[imText1]The government revealed on the 15th, “In agreement with the IAEA’s (International Atomic Energy Agency) reentry to North Korea, 50,000 tons of fuel will be aided to North Korea.” The government’s reason behind this action, “We can confirm that North Korea will disable its nuclear facilities based on the fact that North Korea is allowing the IAEA to reenter the country.”
Under normal procedures, an inspection is complete after the agency has made investigations related to the disablement of nuclear facilities and only after an official announcement has been made to confirm that the disablement of nuclear facilities has actually been made. Accordingly, fuel to North Korea must not be given prior to completed procedures of the IAEA.
Under the notion that “the reentry of IAEA” means “shutting down and sealing nuclear facilities,” the government is hastening fuel aid.
The problem here is not whether fuel is given early or late. The issue that arises from the government’s announcement is the mistaken strategic coalescence with the North.
In the past, the North Korean government has denied claims it had made and has violated agreements made with the international community. For this reason, declarations made by North Korea or agreements made with the international community has little value in resolving any of North Korea’s issues, unless real action is made.
North Korea has violated numerous promises even after signing an agreement. The moment the North Korean government decides to change its attitude or position, the agreement that took great effort to propose becomes a meaningless scrap of paper. As a result, we have now come to realize that whether reward or punishment, these should only be given once specific action has been taken.
North Korea must get a taste of it’s own medicine. North Korea must realize that its actions will result in consequences. We must make it clear that if North Korea cannot act upon its promises, then the consequence is that the promised goods cannot be delivered. The government must set aside its impetuousness and utilize the rewards to compel North Korea to keep its promises.
It is possible that a breakthrough made with great difficulty will crumble because of the government’s overexcitement and ambiguous principles. The Feb. 13 Agreement must be kept intact. It will not be late to aid North Korea with fuel after the disablement of nuclear facilities. Force must be applied which warns North Korea that fuel will only be aided after North Korea’s actions are made.
