Rather than being a comprehensive review of
contemporary North Korea, James Pearson and Daniel Tudor’s North Korea
Confidential is meant to be up-to-date introduction for the growing pool of
readers who are curious about the truth behind the headlines. This book offers
more than a simple appetite whetting however; it challenges our preconceptions
about North Korea by confronting them with inside information attained from
defectors, NGO workers, Pyongyang officials, diplomats, traders, and more. This
access, coupled with the duo’s expertise in crafting compelling arguments,
infuses the book with a mix of street smarts and scholarly wisdom. Ultimately, North Korea Confidential illuminates what has been a dark spot in the popular
literature on the North: how the fallout of 1990’s famine, or “Arduous March,” prompted an
unprecedented shift in the attitudes, governance, and livelihoods of everyday North
Koreans. After losing confidence in their state’s ability to provide for them,
the entire population began leading a double life. The result: people today
have one foot in the state factory and one in the jangmadang (grey market), one
ear trained to Kim Jong Eun and the other tuned to foreign news broadcasts
through jerry-rigged radios. In the new North Korea, even Workers’ Party
officials must wear at least two hats. North Korea Confidential evaluates the
causes and consequences of these two worlds colliding.
Elsewhere in the literature, there seems to
be a schism between soapy human interest pieces and stolid historical
overviews. By giving readers a bird’s eye view of everyday life, North Korea
Confidential strikes a balance between the two. As befitting of the authors’
roots in journalism, the writing style dispatches of linguistic flourishes in
favor of concise, imagistic prose. While Pearson and Tudor certainly aren’t
apologists for the regime, they refuse to limit their depictions to the typical
oppressor/oppressed archetypes that readers of the genre have become so
accustomed to. Even though the transgressions of the Kim Regime and Worker’s
Party remain unforgivable, we are presented with a context in which their
actions no longer look bewildering or irrational. Instead of a grim list of
human rights violations, we get a glimpse into how real North Koreans navigate
a landscape of bribes and clandestine negotiations, love and secrets, homemade
hooch and stark contradictions. The authors’ analytical style falls in line
with “Marxist theory” and “ecological materialism”– their general argument is
that all this social, political, and cultural change has essentially flowed
from a fundamental shift in the economic environment.
The book is divided into chapters that each
delve into a different aspect of North Korean society, including the emergence
of private markets, cultural trends, communications, and the anatomy of the
party leadership. Most of the book focuses on contemporary North Korea, but Chapter
3 breaks this mold by going all the way back to Kim Il Sung’s rise in order to
illustrate how the distribution of political power has changed over time. Some
readers might be less interested in this, but it would be impossible to discuss the anatomy of the DPRK government without addressing the history of
the Kim family and their relationship with the OGD.
My only real gripe with the book isn’t one
of substance, but rather one of style. At times, the authors’ use of footnotes
– many in mid-sentence –interrupts the narrative flow. Some readers will lament
seeing important points being tossed out as mere asides. Footnotes seem rather
out of place in a popular, reader friendly work like this. On the other hand,
it is quite possible that other readers will find the tangential anecdotes and
supplementary information contained in the footnotes to be charming and
interesting, a worthy detour. At the end of the day, it is simply a matter of
taste.
Now to the heart of the story. Pearson and
Tudor dispel a number of common misconceptions about North Korea. First and
foremost is the idea that North Koreans are robots who can’t think for
themselves and are basically slaves to the state. While the vast majority of
North Koreans continue to toil in poverty, the authors show, through vivid
examples, how drastically things have changed over the last twenty years. Here
is a short list of the most common misconceptions, followed by a brief account
of how the authors have been able to put these myths to bed.
1. “North Koreans are mindless automatons;
they can’t think for themselves and are slaves to the state.”
The authors show that before the famine,
the career trajectory of North Koreans was restricted by the quality of their
songbun (family ties and political loyalty). Upward mobility was unheard of
outside a trusted circle of Pyongyang elite. But the 1990 famine or “Arduous
March” was devastating: an estimated one million died of hunger, food
allotments dried up, state salaries withered away, and entire government
agencies were required to fund themselves. The post famine free-for-all opened
up the country up to an entirely more mobile class structure. Pearson and
Tudor describe a North Korea that flies in the face of our expectations.
Everyday North Koreans watch foreign films and movies under the cover of
darkness, bribe their way up the ladder and out of jams, sell comic books at
market, and listen to foreign broadcasts through jerry-rigged radios. They can
even get “double-eyelid surgery” for 2 USD in a back alley.
2. “North Koreans know nothing of the
outside world; they know and believe only what the regime tells them.”
