North Korean Special Envoy, Password to the North’s Nuke Solution?

[imText1]In amidst times where North Korea’s nuke experiments have once again caused tension, the hot issue “North Korea’s special envoy” of Ban Ki Moon appointed as the next U.N. Secretary-General and the former chairman of the Grand Nation Party, Park Geun Hye is receiving much interest.

On leaving the National Assembly and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Ban spoke on his position “Although we must stand by the Security Council’s sanctions and the six-party talks, as the Secretary-General I will begin by nominating a special envoy and if necessary even visit North Korea myself for negotiations.”

The former chairman, Ms. Park also revealed “This has never simply been the security problem but a huge impact on our country’s destiny. Hence, we are not opposed to the role of a special envoy if beneficial to solving the issue.”

Even the current government has been continuously arguing that amidst the present times, sending the former President Kim Dae Jung or other distinguished personage as a special envoy is necessary.”

It is analyzed that this kind of “special envoy” adopts the model agreement resulting from the North’s first nuclear threat in 1994, when Kim Il Sung and former U.S. President Carter met at the time. However, it has been criticized that this agreement made by Kim Il Sung and Carter marked the representative precedent to ultimately prolong North Korea’s nuclear warfare.

At the time, Carter was traveling to all troubled locations of the world for his popularity in order to find a “resolution to the solution” while gaining a bad reputation from the Department of State.

Professional lecturer Don Oberdorfer of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) John Hopkins University said regarding the “Two Koreas,” “The consultations on freezing North Korea’s nukes offered by Carter (after his visit in ’94) was information already suggested to the U.S. government by scholars of North Korean studies” and added “It was a proposal far from solving the nuclear issue.”

He revealed “The information by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspector on the outstanding permits was new, however if we are to freeze the nukes, it is not a feasible measure that must be accompanied. In the end, no information was new and nothing was changed except for the fact Carter’s name was announced on live broadcast.”

The basic conclusions that were made during negotiations with former President Carter who considered himself to be a special envoy, was that the U.S. would provide light-water reactors and petroleum and push for the normalization of a mutual relationship instead of freezing North Korea’s nuclear program.

North Korea is in a difficult situation having to confront the passing of the Security Council’s North Korea resolution yet has still maintained its prestige not forfeiting its negotiation card in which Carter has offered in order to strategically escape threat. It is possible that North Korea is utilizing Carter to evade the threat dragging the U.S. to the negotiation table and trying to hide the nuclear bruise of the past.

However, these negotiations only opened North Korea’s secret of developing nukes and ultimately led to the accomplishment of a nuclear experiment.

Here we can see the rationale behind the Bush Administrations determination for the multi-nations talks. He does not want to participate in futile bilateral talks which guarantees nothing like the Geneva Conference.

The lesson given from these results is that the issue of North Korea’s nukes cannot be solved through the sole efforts of a special envoy. The important thing is that the Kim Jong Il regime surrenders its focus on nuclear armaments and a confirmation of this is made at the six-party talks.

There is a high possibility that the current North Korean special envoy will end its empty propaganda on North Korea’s “Nuke surrender.” In addition, it is possible that arbitration will be used as an excuse to prolong talks with the U.S. so that North Korea will be able to gain time.

It is necessary that an opposite approach to that of Carter’s doctrine during the resolutions made at the first North Korean nuclear threat is made. If we do not tread carefully and a second Carter is created, it is possible that Kim Jong Il’s nuclear warfare will start anew followed by another tragedy. It is possible that if the international community does not respond with a firm agreement at the necessary time, the proposal of a special envoy will only cause disruptive debates at the six-party talks.