The 3rd Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference came to an end on Tuesday with Kim Jong Eun firmly installed as the successor to Kim Jong Il and the Kim family and its close associates in many key posts.
According to an official Chosun Central News Agency report released on September 29th, Kim Jong Eun became a member of the Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Party at the event. Even a new position, that of Vice Chairman, was created in order to hand it to Kim and another close associate, People’s Army Chief of Staff Lee Young Ho.
In addition, Kim received the title ‘general’ of the Chosun People’s Army alongside Kim Kyung Hee (Kim Jong Il’s sister and current Minister of Light Industry) and Choi Ryong Hae (former Chief Secretary of North Hamkyung Province and a trusted confidant of Kim Jong Il) on September 27th. Therefore, some analysts believe that the foundations by which he will take control of the military and thereafter the state based on the “Military-first policy” have been established.
Oh Kyeong Seob, a researcher with the Sejong Institute, summarized it to The Daily NK thus; “It formalizes the fact that he is Kim Jong Il’s successor. I expect Kim Jong Eun to continue with the ‘Military-first policy’ based on the military.”
◆ Emergence of Kim Jong Eun’s power base: the ‘new military authorities’ and support group
The general presumption was that the hereditary succession would be formalized at the Delegates’ Conference, however, no one expected Kim Jong Eun to become both a member of the Central Committee of the Party and take a high post in its Central Military Commission.
Kim Jong Il was appointed to the post of Vice Director of the Guidance Department at age 27 (1969) and promoted to Agitation and Propaganda head at 31 (1973). Based on this, many speculated that Kim Jong Eun, aged 28, would be put in charge of the Guidance Department at this point in his career.
However, he was appointed to the Central Committee and made Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, a fact which analysts suggest means that he is planning to ascend to power by seizing the reins of the military first.
According to Choi Jin Wook, a senior researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification, “Kim Jong Eun has weak foundations; however, this can be seen as him seizing practical authority. Conditions like Kim Jong Il’s health problem preclude a slow building of his career, as Kim Jong Il did. So, it seems to be an expedient in this case.”
Also, Choi added, “Lee Young Ho being appointed Vice Chairman of Military Commission with Kim Jong Eun, and Choi Ryong Hae and Kim Kyeong Ok receiving the title of general, means a reshuffle in the axis of military authority.”
He pointed out, “Existing elders in the National Defense Commission (NDC) like Kim Young Chun (Vice Chairman of NDC and Minister of the People’s Armed Forces) and Oh Keuk Ryeol are stepping down, and their posts are being filled with new personnel. This can be seen as the introduction of new military authorities which can act as Kim Jong Eun’s support base.”
New personnel were introduced to the Central Military Commission at this Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference as the membership rose from 6 to 16, excluding the chairman and vice chairman. Four existing members including Lee Eul Seol, Lee Ha Il, and Cho Myung Rok were eased out, while only 2, Kim Young Chun and Kim Myung Kuk, kept their seats.
Chief of the General Staff Lee Young Ho is the leader of these new military authorities, men in their 50s and 60s, having been promoted to vice-marshal and appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the expense of Kim Young Chun, the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. This is in order to establish Kim Jong Eun’s power base naturally by getting the elder statesmen, the bedrock of the Kim Jong Il system, to take a step back without completely excluding them from power.
Lee, who assumed the position of Chief of the General Staff as the successor to Commander of the 4th Corps Kim Kyok Sik last year after serving well in the role of Commander of Pyongyang Defense, is the premier artillery expert in North Korea. This therefore looks like a measure to help Kim Jong Eun, who has limited military experience, to show skill in the field of military strategy.
Choi Ryong Hae and Kim Kyeong Ok are other key figures in the new elite. Kim Jong Il appointing Choi Ryong Hae as Kim Jong Eun’s closest figure is a message of loyalty from father to son, since Choi is the son of a prominent first-generation revolutionary, Choi Hyun (deceased 1982), who played a critical role in Kim Jong Il’s hereditary succession by rallying 1st generation North Korean partisans together behind him.
Meanwhile, Kim Kyeong Ok, the First Vice Director of the Guidance Department, is seen as an official who can offer good military guidance. This can be seen as another measure in support of Kim Jong Eun’s seizure of the military.
