once a month. More than 90% have watched a foreign drama or movie at least once. It is difficult for the North Korean government to monitor all North Koreans, and it is unlikely to be able to punish the large number of North Koreans who watch or listen to outside information.
In 2022, the North Korean Human Rights Information Center surveyed former North Korean police officers and security guards to find out how many of the people who were caught for misconduct such as viewing outside information were punished. The results showed that only about 19% of those caught were punished, meaning that over 80% of North Koreans could avoid punishment even if they were caught. According to testimony from defectors and North Koreans, many more North Koreans who see or hear outside information don’t face punishment than those who do.
Q: Speculation about who will succeed Kim Jong Un has been a major topic of conversation since the emergence of Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, and Kim Ju Ae’s appearance alongside her father in the New Year has added fuel to the fire. Daily NK has consistently reported that the majority of North Koreans don’t believe the daughter could succeed Kim for a variety of reasons, and we’ve even published comments from North Korean party officials downplaying Ju Ae’s chances as a successor. But are there still reasons to believe she could become heir?
Honestly, I haven’t thought much about it and I don’t have enough information to say.
Those who claim that Kim Ju Ae has been “designated as the successor” cite the fact that she appears at major events alongside Kim Jong Un and that the term “young female general of the DPRK” has recently appeared in North Korean officer training materials. Some North Koreans argue that Kim Ju-ae cannot appear at major political events without a successor because if she were to gain public recognition and popularity, she would subsequently face harsh political retribution from the actual successor. They also claim that Kim Jong Un, who is well aware of the situation, would not send his beloved daughter to her death.
Those who argue that “Kim Ju Ae is not the heir” cite the fact that it is difficult for women to become leaders in North Korea and that if Kim Ju Ae were to become leader, the next in line would be her child, and since Kim Ju Ae’s child would not be part of the “Kim clan,” Kim Jong Un would not accept it.
Both sides have a point. We’ll have to wait a few more years to see who Kim Jong Un’s successor will be.
Q: After a four-year hiatus, tourism to North Korea is showing signs of resuming this year. If tourism does resume, how do you think it will affect the lives of ordinary North Koreans?
It will be a new experience for North Koreans to walk down the street, see trains or buses with tourists on board, and wave to each other through the windows. Some party members and tour guides will see foreign tourists enjoying themselves and may even talk to them. It will be an unusual experience for them, and some North Koreans may have a change of consciousness after seeing or talking to foreigners. For the vast majority of North Koreans, however, the impact of foreign tourists will be minimal. The foreign exchange that the North Korean government earns from foreign tourists will also increase.
North Korea doesn’t seem ready to welcome foreign tourists on a large scale in 2024. In January, North Korea canceled the Pyongyang Marathon, which was scheduled to take place in April. However, if the country’s internal situation improves, it is possible that the number of foreign tourists to the country could increase significantly in 2025 and beyond. Of course, tourism is one of the few ways the North Korean government can earn foreign currency without running afoul of the United Nations.
Q: There have been reports of a recent uprising by North Korean workers in China. The issue of low wages for North Korean workers has been an ongoing concern, and I’m curious how you see this affecting North Korea’s management of its overseas workers.
More than 2,000 North Korean workers sent to China reportedly staged a massive protest in January, occupying a factory to protest unpaid wages. Some media outlets reported that there were deaths during the melee. Let’s first take a look at the North Korean government’s response to the incident.
First, they paid the protesters some of the back wages they were owed and called off the protests.
Second, they reportedly repatriated about 10 key organizers of the riot back to North Korea. Once the investigation is complete, some of the workers are rumored to face severe punishment, including imprisonment in political prison camps. Recently, a North Korean defector who came to South Korea after working as a temporary worker in Russia said that “the other hundreds of workers who were not repatriated to North Korea this time will be repatriated to North Korea soon, and they will be severely punished if they return to North Korea.
Third, North Korea is reportedly stepping up background checks and conducting more thorough ideological vetting when selecting new overseas workers.
All of this suggests that the North Korean government’s control over overseas workers is weakening. The government is known to have greatly expanded its use of overseas workers to earn foreign currency since the COVID-19 pandemic subsided. Incidents similar to the recent riot in China are now more likely to occur in China or Russia.
The incident has the potential to change the way the North Korean government manages its overseas workers. The North Korean government has the difficult task of managing its overseas workers to avoid “protests” or “riots.” It will have to find a way to minimize worker backlash while still being able to manage them more strictly. The protests occurred after North Korean companies failed to pay their workers, so perhaps the North Korean government will change its management style in the future by keeping a closer eye on the workers and paying them on time.
In a totalitarian society like North Korea, it’s almost impossible for workers to protest, but that’s what happened, and if it happens again, we may see a “small spark” that ignites social change in North Korea.
