Is Kim Jong Un’s
grip on the throne secure? Will he be able to follow in the footsteps of Kim Il
Sung and Kim Jong Il by stretching his reign beyond the ten year
benchmark?
There are no simple answers to this
question. In fact, it’s difficult to get a handle on
the state of the regime in the present moment, let alone predict what sorts of
developments tomorrow may bring. This is a central characteristic of a
totalitarian regime; widespread and systemic changes can happen in the blink of
an eye.
It’s difficult for
a liberal democracy to go bust in a single moment. That’s because liberal democracies are composed of self sustaining interlocking systems that support their continuation. Even if one of these pillars
crumbles, the structure remains intact. Totalitarian governments are not built
in this way. Just like the Soviet Union or Romania, these kinds of governments
are liable to collapse at any time. That’s what makes
it so difficult to forecast the future of a totalitarian regime.
Most predictions about the future are made
on the basis of past observations. These predictions are prone to forecasting
the continuation of future trends, which makes them inherently conservative.
That’s why we often see experts reacting to a sudden
change by saying, “we never could have predicted that.”
Events transpired in this exact fashion
shortly after the 1997 IMF foreign exchange crisis in South Korea. Out of all
of Korea’s esteemed economics experts, not even one
person was able to foresee the impending crisis. A small group of
ex-government officials sounded warning bells, but the deputy prime minister
for financial affairs responded that Korea’s economy
was “fundamentally rugged and durable.” The minister’s brain must have been teeming
with conservative thoughts at that time.
Furthermore, unlike the nebulous field of
international security, the field of economics has a host of facts and figures
such as international interest rates, cost of living, oil prices, the trade
deficit, etc. to use as helpful real-time gauges. Despite having these
wonderful tools at their disposal, they were still unable to detect and avoid
the financial crisis.
If you look at things from this angle, it’s no laughing matter. Every time a life threatening incident [e.g.
Jang Song Thaek, Ri Yong Ho, Hyon Yong Chol, etc.] related to North Korea
arises, people are quick to point that fact out. They say, “North Korea does not exhibit any predictable trends with regards to
its attacks,” or, “We couldn’t detect any symptoms which foreshadowed this.”
This kind of remark is generally infused
with the sentiment that a military attack on the south will come with a warning
sign. In other words, “since we don’t see any blaring signs right now, everyone can just relax.”
To be perfectly honest, I laugh inwardly
every time I hear that kind of foolishness. The execution of Jang Song Thaek
itself displayed a trend particular to North Korea. Couldn’t we call the appearance of mask wearing assailants to the Korean
Workers’ Party [KWP] Central Committee building just
one iteration of a trend particular to North Korea?
The moment we catch wind of the news that
mask-wielding assailants entered the Workers’ Party
building or that the North attacked the South, it’s
already too late. To compare with the 1997 financial crisis, it was impossible
to avoid the impending crisis once it was detected. And if we look to
historical precedents, security-related catastrophes tend to flare up much more
suddenly than financial emergencies.
Therefore, even though it can be fruitless work
to make predictions about matters related to conflict and security, it might be
prudent to take a second look at the idea that North Korea is fundamentally “strange” and “suspicious.”
Considering the recent news that defense
chief Hyon Yong Chol has been publicly executed, Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA) broadcast a warning that “all traitorous
sects and groups will be tirelessly purged.”
Korean Central Television (KCTV) continuously aired “The Cutting Winds of Baekdu,” in which the
narrator reminds viewers of the fate that awaited purported traitors in August
of 1956 and asks, “What will come of traitorous
citizens who choose to betray their nation by imitating the likes of Bak Heon
Yeong, Lee Seung Yeop, and Choi Chang Ik?”
Was there a comparable usage of KCTV during
Kim Jong Il’s reign? If there perhaps was an incident
involving a traitorous sect in his time, wouldn’t he be
more likely to cover it up instead of using it in propaganda?
When you analyze the North Korean media,
you have to interpret things with an “opposite” or “upside down”
lens. In 1990, during a transitional stage in North Korean history, the media
proclaimed, “Our republic has no food shortage problem.” In 1998 after getting approval from the UN, North Korea accepted
aid shipments of relief rice from the international community without ever
being subject to an investigation.
Accordingly, we have to interpret North
Korean media statements that say, “We have no food
shortage problem,” to actually mean, “Because we have such a bad food shortage…”
If they didn’t have a food problem, there’d be no reason to deny permission of entry to UN
investigators.
There are many episodes from history which
illustrate that state pronunciations from communist totalitarian countries
cannot be trusted and must be read “backwardly.” There is no reason to list them all out here.
