As was widely reported last week, Choi Ryong Hae, the director of the Chosun People’s Army General Political Department, visited China as a special envoy from Kim Jong Eun. He was the first special envoy that Kim Jong Eun had dispatched overseas since he came to power, since, although Jang Sung Taek visited China last August, he was not sent as a special envoy.
The military tensions raised following Pyongyang’s “nullification” of the 1953 truce have subsided now, and countries in the region are busy shuttling around their diplomatic corps. Therefore, the best question is: “Why did Choi go to China? Why now?”
There are a number of points to make. First, it would appear that Pyongyang has decided that it needs to mend its ways with China in advance of the upcoming summit between presidents Park Geun Hye and Xi Jinping in late June. Pyongyang wanted to make a pre-emptive move before it loses the initiative in the face of the South Korea-China-U.S. combine, which has of late been gaining momentum.
Second, a Choi dressed in military uniform foretells Pyongyang’s position, namely that “the issues at hand are military in nature,” much like the inherent message Jo Myung Rok, also dressed in uniform, carried to Washington D.C. when he met Bill Clinton in October 2000.
Choi no doubt emphasized to the Chinese that Pyongyang will never abandon its nukes. He may also have proposed a peace agreement among the original 1953 signatories to the truce; the U.S., China, and North Korea. He probably insisted that a permanent peace agreement is crucial to solving the fundamental issues on the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, he may well have proposed that China should take the lead role in securing peace. Kim Jong Eun’s closest comrade, Choi was chosen to deliver the message in a serious way. It is also interesting to note that Kim Kyok Sik, the newly appointed People’s Army Chief of Staff, came out to Sunan Airport in Pyongyang to bid farewell to Choi, visibly signaling a “hawkish” posture.
If China understood and accepted Choi’s message, Kim Jong Eun will probably visit China in quite short order.
Third, Kim Jong Eun, by virtue of dispatching Jang Sung Taek last year and now Choi Ryong Hae, has demonstrated that he is in solid control of North Korea. (By keeping Jang at home this time, Kim appears to be saving him for another occasion, while exercising a divide-and-conquer methodology to control them both.)
Fourth, Choi seemed to be a special envoy to deliver one single point. If he had other assignments, they would involve requests for military aid, or cross-training of military personnel.
We must not forget that on May 16th, Pyongyang brought in a highly placed advisor to the prime minister in the Japanese cabinet. The speculation is that they discussed the abductions issue and Japanese reparations to North Korea for damages from the Japanese colonization of Korea.
In terms of Pyongyang’s northeast Asian theater, Japan is the North Korean wild card. In other words, if Pyongyang extends its hand to Japan, under the table so to speak, Japan will gladly grab it. The driving force is the fact that Japan currently has no communication channel with North Korea. Conversely: South Korea has a number of channels; China and North Korea share a solid channel through their ruling parties; and the U.S. and North Korea can initiate contact between themselves through the “New York channel” any time they want.
The fact remains: Japan does not have anything. They can use “Chongryon” (the General Association of North Korean Residents in Japan), but it is an indirect route at best. Actually, Chongryon is regarded as a lower level Workers Party organization, not an official intra-national channel, so it is more like talking to oneself. Therefore, Japan, in search of its own communication channel, is ever-ready to entertain any suggestion by Pyongyang in order to secure its own communication channel. They view it as important not to lag behind the U.S. and South Korea in keeping up with information concerning North Korea.
On the other hand, Pyongyang, by playing the “Japan card,” can improve its strategic value in the eyes of Chinese policymakers. Most likely, China is aware of this ploy since it received Choi, who rushed to Beijing just days after Ijima’s Pyongyang visit.
In truth, Kim Jong Eun’s unilateral nullification of the 1953 truce on March 5th and his actions hence show very little strategic logic. It is very difficult to discern what he is after, whether he is trying a “shotgun” approach to achieve one result or is after multiple effects. His closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex adds to the general curiosity about what he is thinking.
An inexperienced and youthful leader, Kim is bound to fantasize about his import as he studies the events swirling around him. He could easily mistake his ill-conceived notions as real or achievable actions. He reminds one of a student who yells out the (usually wrong) answer in a math class long before he fully understands the full scope of the problem. Similarly, his dispatching of Choi to Beijing might turn into an occasion for him to show what he is thinking, without gaining anything in return.
In short, then, there is no reason for South Korean President Park Geun Hye to worry about Choi’s trip to Beijing. She just needs to prepare for her summit with President Xi based on the contents of her summit with President Obama in May and Secretary of State John Kerry’s prior visit to Beijing in April. Her government will need to come up with sound principles for its own diplomatic strategy.
However, President Park must remember that the current initiatives by Pyongyang are fast paced. It is only natural that a totalitarian system can move faster than a deliberate, democratic one. In a way, the totalitarian system can be considered the more effective, but it often makes mistakes. Kim Jong Il demonstrated this point in his summit with Koizumi in 2002, blurting out the number of Japanese abductees taken by the North without thinking about it. His totalitarian modus operandi inspired a serious diplomatic blunder.
It is wise to remember that history is made of elements accumulating over a long period of time, and contains many accidental events from a given moment. The Park government just needs to avoid making any serious mistakes until that inevitable moment when Kim Jong Eun blunders.
There is a complex diplomatic war brewing in the Far East. If Pyongyang sees that the tide is turning against it, it will revert to brinksmanship and heighten tensions once more. A diplomatic war is a quiet war, but diplomats must take up the posture of soldiers at the front.
*The views expressed in this guest column are not necessarily the views of Daily NK.
