The Yoon Suk-yeol administration is promoting resettlement support for North Korean defectors as one of the central items on its political agenda. This issue has gained so much attention that Yoon has designated a holiday to commemorate North Korean defectors. This is a big step for the South Korean government, particularly in light of the incidents that tarnished the previous administration’s track record, including the forced repatriation of North Korean fishermen and the death of a mother and son, both defectors, of starvation. However, competition for visibility between the government’s various ministries means that policy might stray from Yoon’s pledge of support.
The bottom line is that the Hana Center system must be restructured. However, the solution is not to let the Korea Hana Foundation operate it directly. Hana Centers are resettlement agencies for North Korean defectors, of which there are multiple regional branches. Until now, these centers have been run independently, but will soon fall under the purview of the Korea Hana Foundation. The government has announced its intentions to introduce a revision of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, which calls for the merger of all 25 Hana Centers nationwide under the Korea Hana Foundation.
Hana Centers are agencies that provide counseling, resettlement help, and services related to employment, education, and healthcare to North Korean defectors. Until now, the Ministry of Unification and local governments have entrusted the management of these centers to smaller regional organizations. The Korean Hana Foundation has justified its plans to operate the Hana Centers directly by citing lack of clarity surrounding responsibility for defectors due to the complex governance structure as well as problems with entrusting the program to private NGOs. But the most recent problem stems from the fact that the Korea Hana Foundation is a monopoly that will not grant the Hana Centers any real autonomy. It is clear why the Korea Hana Foundation is unfit to run them.
First, the Hana Center program has lost sight of its original purpose and is in dire need of restructuring. Hana Centers used to be called the “Regional Resettlement Centers.” As the name suggests, their primary mission is to offer “initial resettlement assistance” to defectors who have come to South Korea, completed their stint at Hanawon, and have chosen their new residence. However, the number of North Korean defectors who have escaped to South Korea has fallen dramatically over the past three years. There is even one Hana Center that has had to suspend its operations because there were not enough newcomers to form a cohort. The intended recipients of the resettlement services that Hanawon and the Korea Hana Foundation provide have disappeared. In the past, more than 1,000 North Koreans would arrive in South Korea in a given year, but it seems that escaping to South Korea has become more difficult for the time being due to the situation inside North Korea as well as China’s obstruction of viable escape routes.
Second, this new scheme would waste taxpayer money and establish a diffuse governance structure. The Korea Hana Foundation exists to support the 35,000 North Korean defectors that have come to South Korea. The number of North Koreans employed at the Korea Hana Foundation, also known as the North Korean Refugees Foundation, is insignificant at best, and likely retained for political reasons. Credible rumors have been circulating that executives at the foundation make upwards of KRW 100 million won annually, and there have been ongoing discussions surrounding reform of its lax management structure. It goes without saying that the Korea Hana Foundation will expand when it begins operating the Hana Centers, too. Of the 25 Hana Centers nationwide, currently three are operated by the Korea Hana Foundation. The head of any center’s position is essentially that of a team manager or departmental head. That means that 22 more executive-level staff would be needed to operate all 25 branches nationwide. Additionally, the current Hana Centers are privately-owned, so they do not incur many rental expenses, but branches operated by the Korea Hana Foundation would incur unnecessary leasing fees that it would pay for with tax money.
Third, the biggest problem for the Hana Centers is that there is no restriction on how long each can be managed by its respective NGO. Under the present system, entities, including NGOs, compete for management rights of the centers. After a management organization is selected, its term is initially set to three years. After the Korea Hana Foundation audits the center, it can be contracted to the same organization. However, both the audit and contract are mere formalities, and there is no limit on how long an organization can manage the Hana Center after it is vetted by the Korea Hana Foundation. There are several organizations that have been running their respective Hana Centers since this system was developed 12 years ago. The biggest issue is that new, capable organizations are effectively blocked from entering the system. This approach encourages each provincial Hana Center to prioritize self-preservation above all else, making sure that the auditor from the Korea Hana Foundation is just satisfied enough with its performance. A Hana Center that pioneers creative and novel ideas to provide better services to defectors will be scored more negatively during its audit. When the Korea Hana Foundation allows an organization to continue operating a Hana Center, there is no way to contest its decision, and other organizations in the community are unable to compete for management rights.
Fourth, the employment structure is unstable. Even now, staff at the Hana Centers are treated differently from the counselors affiliated with the Korea Hana Foundation, and many have pointed out the potential for conflict between the two groups. The professional counselors from the Korea Hana Foundation are not permanent employees and are thus discriminated against at work. These counselors are on the front line helping North Korean defectors, yet they find themselves on the lowest rung of the ladder. If the Hana Centers were to be operated by the Korea Hana Foundation, it would result in an organizational structure that discriminates against employees who are not permanent workers.
Lastly, we must consider the profound loss that North Korean defectors will experience on an individual level, as well as the NGOs working to provide services for them. Until now, NGOs that advocate for defectors have always demanded that the heads of organizations related to defector issues be well-known and distinguished defectors who understand the needs of their constituents as it relates to policy. This is important for symbolic reasons as well. It is impossible to describe the sense of loss that defectors will feel if these posts go to executives with no relation whatsoever to North Korean defectors. If the Hana Centers are operated by the Korea Hana Foundation and positions start to be filled by South Korean employees, we will have to ask ourselves for whom the Korea Hana Foundation exists in the first place.
There is a definitive answer to the question of whether this restructuring is for the benefit of North Korean defectors. Local Hana Centers, which offer initial resettlement support to newcomers, should be consolidated to branches in each metropolitan area or transferred to the control of the Administration and Welfare Centers, which report to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. It is also crucial that the government promote projects for the social integration between resettled North Korean defectors and South Korean residents. Part of integrating North Korean defectors into society means recognizing them as citizens of equal status in South Korea instead of as victims that need protection and aid. These defectors risked death at the hands of the Kim family’s regime to find freedom in South Korea. To allow North Korean defectors to enjoy the same democracy, human rights, and economic security as the rest of us, we must first let them become members of civil society. I find myself thinking of my friend from Pyongyang who resettled in South Korea more than ten years ago, yet still feels that he is labeled a North Korean before anything else. Though he may happen to be from Pyongyang, he is a colleague of mine as well as a proud citizen of South Korea.
Translated by Audrey Gregg. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
