Officials from the Daegu Metropolitan City Election Commission conduct a campaign on the afternoon of May 14, 2025, at Igok Rose Park in Dalseo District, Daegu, to promote voter participation in the presidential election to be held on June 3. /Photo=Yonhap News

Why unification and North Korea policy define Korea’s presidential election

As Korea approaches its presidential election on June 3, 2025, questions of national security and unification have become more complex than ever. With North Korea’s nuclear threat looming large, U.S.-China strategic competition intensifying, and domestic divisions deepening, many Koreans are grappling with fundamental questions about whether Korean unification is necessary—or even possible.

The three frontrunners—Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party, and Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party—have presented distinctly different policy platforms. Their approaches to unification and North Korea policy reveal not just their views on national security and foreign policy, but their broader vision for Korea’s future direction and identity.

Lee Jae-myung: Pragmatic peace through economic engagement

Lee Jae-myung’s central approach centers on “sustainable peace and joint prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.” The Democratic Party candidate takes a pragmatic stance that emphasizes “conditional engagement” while building on the progressive tradition of North Korea policy.

His platform rests on three pillars: gradually reducing North Korea’s nuclear threat, easing military tensions on the peninsula, and maintaining deterrence through the U.S.-Korea alliance. To address the nuclear issue, Lee plans to develop a denuclearization roadmap and guide North Korea toward denuclearization through step-by-step, reciprocal measures.

What stands out is Lee’s strategy of advancing inter-Korean relations and achieving denuclearization not through military pressure or traditional diplomacy, but through multilateral economic and trade engagement. This represents a practical attempt to overcome the limitations of past efforts that relied heavily on aid to North Korea.

However, Lee’s platform lacks clarity on resolving practical challenges. He offers no medium- or long-term strategy for the peninsula’s future, nor does he explain how he would achieve “sustainable peace and joint prosperity.”

Moreover, Lee provides inadequate answers for overcoming persistent obstacles like North Korea’s questionable sincerity and entrenched resistance to change. He appears to have given limited consideration to improving North Korean citizens’ lives or transforming North Korean society.

Given the stark asymmetry between South and North Korea, an approach that relies solely on external environmental changes may prove insufficient.

Nevertheless, Lee’s platform demonstrates his commitment to organizing negotiations with the international community while focusing on national interests, rather than relying on the “goodwill” that many progressives have emphasized in the past. This represents a balanced approach that pursues practical gains without abandoning the broader goal of peninsula peace.

Kim Moon-soo: Unification through strength

On national security and unification, Kim Moon-soo prioritizes systemic competition and deterrence under his “strong state” banner. His platform emphasizes robust national security, featuring plans to restore state counterintelligence capabilities, introduce AI-based counterespionage systems, enhance nuclear deterrence against North Korea’s arsenal, and expand Korea’s global defense industry reach.

Kim’s unification and defense strategy focuses not on coexistence with North Korea but on using competition and pressure to force regime change. He apparently sees little value in dialogue unless it’s premised on the North Korean regime’s relaxation or complete collapse and reorganization under liberal democratic principles.

But reality is more complex. Korean Peninsula affairs are deeply intertwined with geopolitics, and North Korea operates within a security bloc with China and Russia. In such a complex strategic environment, unilateral pressure based on hard-line security thinking is unlikely to produce change in North Korea.

Furthermore, extended nuclear deterrence or nuclear sharing require substantial technological and financial resources. While Kim proposes securing necessary funding through innovative defense budget restructuring and prioritizing national security in government spending, questions remain about implementation details.

Even assuming Kim could overcome the significant obstacle of progressive control in the National Assembly through collaborative governance, deploying tactical nuclear weapons or NATO-style nuclear sharing would require consent from geopolitical players like the U.S. and Japan.

Kim’s policies prioritize state survival, balancing practical security threats with Korea’s constitutional identity. This approach may appeal to voters who favor muscular peninsula security policy, but many questions remain about whether it’s a viable path to unification.

Lee Jun-seok: Abolishing the unification ministry for government efficiency

Lee Jun-seok doesn’t address unification policy in his official platform, but in interviews, he’s offered the most radical prescription for the unification question—eliminating the Ministry of Unification.

Lee believes it’s inefficient to separate unification work from foreign policy and wants to bring North Korea policy under the foreign ministry’s umbrella. This isn’t merely administrative reshuffling—it fundamentally challenges the unification ministry’s reason for existence and symbolizes Lee’s political stance on Korea’s unification vision.

Lee offers three reasons for closing the unification ministry: (1) overlap with foreign ministry functions, (2) institutional ineffectiveness, and (3) minimal impact of previous ministers. The Reform Party candidate clarifies that while he doesn’t oppose unification itself, he questions the ministry’s structural significance and diplomatic role.

This stance reflects Lee’s broader “small government” advocacy, which seeks to maximize administrative efficiency and reduce costs by merging or eliminating inefficient agencies. Dismantling the unification ministry aligns with his vision of smaller government through reduced presidential authority, deregulation, and decentralization. However, it lacks specific details about who would handle the ministry’s unique responsibilities, such as civilian exchanges, family reunions, and North Korean defector assistance.

Whether small government philosophy suits the Korean Peninsula’s specific geopolitical reality is questionable. Moreover, closing the unification ministry might violate the constitutional principle of “peaceful unification based on free and democratic order” enshrined in Article 4.

The unification ministry isn’t just another government agency—for 56 years, it has symbolized and demonstrated South Korea’s commitment to achieving unification through free and democratic means. Regardless of actual intentions, shuttering the ministry could signal systematic erosion of Korea’s unification commitment.

Unification as strategy or ideal?

The three leading candidates in the 2025 presidential election each bring distinct philosophies and strategies to unification and national security. Lee Jae-myung outlines a pragmatic strategy for realistically achieving peaceful unification. Kim Moon-soo prefers responding decisively to North Korea by reinforcing South Korea’s systemic legitimacy. Lee Jun-seok represents the efficiency-focused manager who approaches unification not as a strategic state goal but from an administrative perspective.

If we were to label each candidate’s approach, Lee Jae-myung represents “inclusive pragmatism,” Kim Moon-soo advocates “conservative deterrence,” and Lee Jun-seok embodies “efficient managerialism.”

This presidential election involves more than simply installing a new administration. Constitutional amendments are likely, potentially leading to new national security and unification strategies that will shape the peninsula’s destiny for years to come.

Unification cannot be achieved through sentiment or ideals alone. Equally, security and efficiency by themselves are inadequate for addressing the fundamental challenge of building a Korean Peninsula community.

South Korean voters must view candidates’ unification and national security strategies not as partisan slogans but as concrete plans that could define the peninsula’s future. Whatever policy direction these candidates pursue, they ultimately bear responsibility for protecting the nation and charting a course on unification.

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