The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia has brought immediate benefits to the North Korean leadership. In addition, it has further strengthened North Korea’s position in its relationship with China, as reflected in China’s continued accommodation despite North Korea’s increased belligerence and the apparent unease that it has caused in Beijing. An implication is that – for as long as North Korean interests are best served by maintaining the status quo – any hope of fundamentally changing the situation on the Korean peninsula is remote. Yet, while for the moment, the North Korean leadership is a main beneficiary of the shifts in the balance of power in Northeast Asia, this may not last.
The Russia-North Korea rapprochement
Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow have historically developed countercyclically to relations between Pyongyang and Beijing.[1] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea became more dependent on China but since the first meeting of their current presidents in June 2023, Russia-North Korea relations have experienced a turnaround, leading to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Pact”, signed in June 2024 which commits both countries to provide military assistance if the other is subjected to armed aggression.[2]
The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia is widely seen as reducing North Korea’s dependence on China and providing the DPRK with greater strategic independence.[3] In official trade data, North Korea-China trade still dwarfs North Korea-Russia trade even though the latter was expected to triple in 2024.[4] However, since September 2023, there has been a steady flow of weapons shipments from North Korea to Russia[5] to make up for ammunition shortages that had emerged during Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and, by October 2024, North Korea had begun with the deployment of troops to Russian Kursk Oblast. Olena Guseinova of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul[6] estimated that by October 2024 the weapons deliveries alone had reached a value of between $1.7 billion and $5.5 billion. While this estimate excludes any earnings from North Korean troop deployments in Russia, it already puts trade with Russia at a similar level as official trade with China of about $2.3 billion in 2023.[7]
North Korea appears to have used part of its earnings from trade with Russia to cushion the inflationary impact of a short-terminist policy of increasing wages in the state sector which was rolled out in late 2023.[8] The partnership agreement also includes cooperation in scientific and technological research, in particular in space and peaceful atomic energy, raising fears of Russian support for the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile program, directly enhancing North Korean capacity for belligerence. Shortly after concluding the agreement, in November 2023, North Korea finally succeeded – reportedly with the help of Russia – to launch a reconnaissance satellite.[9]
While the frequency of serious provocations such as missile tests has remained consistently high since the end of the pandemic restrictions in January 2022,[10] there has been a recent hardening of North Korean policy towards South Korea, including the destruction of border crossings, the renunciation of the aim of unification and, as reported in late 2024, a constitutional amendment that classifies South Korea as an enemy state.[11]
China-North Korea relations
As direct neighbors, the relationship between North Korea and China is ambivalent. North Korea is the only country with which China has a defense treaty – going back to 1961. While North Korea depends on China for an overwhelming share of its trade, the level of trust in the relationship is low: North Korea fears China’s meddling in its affairs and relations have been strained by North Korea’s policy of developing nuclear weapons.
For China, North Korea serves as a buffer against the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea that it perceives as a threat to its own security.[12] Yet North Korea’s belligerence also creates a risk for China of getting drawn into a conflict – a fear which it tried to address when the defense treaty was renewed in 2021: mutual obligations were explicitly limited to cases of aggression instigated by third parties.[13]
China-North Korea relations were traditionally managed through summit diplomacy, with China showing some success in reining in North Korean belligerence.[14] China’s long-standing objectives in this relationship are peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the denuclearization of North Korea. However, with Xi Jinping’s accession to the CPC leadership in November 2012, the drive for denuclearization took a greater precedence in China-North Korea relations. In February 2013, North Korea’s three missile tests signaled a clear disregard for China’s calls for restraint. In response, China scaled back diplomatic and military engagements, and ties between the leaders of the nominal allies cooled significantly.[15] Moreover, the common interest in bringing North Korea to the negotiation table over its nuclear weapons program saw China align with the United States in support of increasingly stringent UN Security Council resolutions in 2016 and 2017, aimed at coercing North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
China’s approach shifted again in 2018,[16] when the prospect of a US-North Korea settlement emerged, leading to the high-profile – but ultimately unsuccessful – summits between the US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore and Hanoi. Following the announcement of the first Trump-Kim summit on March 8, 2018, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping held two meetings, with two additional meetings taking place thereafter.[17]
Subsequent Chinese government visits to North Korea, however, have produced a lack of tangible outcomes. In 2019, tensions surfaced when North Korea appeared to snub China diplomatically. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not received by Kim Jong-un, and North Korea sent only a lower ranking government official to the second Belt and Road Forum.[18] Despite this, China, alongside Russia, vetoed UN Security Council resolution 2022/431, which condemned the intercontinental ballistic missile test of March 24, 2022. This marked a strong contrast to the Council’s unanimous condemnation of similar tests in 2017.[19] In May 2025, a joint statement by Russia and China, issued on the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, called to stop unilateral sanctions and military pressure against North Korea. [20]
China-Russia relations
The Ukraine war also brought about a deepening of the relationship – dubbed a “no limit partnership” – between Russia and China, with Russia becoming increasingly dependent on China as a supplier of technology and a market for fossil fuels. Amid growing hostility between China and the United States, the US administration’s recent attempt to improve relations with Russia must have raised some concerns in Beijing.[21] While the Russia – North Korea rapprochement negatively affects Chinese interests in Northeast Asia and Russia has no alternative to the partnership with China in the short term, China’s interests would be ill served if a repetition of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s happened in the medium term.
