[imText1]In a telephone interview with the Daily NK, Lee Dong Bok, a leading North Korean specialist and president of the North Korean Democracy Forum, analyzed North Korea’s dramatic change in its nuclear policy as a result of the U.S. financial sanction.
Lee, in the interview, said, “Until last year, North Korea was getting ready for a ‘protracted war’ by putting off the six-party talks and keeping its nuclear warheads while splitting the U.S. and South Korea and supporting the pro-North Korean faction in Seoul.”
“However,” Lee added, “North Korea’s calculations met an obstacle when the U.S. imposed a financial sanction on Pyongyang last September. Thus, Pyongyang might have considered the sanction as a life-or-death threat.”
“So North Korea took a whole new course of action,” Lee’s analysis continued. “This was to get acknowledged as a nuclear state as early as possible. And, because the regime felt that it was not enough to just declare possession of nukes, it conducted a nuclear test.”
“Ultimately, it will be North Korea who is going to beg to return to the six-party talks, because Kim Jong Il will exploit the negotiation roundtable to get recognition as a ‘nuclear state.’ And he will turn the topic of the talks to multilateral nuclear arms reduction,” Lee anticipated.
Of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Lee pointed out President Roh’s changed stance from a comprehensive tolerance policy toward North Korea in his special press conference on Monday as a lame excuse.
Lee predicted that the Sino-North Korean relationship will deteriorate because of the nuke test. “We may expect that Beijing will eventually give up the relationship with Kim Jong Il. If Washington promises to respect Chinese vested rights in North Korea, China could alter its North Korean policy.”
In terms of military action, Lee anticipated the possibility of American military response to North Korean nukes to be low because the U.S. can change the Kim regime with only diplomatic and economic measures.
Although Lee defined the Sunshine Policy as a ‘total failure’ and South Korea would be likely to follow the international society’s reaction and popular outrage against North Korean nuclear development, he was cautious to comment on what the Roh administration would do as international punishment getting serious.
When asked about the best solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, Lee firmly said that there was no better solution than destroying the Kim Jong Il regime. “To Kim Jong Il,” Lee emphasized, “abandoning nukes means creating a normal relationship with the United States, which will undermine his militarist policies. And Kim needs an imaginary enemy to keep his regime stable and safe.”
“So,” Lee concluded, “Kim Jong Il will never leave nuclear warheads aside. Regime change is not the best solution. It is only solution.”
