On December 12th,
2013, Jang Song Taek was executed in accordance with the ruling of a special
military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security. There are two important
points for discussion here. Firstly, what was the real reason behind Jang’s
execution, and on whose initiative did it happen? Secondly, what changes are
likely in the post-Jang world?
Currently, there
are two theories surrounding the identit[ies] of the purge instigators.
I. The first theory
is the “Party-military instigation” theory. This theory holds that Jang had
tried to shift ownership of significant foreign-currency earning capacity from
the military to the Party, and had been forced to remove former KPA
Chief-of-Staff Ri Yong Ho in the process. This, in turn, met with stern
criticism from military hardliners around Ri, who then joined forces with the
Party Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) to uncover corruption by Jang
and his followers. Thereafter, this clique had Kim order the execution of Jang and the purging of his group.
Under this theory,
military hardliners and the Party OGD were the main instigators of the purge,
and Kim Jong Eun was a mere puppet doing their bidding. However, there is a
problem, and it is that if this were the case, it would be hard to explain the
very public nature of Jang’s execution. If the recovery of foreign revenue sources
and other rights and interests were truly at the core of the purge and execution, then
it would have been better to quietly execute Jang and equally quietly isolate
his power base at home and abroad. This would have helped hard currency revenues to keep flowing and inward investments to continue.
Killing Kim’s uncle in such a ruthless and public manner surely required a crime of greater significance than this. Given North Korea’s political reality, only
challenging the monolithic leadership system would appear to be sufficient.
II. The second theory
is the “Kim Jong Eun directed Jang’s execution” theory. The late November meeting in rural Samjiyeon, reported in the state media and at which some assert Jang’s fate was ultimately decided, included
Ministry of State Security and Party OGD personnel, in addition to Choe Ryong
Hae. The character of the meeting was the maintenance
of the monolithic rule of the Mt. Baekdu bloodline (i.e. the Kim family). Within this context, Jang’s death was of, to an extent by, and certainly for Kim. The impulsive and
uncalculating nature of the execution itself, seemingly without undue regard for the possible aftermath, bears Kim’s emotional fingerprint.
The only problem with
this theory is time: less than a month to deal with the event,
from November 18th, when Jang was reportedly under house arrest, to his
execution on December 12th.
III. It is not possible to say with absolute certainty why
Jang was removed. The judgement of the special military tribunal
articulated a range of allegations, but they must be reviewed with care as it
would be unwise to assume that official charges coincide closely with the actual
crimes of the accused.
There are two main strands.
Firstly, that Jang used personal means to create an influential clique that
undermined or threatened to undermine the monolithic leadership system of the
Kim family. Secondly, that he was in agreement or sympathized with the policy of third countries regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. The first
concerns a power struggle; the second concerns conflict over future courses of
action and direct disagreement with mainstream policy.
It is too simple to suggest that Jang’s fall from grace solely resulted from conflict
over access to resources. The tribunal backs this assessment, ruling also that Jang cleaved to “the ‘strategic patience’ policy and ‘waiting
strategy’ of the U.S. and the South Korean puppet group of traitors.” Superficially,
this is identical to the sort of routine charge levelled at persons
accused of acting as American spies, such as Pak Hon Yong. However, it implies that Jang actively disagreed with Kim over future strategy, and this is a serious assertion. The strategy of the
US and South Korea with regards to the nuclear issue is to wait for the
collapse of North Korea, it is alleged, and Jang is charged with supposedly
facilitating that very strategy.
Then how did
Jang help to facilitate it? He was in favour of
economic liberalization and building a cooperative relationship with China, rather
than conducting another nuclear test. That some form of Jang-style economic liberalization
would have greatly improved the living standards of the North Korean people is obvious; however, the tribunal judgement takes a different line:
“I attempted to
trigger off discontent among service personnel and people when the present regime
does not take any measure despite the fact that the economy of the country and
people’s living are driven into catastrophe.”