China’s response to the Russia-North Korea rapprochement
Amid China’s increasingly adversarial relationship with the United States – dating back to the first Trump presidency – and concerns of losing leverage over North Korea, the prospect of a US-DPRK rapprochement appears to have shifted China’s stance toward its neighbor. While the Russia-North Korea rapprochement is, arguably, less threatening, China still seems to view their relationship with unease.
North Korean belligerence remains a key concern for China. Since 2018, China has tended to shift blame for tensions on the Korean peninsula from North Korea to the United States and its trilateral alliance.[22] But more recently, China’s uneasiness about North Korea has been growing:[23] in October 2024, the Chinese CCTV news channel expressed concern about the complexity of the situation created by the Russia-North Korea alliance, and its impact on the Korean peninsula.[24] Ultimately, however, China has few other options than continue to accommodate North Korea if it wishes to avoid even further destabilization of the situation on the Korean peninsula and there are no signs that it is willing to undermine its own partnership with Russia.
As the North Korean leadership has shown in the past, it is quite adept at playing off different stakeholders against each other. Therefore, it must perceive the current strategic environment – marked by competing interests among partners and adversaries – as highly advantageous. Soon these dynamics will include South Korea, under a new Lee Jae-myung Presidency. While North Korea is likely to seek ways to further enhance its position – possibly including fresh advances to the United States[25] – it would be hard pressed to give up advantages tied to the present geopolitical situation. This is likely to frustrate hopes that the second Trump presidency is going bring about a change in the status quo on the Korean peninsula.[26]
The future, however, looks less promising for North Korea: it remains unclear to what extent the United States is willing to re-engage on the Korean peninsula. While Russia is likely to remain focused on maintaining and rebuilding its military power, an eventual end to its war in Ukraine is likely to shift priorities to its military-industrial complex at home. A China interested in shifting the geopolitical balance in Northeast Asia in its favor might be less interested in an unreliable ally. While it lasts, though, North Korea is unlikely to be the wedge with which to effect change in the balance of power in Northeast Asia.
References:
[1]Lee, Choong-Koo (2025), “China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity.” War on the Rocks. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/chinas-ties-with-north-korea-are-in-a-ditch-and-therin-lies-opportunity/.
[2]Von Essen, Hugo, “Putin’s June 2024 Visit to North Korea Sends Ripples Through Both East and West”, SCEEUS Commentary No. 10, 2024, https://sceeus.se/en/publications/putins-june-2024-visit-to-north-korea-sends-ripples-through-both-east-and-west/
[3]Institute for the Study of War, “China-Taiwan Weekly Update”, May 2, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-2-2025
[4] In the first half of 2024, North Korea – Russia trade was $53mn, up from $34mn in the entire year 2023, see Frederic Spohr (2024), New ties between North Korea and Russia, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, October 28, 2024, https://www.freiheit.org/new-ties-between-north-korea-and-russia.
[5]https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/
[6] Olena Guseinova, “Putin’s Partner”, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea, October 2024, https://shop.freiheit.org/#!/Publikation/1807.
