The current situation on the Korean peninsula resembles a sporting event at intermission.
Last year, the North Korean regime committed attacks on the ROKS Cheonan and Yeongpyeong Island. They followed those actions by demanding for inter-Korean dialogue earlier this year. They then attracted the world’s attention with Kim Jong Il’s surprise visit to China in May. Then, there was an opening ceremony for the joint development of Rasun and Hwanggeumpyeong. At the same time however, North Korea has been threatening the South Korean government with the disclosure of secrete meetings, and pretending to desire improvement of inter-Korean relations by calling South Korean officials to meetings at Mt. Geumgang.
Kim Jong Il’s recent moves are certainly attempts to create change. Most importantly, his moves are attempting to strengthen North Korea’s relationship with China. However, it’s very difficult to predict how the Sino-North Korean relationship will unfold.
This relationship, which was once a ‘blood-alliance’ after the Korean war, has been deteriorating since China’s reforms and economic opening in the late 1970’s, as well as Kim Jong Il’s criticism of Deng Xiaoping as ‘revisionist’.
Nor has China treated North Korea as a real comrade as of late. During North Korea’s great famine in the mid-1990’s, China did very little to help. In fact, there is a closer relationship between the ROK and the United states than between China and the DPRK. The latter relationship has continued since the normalization of relations between South Korea and China in 1992. However, despite Kim Jong Il’s emphasizing of the ‘generational blood alliance’, the Chinese-DPRK relationship is moving towards an interest-based relationship. In fact, the 1992 Sino-South Korean normalization of relations ended the five decade long Sino-North Korean ‘blood-alliance’ relationship.
However North Korea remains a geopolitically, diplomatically, militarily, economically, and culturally important area for China, and there remains something more than a normal alliance between the two. The Korean peninsula is the crossroads at which American and Chinese interests collide. There will continue to be friction along these lines in the future.
Kim Jong Il is attempting to lease the Rasun area to China and Russia-although the extent of this leasing remains uncertain. The Rasun area’s strategic importance will be very meaningful to South Korea. If China has more, and freer, access to the Jeju strait through Rasun and Chongjin, it will have a competitive advantage over the U.S. and Japan.
Rasun is important for China’s national strategy as a way to pioneer a new sea route, and Kim Jong Il is selling Rasun to China fin exchange for stability of succession. However, China will reduce there ‘price’ in this deal since it is Kim Jong Il who needs this quid pro quo more.
As intermission ends, and the next round of ‘Korean Play’ starts, it’s hard to know whether it will be inter-Korean talks->US-DPRK talks ->Six Party Talks, or North Korea testing long-range missiles, or a third nuclear test, or a mixture of both-arguing for peace negotiations first at the six party talks(while refusing to discuss the UEP issue since it’s price tag is separate) while preparing a third nuclear test and long range missiles to gain further concessions from the United States that comes into play.
However, it is certain that the governments of South Korea, Japan, and the US are at the disadvantage. They all need quick progress in nuclear talks because of upcoming political term limits. Kim Jong Il, on the other hand, can benefit by delaying talks. China is satisfied with organizing the six party talks itself, naming itself a chair country. Hu Jintao has no worries about dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue before his own retirement. Therefore, in the next stage of talks, it is likely that Kim Jong Il will have the advantage.
South Korea is in an uneasy situation. After continually being rocked by the Kim Jong Il regime with the killing of a tourist at Geumgang, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the Yeonpyeong shelling, Lee Myung Bak’s term as president is quickly nearing its end.
South Korea’s North Korean strategy has been to change the North Korea from the inside in an attempt to create reform and an opening of the society, while at the same time deterring the North from provocative military actions. This has been by South Korea, as well as through South Korean-US and South Korean-Chinese cooperation.
The Lee administration has done a good job showing it’s strong will to refuse to give in to Kim Jong Il-which is in contrast to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments-and it has been in the national interests of South Korea. Continuing the policies of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun would be costly, while solving nothing. However, it’s true that the Lee administration has not proactively acted on its North Korean strategy for a variety of reasons.
Going forward, South Korea needs to focus less on short term changes to the approach towards North Korea, and should focus on more subtle, long term changes in tactics. South Korea should focus on obtaining an apology from North Korea for the sinking of the Cheonan, as well as tactics to carry on successful, cooperative, relationships with the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia in the upcoming stages of negotiation.
Specifically regarding Rajin and Sunbong, the South Korean government needs to pursue ways to be involved with any possible Chinese or Russian investment. However, the South Korean government should not feel rushed in making this decision. There is no reason to rush these decisions because Kim Jong Il is unlikely to make any bold or decisive decisions to open the Rajin-Sunbong or the Hwanggeumpyeong areas any time soon. Therefore, the South Korean government should make a much more meticulous plan using cautious and elaborate tactics. At the same time, we must actively operate to lead the North Korean society into the flow of free information. It is time the South Korean government must work more actively, resolutely, and cautiously.