Membership of the Politburo (including members of the Standing Committee) also increased, from 3 to 17, and candidate membership also rose from 5 to 15. The Secretariat also grew from 5 to 10.
However, the predictions of those who believed that the inexorable rise of Jang Sung Taek would continue fell through. Jnag Sung Taek was appointed to the Central Military Commission, but no other position was given. As is common in the Kim regime and many other dictatorships, it can be seen as a measure to prevent any one person besides the leader from accumulating too much power.
◆ The possibility of the third generation hereditary succession being achieved, and variables
Kim Jong Eun emerged as Vice Chariman of the Military Commission, and was thus formalized as the true “second in command”, but he did not realize great real authority. Therefore, Kim Jong Il’s health is the biggest remaining variable.
Lee Ki Dong, a senior researcher with the Institute for National Security Strategy, explained, “Kim Jong Il’s role in the third generation succession is huge, since Kim Jong Eun is incapable of establishing his own system. His leadership skills are unconfirmed and there is a great deal of dissatisfaction in the system as well.”
Therefore he went on, “Kim Jong Il will provide active support in the establishment of Kim Jong Eun’s power base. How long Kim Jong Il will live is crucial; also, how steadily the North Korea-China relationship can be maintained in the future is a big variable.”
On this, Oh Gyeong Seob anticipated, “Kim Jong Eun cannot serve an independent role. He needs to establish the foundations of his support in the military under Kim Jong Il’s wing for a minimum of 2~3 years to solidify his status as the successor first.”
Oh also stated, “In order to complete the hereditary succession, Kim Jong Eun needs to seize authority in the National Security Agency and People’s Safety Ministry, in addition to the military and Party.”
Therefore, “If Kim Jong Il dies within five years, there is a big possibility that Kim Jong Eun’s authority will be shaken. If Kim Jong Il suddenly passes away, it is important for Kim Jong Eun to show what type of leadership he has. The crucial factor is how to make the elite ruling group into the base of his support.”
He stated, “In order to build the foundations, he sometimes needs to give incentives and also purge to plant his people. However, what type of leadership Kim Jong Eun will show is yet to be seen.”
Kim Jong Il joined the Party in 1964, and established his authority by driving out 20 key officials in the “Gapsan faction” (a pro-Soviet group) in 1967. He also eliminated some close personnel associated with his uncle, Kim Young Ju, who was the second in command after Kim Il Sung at the time and a possible alternative axis of power.
Therefore, for Kim Jong Eun to completely seize authority in the future, the purging of people who get in his way is essential. Whether he can show the ruthless boldness needed is still in question.
◆ Kim Jong Il-Kim Jong Eun initial joint authority era; international and South Korea policy
Now Kim Jong Eun has been formalized as the successor, interest is bound to focus on the possibility of change in international policy, including toward South Korea, in the future.
Some suggest the possibility of introducing reforms to secure support from the people; however, most experts see little chance of change for a while to come.
Lee Ki Dong was one such person, stating, “No new political route was suggested at this Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference, and Kim Jong Eun did not completely seized authority. This means that there will not be any big changes.”
He analyzed, “The period until 2012, which North Korea proclaims will be the first year of the strong and prosperous state, will be used as a transition period to reinforce Kim Jong Eun’s support base by strengthening the ‘Military-first policy’. If Kim Jong Eun can forge his support group within the military and Party by then, he will be able to seek change after 2012.”
Oh Kyeong Seob commented, “While Kim Jong Il is alive, there will be limits to Kim Jong Eun’s ability to draw up or pursue independent plans. Kim Jong Eun’s status as the successor has been secured, however, his ability to run the military, Party and security agencies is insufficient.”
Choi Jin Wook added, “There is some possibility of Kim Jong Eun implementing an appeasement policy domestically and toward South Korea; however, the foundations of his support are not established yet and, since elder groups, Kim Jong Il’s power base, are still strong, there is a high risk attached to change.”
Therefore, the general analysis of experts is that the Party will concentrate on establishing Kim Jong Eun’s independent foundations while maintaining the current status of inter-Korean relations, the North Korean nuclear issue and domestic policy for the next two or three years at least.