Q: China seems to be cracking down on North Korean defectors to prevent them from traveling to South Korea. Do you think this crackdown is due to pressure from the North Korean government?
The Chinese crackdown on North Korean defectors may encourage more North Koreans to leave China and go to South Korea. There have been cases of North Korean defectors who were married to Chinese women being sent back to their families in China. Of course, I think it’s also possible that the North Korean government has been pressuring the Chinese government to crack down on defectors and demand their repatriation. I don’t know whether the fact that some defectors are being arrested and investigated by the police in China is due to pressure from the North Korean government or whether it is due to some kind of crackdown on illegal immigrants in China. We don’t have the information to answer that question accurately.
Q: North Korea recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s declaration of “Kimilsungization.” Tell us about the significance of this anniversary and whether we’ll see the rise of “Kimjongunism.”
The North Korean regime has long used the birthdays of its leaders and national anniversaries as an opportunity to gain the loyalty of the North Korean people. On major anniversaries, such as the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party in 2020 and the 70th anniversary of Victory Day in 2023, Kim Jong Un has held large and spectacular ceremonies or celebrations. In 2024, he appears to have planned to use the 50th anniversary of the declaration of the nationwide adoption of “Kimilsungism” to rally support among his people.
On the eve of Kim Il Sung’s birthday, April 14, 1974, his son, Kim Jong Il, issued a document called “Ten Principles for Establishing the Party’s Monolithic System. The first article of the document said, “We must make an all-out effort to unify the whole of society with the revolutionary ideas of the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung. Since then, the Protocols of the Workers’ Party have emphasized that “making the whole society a society dominated by Kim Il Sungism [Juche Thought] is the supreme code of the party.” The publication of this document marked the moment when the “Code of the Workers’ Party of Korea” was presented to the people of North Korea. The event planned to commemorate the nationwide adoption of Kimilsungism was to honor the day of the release of this code.
On Feb. 19, Rodong Sinmun assessed the significance of the “Declaration of the Kimilsungization Code” by saying, “The ideological unity of the whole society is the greatness and absolute power of our revolution, our nation.” At the same time, the newspaper affirmed that the visionary concepts of the Comrade General Secretary (Kim Jong Un) represent a remarkable continuation and development of the revolutionary ideals of the Great Father (Kim Il Sung) and the Great General (Kim Jong Il). It also stressed that by accepting the revolutionary ideas of the Comrade General Secretary and diligently incorporating them into the spheres of work and daily life, an unshakable guarantee would be created for the lasting revolutionary achievements of the Great Supreme Leader and the Great General to light the way and eventually lead to the complete Kimilsung-Kimjongilization of the entire society. In short, it emphasized “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas” and said that to “Kimilsungize the whole society” everyone must “arm themselves with Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas.”
Q: As you mentioned, the North Korean government recently announced that it would hold the “Central Reporting Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Kimilsungism” on Feb. 19 and ordered the entire population to watch the event on television. Interestingly, on Feb. 17, just two days before the event was to take place, it was announced that the event had been “abruptly canceled. Why cancel an event that was an important opportunity to promote “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas” to the entire population?
A North Korean source told Daily NK that the event was canceled because it was feared that it would not highlight the “Kim Jong Un era” and “Kim Jong Un’s revolutionary ideas.” If this is true, one cannot help but wonder whether Kim Jong Un has not yet created his own ideas with a theoretical framework rich enough to be compared with “Kimilsung-(Juche)-Kimjongilism,” or whether he is touting his “new ideas” as something that has little difference from the content of Kimilsung-Kimjongilism. In 2013, Kim Jong-un began to use the term “people-centeredism” and in recent years has emphasized it as a protocol of the Workers’ Party, calling it “the basic political method of a socialist society.” However, it is difficult to find any difference between this “people-centeredism” and the Juche idea of the past. Nor has it been published with a theoretical framework.
The term “Kimjongunism” will probably make its official appearance at some point in the future, perhaps when his successor publishes a paper praising Kim’s intellectual achievements to promote the leader as a “great thinker.”
Q: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on human rights in North Korea. Do you think the COI helped improve the human rights situation in North Korea? (Thanks to Audrey Gregg for posing this question)
First, it made the world aware of the severity of human rights violations in North Korea, especially the fact that hundreds of thousands of North Koreans are suffering in political prison camps, and urged the international community to take action to address this issue.
Second, the report made it clear that the human rights violations in North Korean society are serious enough to be called crimes against humanity, and that the perpetrator of these crimes is the supreme leader of North Korea, and recommended punishment for the perpetrators.
The North Korean government, which had rejected the international community’s demands for improvement of human rights, came to the United Nations and submitted a report on the human rights situation in its country and took a position that makes it appear as if it is making partial efforts to improve human rights. That, I believe, is the result of the country’s leaders feeling pressured by the efforts of the Commission of Inquiry and its recommendations.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
