[imText1]There are a number of disputes on what it is North Korea is trying to gain from its recent “nuclear statement.” The government of South Korea seems to think the statement was for “the purpose of negotiation.” In other words, it believes if the others provide enough inducement, North Korea will come back to the six-party talks. According to this assumption, North Korea is demanding something more from the U.S. and this part is what remains dubious.
Recently a high level US official asserted that there would be no additional yields to North Korea’s recent move from the American side, which was somewhat an expected answer. However, I wonder if we could consider North Korea’s nuclear statement merely as a miscalculation from the North Korean part. If North Korea misjudged the situation, then we could say the North Korean regime has a serious problem in making judgments, which seems to be unlikely.
Although it is certain that the government of South Korea has a wrong interpretation of the situation, but let’s discuss this more under the premise that South Korea’s interpretation is correct. What could it have been that led North Korea into such a serious miscalculation? Since the U.S. has never implied any possible further yields from their own part. We exclude U.S. role in this. China too, has been reticent in most cases, thus it is unlikely that China provided North Korea with wrong information. Then, what we are left with is the government of South Korea. President Roh said in his “LA statement” that it is reasonable for North Korea to pursue nuclear possession for defense purposes, and Chung Dong Young, the South Korean minister of unification indicated in comments in the Davos Forum that the U.S. must make further yields to North Korea.
According to the South Korean government’s interpretation, we can draw the ridiculous conclusion that North Korea’s misjudgment was made from the information the South Korean government provided. I wonder if the government is aware of the fact that as it insists more and more that North Korea’s “nuclear statement” is for the “purpose of negotiation,” North Korea will be perceived as stupid and South Korea as nothing more than an obstacle for negotiations. As a result, if North Korea did bluff by making a misjudgment, both South Korea has pretended they could induce more American yields, and North Korea believed South Korea can do such a thing, become helpless beings.
If North Korea made the “nuclear statement” understanding that the US will not make any further yields (according to the North Korean suggestions so far, further yields mean a repeat of the Geneva Agreement, where it received aid from freezing nuclear materials and denuclearization to be put off as homework to be done in the future), then what could the US be expecting? Regardless of what North Korea did so far, if the U.S. accepts North Korean demands, North Korea will return to the six-party talks. However, the possibility of this is zero, thus hoping for it is meaningless.
Trying to De-weaponize the US By Involving South Korea and China
In order to gain a different perspective let’s look into what North Korea wants from China and South Korea prior to returning to the six-party talks. Until now, China has played a key role in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table and it is known that China has been giving a lot of “gifts” including economic aid in return. We could think of North Korea’s recent remark as the game it plays to ask for more aid, not from the US, but rather from South Korea and China. It is true that we have to bear in mind this possibility, but considering that the North Korean nuclear statement came out after the US presidential elections, and after having observed the second term of the Bush administration and policy directions, it seems rather too simple to think North Korea’s action only to request more benefits from South Korea and China.
Let’s look at the possible American responses to North Korean demands. First of all, unless some extreme cases occur; such as North Korea exports nuclear materials to terrorist groups or harms the US directly, the general perception is that use of military force would be difficult. North Korea is surely aware of this, and it seems as though North Korea considers it as the last safety valve.
The US will be left with no choice but to first insist for North Korea to return to the six-party talks; then at one point, take it to the United Nations Security Council. In the process, if the US takes the matter too sensitively, the media within the US will become a pressure to come to a rapid solution and therefore the U.S. will take a position where it seems to undermine the seriousness of the problem. In any case, the key for taking the matter to the UN Security Council is China. If China does not agree, the whip that could turn a warning to an economic sanction will be to be vetoed down.
It seems as though what North Korea wants is for China and South Korea to protect North Korea so what the US tries to do becomes futile. As it earns more time, North Korea’s “nuclear state” could be accepted widely. It seems as though due to such a calculation, North Korea refuses to return to the six party talks, and came up with a “nuclear statement” as a package. This is running a high risk.
On the other hand, as North Korea’s actions always have been, the recent “nuclear statement” would also have a multifaceted card. North Korea will try to raise a “war with America” sentiment to build tension and once again tightly maintain control of the regime. In addition they will hope for an emergence of an active anti-war, anti-American movement.
As a result, the bolt of the matter is whether the members of the six-party talks builds a consensus on the North Korean strategy or break into divisions as North Korea wishes. What is interesting is that in its statement, North Korea not only showed hostility toward the U.S., but also Japan. This could be an intent from the dream of solidarity with South Korea and China to besiege U.S and Japan.
China in Real Dilemma
From a wider perspective, it could seem as though the situation will unfold as North Korea intends to. However, the part that North Korea mistakenly undermined is the fact that China as a nuclear state itself, does not want a nuclear North Korea as much as the US. Therefore, perhaps it was a big mistake, perhaps too much of a greed for North Korea to declare itself as a “nuclear state” for it made China feel very uncomfortable. For this reason, China is now in a real dilemma, where at the end, it will be forced to make a decision that will protect their own interest.
The government of South Korea used the rhetoric of an important player of solving the North Korean nuclear problem, but in fact, played the role of a mediator. However, in the end, it seems like it has become nothing more than an agitator. It is hard to know whether North Korea knew how South Korea would react after its statement, but it is likely that it was taken into consideration. The division between South Korea and the US is exactly what they aimed for. South Korea must have believed that if they appease North Korea, they could be convinced to return to the six-party talks. This is because Jung Dong Young, the South Korean minister of unification publicly spoke of resuming the six-party talks with North Korea, until right before the North Korean “nuclear statement.” However, contrary to what the government of South Korea intended, North Korea used South Korea’s appeasement as a tool for its own hard-line policy.
Approaching a matter with only good intentions is typical amateurism. I hope the government of South Korea does not expand previous justifications for its rationality thus cutting off all other possibilities, but to patiently analyze the problem before approaching it. Moreover, I hope the government of South Korea does not take a unilateral and subjective hope as the basis for its policy decisions and to please save their words.