There is no
reason why Jang would make such a confession unless it were under duress. This
can only be a fabrication designed to slander him. In any case, that the
judgement speaks frankly about the real condition of North Korea is a
surprising admission (and suggests that Park Pong Ju, the premier of the
Cabinet now responsible for the economy, will not avoid dismissal or worse if
he fails to improve matters).
The fact that
after Jang’s execution the North stated that its economic strategy would remain
the same, then took part in a management committee meeting at Kaesong and
worked to normalize relations with China, is evidence that the Kim regime is
aware of the country’s dire economic straits. Unfortunately, however, the main
obstruction to the improvement and liberalization of the economy is the monolithic
system itself; Pak Pong Ju cannot and will not promote a Chinese-style campaign
of liberalization. Accordingly, special economic zones can only be half-hearted attempts at economic liberalization with few or no significant results.
“I didn’t fix the definite time for the
coup. But it was my intention to concentrate my department and all economic
organs on the Cabinet and become premier when the economy goes totally bankrupt
and the state is on the verge of collapse in a certain period,” Jang supposedly
admitted.
The reason why
there was no specific schedule for the alleged “coup” may have been that in the absence of
significant measures the economy would eventually collapse by itself. The question
is what the Kim regime would do when it became clear that its economic reform efforts had failed. That
Kim wants to alter the present situation is clear in his other actions, in
addition to the tribunal judgement itself. The March Plenary Meeting of the
Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee decided on the new strategic line of
simultaneously pursuing economic development and nuclear weapons (the “Byungjin
Line”). Logically, once economic development fails, nuclear weapons would have
to be employed to stave off complete collapse.
The charge that
Jang embraced to the “strategic patience” and “waiting strategy” of the US and
South Korea bears re-examination. From the viewpoint of economic
liberalization, this charge is a complete fabrication. However, it does also suggest
that Jang may have expressed opposition to Kim and the military’s hard line of
declaring the armistice invalid in the spring of 2013 and shutting down the Kaesong
Industrial Complex.
“He committed such anti-party acts as
systematically denying the party line and policies, its organizational will, in
the past period. These acts were a revelation of deliberate and sinister
attempt to create extreme illusion and idolization of him by making him appear
as a special being who can overrule either issues decided by the party or its
line,” the judgment said.
Since the
beginning of 2013, the number of inspection tours on which Jang accompanied Kim
Jong Eun decreased dramatically. There is the rumor going around that Jang may have told
his wife Kim Kyong Hui to “stop Jong Eun” when he initially threatened to close
Kaesong, and that this led to Jang’s removal from policy formulation activities. In May, Choe
Ryong Hae visited China with a letter from Kim informing Xi Jinping of a fourth
nuclear test, which was strongly discouraged by China. It was reported that Jang
also opposed further such tests, like China.
IV. If Jang’s
death resulted from his rebelling against the monolithic leadership system or
organizing an opposing faction, then his death is merely the result of a
routine power struggle, similar to a gang in which a new boss has assumed
absolute power.
However, if it resulted from conflict over nuclear strategy or economic planning, then
it could have significant repercussions for the Korean Peninsula as a whole.
Without a mediating factor in Jang, there is a greater possibility of Kim
proceeding to a fourth demonstration of North Korea’s nuclear might, in
addition to further provocations vis-a-vis the South; even the possibility of direct
conflict cannot be completely ruled out.
Kim’s actions thus
far show that he suffers from greater delusions of grandeur than his
grandfather, pursues greater luxuries and vainglories than his father, and is somewhat
unstable and unpredictable by virtue of living in his own world, detached from
reality. That Kim suffers from delusions of grandeur is confirmed by the
needless warnings of nuclear warfare against the US and South Korea and
other provocations after the 2013 nuclear test. That he pursues dreams rather
than reality is corroborated by the construction of a ski resort and other
luxury facilities, as well as heavy investments in his own deification, things
that are not necessary, and will be of no help to ordinary citizens at all.
One thing is clear: Kim Jong Eun is not about to stay quiet and focus on economic liberalization, steering
clear of militant actions.
* This is a shortened version of a Guest Column that appeared in Korean on December 23rd. The views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