For this reason, we must use our lens to
interpret incoming news about the North. For example, after North Korea’s test of their submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the
national defense policy spokesperson said, “it’s been a long time since we achieved successful miniaturization on
our nuclear delivery systems.” But we should interpret
this to mean, “in order to reach that stage, it will
take a little bit more time.”
If by some chance, North Korea really did
achieve full miniaturization, would they be likely to announce it? Considering
it’s a matter of top secrecy and they could maintain an
advantage by keeping it that way, the odds are slim they’d let anyone know.
When you look at things this way, what goal
could North Korea have in using the traitorous sects as propaganda? Is it
legitimately the case that these groups are causing havoc in the country? Or
are they merely using this episode as a means to unify the people and whip up
loyalty?
Bak Heon Yeong and Lee Seun Yeob are former
South Korean Workers’ Party members. Kim Il Sung blamed
and executed them for being responsible for the June 25th War, known in the
broader international community as the Korean War. Choi Chang Ik and Kim Du
Bong were together at the core of the Yeon Ahn group. Kim Du Bong became the
victim of a purge during the June 25th War and Choi Chang Ik, who was once
deputy prime minister, was demoted to a position related to the farming of pigs
in the aftermath of “The August Faction Incident.” He stayed at that post for the
remainder of his life.
But The August Faction Incident of 1956
happened over 60 years ago. Why is this issue being brought up in the media now
as if it is a new development? The heart of the problem is hidden in the answer
to this difficult question.
The August Faction Incident was the largest
conspiracy to occur since Kim Il Sung rose to power on September 9th,
1948.
The “Kapsan
Incident” occurred from 1966-67, but even this was
small potatoes when compared to the August Faction Incident. During the Kapsan
Incident, a few different groups expressed their dissatisfaction over Kim Il
Sung’s governance, but the August Faction Incident was
a genuine attempt to topple the ruler. As a result of their efforts, it was
entirely possible that Kim Il Sung might have lost his grip on the throne. So,
does that mean that the current incident in North Korea involving “traitors” is comparable to the 1956 episode?
Does that mean we should compare Jang Song Thaek and Hyeon Yeong Cheol to
figures like Bak Heon Yeong, Lee Seung
Yeop, and Choi Chang Ik? If that were the case, then Kim Jong Un’s security on the throne would be tenuous indeed.
However, if we apply our lens to
interpreting this, is the current incident fundamentally different from The
August Faction Incident? In other words, even if we were 100% sure that Kim
Jong Un’s power base was secure, how would we interpret
KCTV’s continuous airing of a movie that poses the
deadly serious question: “What will come of traitorous
citizens who choose to betray their nation by imitating the likes of Bak Heon
Yeong, Lee Seung Yeop, and Choi Chang Ik?”
Now, for those of us who wish to really
understand and deal with the North Korea problem, there is a need to approach
this issue with a common sense tactic.
If Kim Jong Un’s
claims to authority were in fact secure, would there be any reason to
continuously make references to The August Faction Incident on KCTV? If
his political legitimacy was not threatened in any way, Kim Jong Un would have
already traveled to China, Russia, and Indonesia. He would have already made
appeals for financial and diplomatic assistance from those countries. There
would be absolutely no need to continue referencing past acts of betrayal on
KCTV.
To put it bluntly, there’d be no reason for KCTV to make fools of themselves by repeating the
same blunt message over and over again if Kim Jong Un had confident control of
the country. At this point, we are ready to look at two hypotheses:
1. When the wind blows, the leaves dance
about.
2. The leaves dance on their own power,
thereby producing wind.
Which one of these makes more sense?
Common knowledge tells us that number one
is entirely more reasonable: “When the wind blows, the
leaves dance about.” To put this into context, when the
wind blows (when Kim Jong Un’s power base is in
question), the leaves dance about (Jang Song Thaek and Hyon Yong Chol are
executed).
Therefore, if the leaves are not dancing
about, is there really any need to release a report saying as much? What would
be the point?
Despite this, there are those who argue
that the leaves do in fact dance about on their own. These people think that
Kim Jong Un executed Jang Song Thaek and Hyon Yong Chol merely for the purposes
of shoring up power, and that this is no indication that there is a pronounced
threat to his power base. Of course it’s difficult to
rule out this kind of supposition altogether, but at very least we might
benefit by examining the cause and effect of this problem a bit more carefully.
If Kim Jong Un’s power base was totally secure, what
possible cause could he have for executing Jang Song Thaek and Hyon Yong
Chol?
To investigate this matter, it is helpful
to take a second look a KCNA’s December 13, 2013 report
which aired after Jang Song Thaek’s execution. If we
look at the passage below, we can see that Jang Song Thaek was charged with
sedition at the special military tribunal by the State Security
Department.
The following section consists of passages
from that transcript, including statements allegedly made by Jang Song Thaek at
the tribunal.
