MOFAT Proposes a “Roadmap for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by 2010”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) submitted to the presidential transition team on the 13th “A Plan for Pursuing Denuclearization on the Korea Peninsula.” The plan calls for North Korea to complete the disablement of its nuclear facilities and declare its nuclear programs by this March and to completely abandon all nuclear weapons by 2010 by agreeing to a schedule for the first half of the year.

However, such a timetable differs considerably from the “February 13 Agreement” of the Six-Party Talks. When the agreement was being negotiated, the Bush administration planned to complete nuclear abandonment by the end of his term through the completion of the declaration of all nuclear programs and the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility by the end of this year.

Subsequently, with smooth progress of the disablement project beginning November 5th, the nuclear abandonment roadmap seemed to be on track. However, due to the anticipated obstacles relating to the Uranium Enrichment Program (UEP) and questions regarding nuclear proliferation to Syria, the deadline for declaration passed.

President Bush, for the first time in his term, sent a personal letter to the “Dear Chairman” and urged Kim Jong Il to declare North Korea’s nuclear programs, but the results appear to have been unsuccessful.

Following North Korea’s failure to keep the declaration deadline for disablement delineated in the “October 3 Agreement,” the fate of the “Second Phase Roadmap for Denuclearization on the Korea Peninsula” seems to be up in the air.

According to MOFAT’s plan, the administration should adhere to the principle of urging nuclear abandonment as the highest priority, and should pour all of its energy into getting a declaration of nuclear programs by March. There is much interest regarding coordination with the U.S. administration.

Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Six-Party Talks, while departing for Beijing from South Korea on the 10th, commented that before the new administration steps in, it would be wise to complete the second phase of denuclearization, raising questions as to whether a new deadline had been proposed.

Simultaneously, the reason for MOFAT deciding on March as the new deadline seems to stem from the fact that extracting fuel rods from the Yongbyon 5 megawatt nuclear reactor will most likely be completed around March. Thus, if the declaration is concluded by then, the “momentum” can be maintained.

According to the schedule for nuclear abandonment, MOFAT also announced to the presidential transition team that it would pursue a plan for wrapping up nuclear abandonment that would include such issues as removing nuclear materials and nuclear weapons abroad, and signing a peace agreement.

However, the abandonment of North Korean nuclear facilities will be decided by internal factors in North Korea rather than external factors, so pessimism regarding the possibility of the complete abandonment of the nuclear facilities is growing. This is due to the fact that economic support and improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations are insufficiently persuasive.

One diplomatic expert on North Korea pointed out, “There is an opinion that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons if the U.S. actively steps up its efforts to improve relations with North Korea or sizably compensates the North. However, they misread the North Korea’s characteristics.”

He said, “North Korea’s ‘military-first politics’ dictates that the pursuit of a powerful military with nuclear weapons is an important goal of the state. Economic compensation or improved U.S.-North Korea relations can contribute to the security of the country, but they can pose other threats to the Kim Jong Il regime, so nuclear abandonment is not as easy as it sounds.”

Although North Korea itself is the biggest variable, the international situation around the Korea Peninsula and other unexpected international issues would also be obstacles, with respect to nuclear abandonment. At any rate, due to the delay in the North’s Declaration, the voices of the hard-liners in the U.S. have been growing increasingly loud. A change in the Bush administration’s North Korea policy is possible.

Accordingly, the Lee Myung Bak administration’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” the premise of which is North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, will have an effect as well.

The presidential transition team revealed the idea of linking support for North Korea to whether or not there is progress in the roadmap to North Korea’s nuclear abandonment. The intention is to strictly observe the speed of support for North Korea by dividing the nuclear abandonment process into three stages: nuclear program declaration, initiation of the process of the abandonment of nuclear facility, and the completion of abandonment.

Some wonder about coordination between the “Plan for Pursuing Denuclearization on the Korea Peninsula” and the Lee Myung Bak administration’s “Vision 3000.”

Of course, if the abandonment of nuclear weapons is completed by 2010, the Lee administration’s plans on North Korea will be put into effect, but if it is not completed by that time, the formation of a new North Korea strategy cannot be ruled out. Experts on North Korea maintain that North Korea policy should be based solely on the possibility of support based on North Korea’s cooperation, but also the possibility that the opposite scenario may occur.