[7]Official North Korea – China trade was about $2.3 billion in 2023, see https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/prk. In the first half of 2024, North Korea – Russia trade was $53mn, up from $34mn in the entire year 2023
[8]Andrei Lankov, “How North Korea has clawed back control over the economy by hiking state wages”, NK News, May 13, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/how-north-korea-has-clawed-back-control-over-the-economy-by-hiking-state-wages/. See also Bang, Chan Young, “Why North Korea’s bold experiment with raising wages is destined to fail”, NK News, May 27, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/why-north-koreas-bold-experiment-with-raising-wages-is-destined-to-fail/
[9]See e.g. Institute for the Study of War, “North Korea Joins Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and Northeast Asia”, November 1, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications
[10] See https://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-north-korean-provocations/.
[11] ”North Korea Construction at the East and West Border Crossings”, 38 North, October 25, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/10/north-korea-construction-at-the-east-and-west-border-crossings/ and “North Korean constitution now calls South ‘hostile state” , BBC News, October 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wnxlxxwq2o.
[12] See, e.g., Mearsheimer, John (2014), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition, WW Norton, 372.
[13]Vu, Khang (2021), “Why China and North Korea Decided to Renew 60 Year-old Treaty”, Lowly Institute July 30, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty
[14]See, e.g. Lee, Yongjae (2023), “China’s Diplomatic Leverage on North Korean Provocations: Effect of High-Level Meetings Between China and North Korea on North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests”, Journal of East Asian Studies, 23: 517–546, https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.12.
[15]Snyder, Scott, “Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?” Council on Foreign Relations March 31, 2016, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/will-china-change-its-north-korea-policy.
[16]Min, Kyung-tae 2023), “Navigating Geopolitical Change in Northeast Asia: A Realist Approach to Analyze the Matrix Scenario of US-China Conflict and US–North Korea Relations”, Pacific Focus 38: 378–408, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12236.
[17]CICS (2017), List of China-North Korea High Level Visits Since 1953, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/china-dprk-high-level-visits-since-1953-2/
[18]Frohman, Ben, Emma Rafaelof, Alexis Dale-Huang (2022), The China-North Korea Strategic Rift: Background and Implications for the United States, Staff research report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North_Korea_Strategic_Rift.pdf
[19]UN Security Council Resolution 2371, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2371
[20]Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Further Deepening Relations of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation in the New Era to Commemorate the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, the Victory of the Chinese People in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression and the Establishment of the United Nations, p.26. May 8, 2025. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6309/, see also Sokolin, Anton. 2025. “Putin, Xi demand end to sanctions and ‘military pressure’ against North Korea. NK News. Retrieved from https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/putin-xi-demand-end-to-sanctions-and-military-pressure-against-north-korea/?t=1747050244.
[21] Jie, Yu (2025), China’s partnership with Russia needs to have limits, Financial Times, February 28, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/880bfd61-c1d6-40e4-9df0-ddf67a4a2b4d.
[22]Park Sang-joon, Han Yong-joon. (2023). “The dilemma of North Korea-China relations”. The Korean Journal of Area Studies 41(2), 55-86. https://scholar.kyobobook.co.kr/article/detail/4010047507932.
[23]Lee, Choong-Koo (2025), “China’s Ties with North Korea Are in a Ditch, and Therein Lies Opportunity”, War on the Rocks, February 19, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/chinas-ties-with-north-korea-are-in-a-ditch-and-therin-lies-opportunity/
[24]While stopping short of blaming its allies, Chinese state media has expressed serious concern about the tensions on the Korean peninsula after the Russia-DPRK rapprochement: “However, this has also led to a complex situation of “Russia North Korea vs. the United States, South Korea, and Japan” in the Korean Peninsula and even East Asia, causing great concern from the outside world.“ see “Who is stirring up the situation on the peninsula from melting ice to falling to freezing point?”, CCTV News, October 21, 2024, https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=1747617345351656070&toc_style_id=feeds_default&share_to=copy_url&track_id=8dd60738-109b-4786-bfd9-2c75121d9133.
[25] Defector interviews suggest that if the Russia-North Korea partnership were to fail in providing benefits, North Korea might “turn” to the US according to John Everard on the RTE1 Today program on November 11, 2024.
[26] see, e.g., Dmitri Alperovitch and Sergey Radchenko, “Trump-Kim, Part II, Could Shake Up the World”, New York Times, December 29, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/opinion/us-north-korea-china-russia-axis.html.
