The World Food Programme (WFP) believes that North Korea’s total yield in 2010 was 4.25 million tons, similar to that of the previous year. Given that international estimates say that North Korea needs 5.35 million tons of food, this leads to an estimated shortfall of 1.10 million tons. Based on the results of its own investigation into the shortfall, the WFP claims that 430,000 tons of aid is immediately required.
Currently, the North Korean authorities are collecting donations of rice for the military from civilian organizations, according to an April 18th report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Fifteen-day vacations are also reportedly being given to those soldiers who present 100kg of rice to their base commander.
Meanwhile, the NIS told the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee on April 18th that North Korea’s production of food last year was actually 5.11 million tons, an increase of about 190,000 tons over 2009. A high-ranking official with the Ministry of Unification also said something similar, claiming, “North Korea’s harvest last year was tens of thousands of tons different to the previous year. Therefore, we do not believe North Korea’s food situation to be difficult due to a decreasing harvest.”
The Blue House is also very suspicious of North Korea’s motives, with one official implying as much, saying, “The North Korean authorities are visiting European nations like Italy to ask for food aid, but they are asking that the aid should be provided in rice only, and won’t even consider receiving other forms.”
Therefore, another official with South Korean government stated, “North Korea appears to be acquiring food aid for purposes including securing rice for the military and inventory-building to improve distribution to the North Korean people next year.”
Why has the North Korean authorities’ ability to supply food decreased while the available food quantity has not?
There are a range of reasons; some are international but many relate to corruption and gross inefficiency, plus the clear benefits of trading in the market rather than with the state.
First, farms tend to report production figures to the state but take a share off the top and sell it in the market so as to purchase the fertilizer etc required for the following year’s farming, meaning that less goes to the state and more to the market.
In addition, workers on farms steal food for themselves, and a considerable amount of food is lost in transit. Also, cadres embezzle food during the process of redistribution to Pyongyang and the provinces.
As a result, sources say that distribution for Pyongyang, whose residents are supposed to receive special provisions, stopped back in March. Some people even say that North Korea took recent measures to redistrict some areas of southern Pyongyang out of the city in order to reduce the pressure on this system of privilege.
Distribution to enlisted men, which was successfully delivered even during the March of Tribulation, is also allegedly falling. According to one inside source, daily distribution has been reduced to 550g and now includes more corn. Worse yet, one other source even said that troops are under orders to find one meal per day outside the base.
Needless to say, the South Korean government of Lee Myung Bak’s refusal to continue delivering 400,000 tons of rice to North Korea’s grain stores with no strings attached, in addition to reduced aid from private South Korean groups, has had an impact, too.
So, overall, whilst food which should be in North Korean state grain silos is not and the authorities’ practical capacity to meet demand is falling, market prices have stabilized and begun to fall, and rice there is in reasonably good supply.