————————————————-
Drunk from his ambition of seizing power,
Jang Song Thaek lost the ability to make sound and sane deliberations.
Furthermore, had he been able to mobilize the remainder of the army, he would
have been able to attempt a coup. He foolishly calculated that he’d be able to exert his evil influence on the People’s Army.
At the hearing, Jang Song Thaek said, “In spite of the fact that it would cause catastrophic damage to the
country’s economic situation and its citizens, I
attempted to launch a coup.” He further unveiled his
ugly and traitorous intentions when he admitted he was the coup’s most senior leader.
When speaking about the specific method of
undertaking this coup, Jang Song-thaek continuously repeated, “I attempted to use the military officials I had personal
relationships with, such as Lee Young Ha and his followers, in order to
forcefully dominate them. I do not know about the recently appointed military
officials, but the officials appointed in previous times have honor. I believe
that even if the lives of citizens and soldiers get rougher, they will not be
able to be mobilized to carry out a coup. I also tried to recruit higher ups at
the Ministry of People’s Security. Outside of this,
there are a few other people that I tried to use as well.”
When asked what Jang Song Thaek would do
once he instigated the coup, he responded, “Once I
execute the coup, I do not have any firm plans set in place. But before the
country and the economy totally collapsed, I planned to concentrate all the
economic institution heads and assign them to the department I was in and
appoint myself prime minister. After becoming prime minister, I would procure
enormous funds in order to try to solve the major problems that our people and
our army suffer from. In this way I calculated that a coup could be smoothly
accomplished as the people cheered me on.”
Jang Song Thaek foolishly believed the
delusion that after he usurped power, he would become known as a reformer to
the outside world and that foreign countries would welcome his new regime.
The truth of the matter is that Jang Song
Thaek has clearly revealed himself to be a traitorous American puppet willing
to go along with their policy of strategic patience in order to cause a
collapse of our republic from the inside and seize supreme power. This plan to
utilize the most cunning and wicked methods at his disposal was hatched a long
time ago, making him a traitor unmatched in his unscrupulous and scheming ways.
The ugly truth of Jang Song Thaek’s traitorous, anti-national, anti-citizen crimes have thusly been
revealed by the State Security Department’s special
tribunal.
————————————————-
First, let’s try to
unpack this passage. It is hard to determine whether the accusations set forth
in the sentencing are true or not. The error range falls somewhere between
0-100%. Understanding the nature of North Korean media, however, we can begin
to parse fact from fiction. (After all, we expect bright people to make bright
judgments and dimwits to make dimwitted judgments).
The author asserts that the truth rate of
the comments made at sentencing is probably about 20%, which means that the
remaining 80% is a story concocted by the State Security Department.
This explains why Hyon Yong Chol was executed in the
aftermath of Jang Song Thaek’s ouster. To put it
another way, the effects of the Jang Song Thaek incident are continuously
developing inside North Korean power politics. I’m not
sure if we can compare the scope of the Jang Song Thaek incident with The
August Faction Incident of 1956, but as of right now it appears as if the
paranoid mood which began with the July/August of 2013 internal investigation
of Jang Song Thaek has continued to this day.
If you look at it from this angle, national
intelligence statistics say that between 2012 and now approximately 70 people
have been purged. This gives us a way to gauge the extent of the injury caused
by the Jang Song Thaek incident.
Right now, North Korea is still in the
process of beginning to idolize Kim Jong Un. In North Korean power politics, is
there a more important element than idolization? The relationship with China
and Russia, along with the policies related to industry have all been pushed
back and delayed. In a totalitarian dictatorship, the leader’s authority is not guaranteed without idolization firmly in place.
To accomplish this, the regime must kill many people. To put it another way, as
the regime continues to snatch up important people and examine them, they’ll need to kill more and more. As Kim Jong Un continues to secure
his place, we will most likely see a revamp of the North Korean totalitarianism
that occurred from 1960-1980.
In all likelihood, about 30-40 years
remain. In the road ahead, Kim Jong Un will not likely be able to establish
power in the way his father and grandfather did. During the time of Kim Il Sung
and Kim Jong Il, the foundation for their absolute dictatorship was already in
place. If Kim Jong Un wishes to command the power and respect that his
forebearers did, he still has many, many people left to kill.
However, Kim Jong Un will likely never be
able to throw away the memory of his father and grandfather. The result of this
is that the establishment of his absolute authority rests on his ability to
instill the attitude that, “based on the foundations of
the past, our present and our future will have to fight against one another to
form our ultimate path.”
Kim Jong Un will falter if he is unable to
avoid being struck by a “stray bullet.” For him, the problem will always be that no one has the ability to
forecast a “sudden emergency.”