Officially speaking, North Koreans are only
allowed to watch preset TV and radio channels. But engineers at the jangmadang
can tweak your hardware for a price, giving you access to broadcasts from
international sources. But even the North Koreans who have come to realize the
ineptitudes of their government through exposure to foreign media do not thirst
for revolution. They instead favor graduated reforms, vis-a-vis more chances to
make money. USB sticks, containing movies, songs, and dramas, have exploded in
popularity of late. By and large, North Koreans mainly seek out foreign
information as a way to relax and they mainly sell it as a way to make money.
DVD and USB smuggling has increased proportionally, becoming an extreme
nuisance for Central Authorities. But since state salaries have been reduced to
pittance, agents from the Ministry of People’s Security are willing to look the
other way for a bribe. Money then has become an equalizer, affording those with
lots of curiosity, a risk taking personality, some spare won in their
pocket, and a glimpse at the outside world.
3. “North Korea is the world’s last holdout
Communist Dictatorship. There is no market to speak of, and the private sector
plays no role.”
Due to dried up central funding, most
government agencies now operate partnerships with local businesses to stay
afloat. Even the National Library started a trading company in the 1990s. De
jure systems for regulating the amsijang (black market) were introduced in fits
and starts. That necessitated an extensive and pervasive system of bribes and
kickbacks to fill in the cracks between state-sanctioned projects and private
enterprise. Members of the public and private worlds now exist as mutual
hostages of one another, unable to live with or without their counterparts. The
resulting corruption and necessity for constant bribes has created an uneasy
balance. The authors liken this system to a “protection racket,” with
entrepreneurs seeking out the sponsorship of powerful officials to legitimize
their operations. The regime uses every tool at its disposal to suppress
private sector leaders from usurping power. The most well cited example of a
government crackdown on the black market was the 2009 redenomination, during
which time the government devalued the relative worth of the North Korean won.
This wiped out the cash savings of amsijang (blackmarket) traders and created a
slave class by drastically reducing the market value of the wages doled out to
state employees. But the measure was an overall unsuccessful attempt to control
the grey markets. In the long run, it only succeeded in “pushing North Koreans
even further beyond the orbit of the state economic control.” The systematic
implementation of bribery on all levels has changed people’s perceptions, their
dreams, and their ability to climb upwards. Before the famine, the ideal North
Korean was loyal, spartan, and dedicated to the worker party. A smartly dressed
young professional using an iPad in a Pyongyang cafe is now the epitome of
success.
4. “The Kim Regime is focused only on
concentrating and abusing power at the expense of its people. It is backwards,
dysfunctional, and irrational.”
The authors depict the Kims and other top
officials in such a light that it’s often possible to understand their motives. Power sharing among the ruling
elite in North Korea has been a high-wire balancing act for some time now: the
Kims do not have absolute control. Like any country, factionalized sects duke
it out for control of appointments, policy decisions, and access to lucrative
deals. Pearson and Tudor reject the liberal/conservative, old power/new money
dichotomies that have typically been used by the Western media to describe the
situation, instead mapping out a much more complex web of individual actors and
institutions. In 1976, Kim Jong Il took it upon himself to secretly reroute his
father’s telephone lines through his office. He used the information he got
from spying on his father to curry favor and usurp power. Kim Il Sung never
intended for North Korea to be a hereditary dictatorship, but from 1973, Kim Jong Il
began revamping and shifting the locus of power towards the OGD, with him at
the helm. He used surveillance and control as a means to create an atmosphere
of fear among his people, banished 500 “non-loyal” officials, and carefully
appointed only those who demonstrated fierce loyalty to him. He was more astute
than the Western media would have you believe: he drank colored water in his
later years so he could watch his comrades drunkenly reveal their hands.
This book recommends itself. Anyone with
even a passing interest in North Korea is likely to find it captivating. To the
careful reader, it is clear that Pearson and Tudor have taken pains to
indicate that the vast majority of North Koreans remain poor, overworked, and
oppressed. The one thing that worries me is the prospect that a small minority
of readers might walk away thinking the outliers are the new norm, thinking the
new prototypical North Korean is a cell phone toting business man who spends
his weeknights wooing party cadres and his weekends watching American movies.
While that kind of Pyonghattanite no doubt exists, he is by no means
representative. Looking at the facts on the ground, it certainly is the
case that the economy has improved since the famine days, people are forcing de
facto liberalizations by disregarding anachronistic laws, and the songbun caste
system’s slow degradation is opening up room for an emerging middle class. The
authors also shine a light on the North’s draconian penal system, the pervasive
system of bribery that has saturated every nook and cranny of institutional
life, and the endemic corruption at the heart of the political system. It is a
measured and balanced look at North Korea, one that doesn’t shy away from the darkness
or the light. Overall, the authors’ voice is refreshing, their storytelling is
gripping, and their analysis is perceptive. North Korea Confidential is
definitely worth a read.
North Korea Confidential, already out in Asia with releases in both the United States and Europe to come in mid-April, is available here.
Those unable to view the embedded video can listen here.
