Analysis by Kwak Gil-sup, a former North Korea intelligence officer for the National Intelligence Service. Originally published in Korean on Daily NK’s Korean website in seven installments between December 2025 and March 2026.
North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress — the most significant political event in the country’s five-year cycle — convened on February 19, 2026, and concluded on February 25 after seven days of proceedings. The congress, which drew 5,000 elected delegates and 2,000 observers for a total of 7,000 participants, formally established Kim Jong Un’s policy direction and power structure for the next half-decade. What follows is a comprehensive account of how the congress unfolded, what it decided, and what those decisions mean.
Background: Why Party Congresses Matter
North Korea’s party congresses function as the country’s supreme policy-setting body. They are the closest analogue the DPRK has to a major national election: platforms are set, leadership rosters are locked in, and the ideological direction of the state is codified. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il went 36 years without holding one, citing economic difficulties and the demands of the “Songun” (military-first) era. Kim Jong Un broke that pattern dramatically, convening the Seventh Party Congress in May 2016, then the Eighth in January 2021, establishing a five-year cadence.
The Ninth Congress carried particular weight. Unlike the Eighth, which took place under the shadow of COVID-19 border closures and the catastrophic breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit with Donald Trump, the Ninth was convened from a position of relative confidence. North Korea’s nuclear program had advanced substantially, Kim had dispatched troops to support Russia in Ukraine, and the regime had recalibrated its relationship with both China and Russia in ways that eased economic and diplomatic pressure. The Ninth Congress was, in essence, Kim Jong Un’s opportunity to declare victory and set the terms for what comes next on his own.
The Road to the Congress: A Delayed Start
The congress was initially announced at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in June 2025, with a target of “early 2026.” But the timeline slipped — and the reasons why are themselves revealing.
When the Thirteenth Plenary Session convened in December 2025 (December 9–11), observers expected a formal convening announcement. Instead, the session dealt only with preliminary organizational questions: forming a preparatory committee, establishing working subcommittees, outlining procedures for electing delegates. That was start-of-process work, not a countdown to an imminent congress.
More telling still was the fact that a December plenary was held at all. Historically, North Korea has not convened a plenary session in the period immediately before a party congress — the understanding being that the congress itself, with its election of new leadership organs, would trigger the first post-congress plenary. The decision to hold a December session before the Ninth Congress was an anomaly, and a meaningful one: it suggested the congress had been pushed back, and that Kim wanted to use the intervening weeks for additional preparation.
Several factors contributed to the delay. Kim had been conducting intensive field inspections throughout the second half of 2025, personally checking on progress toward economic targets and signaling dissatisfaction with results in multiple sectors. The new five-year plans for national defense and economic development — a core agenda item for any party congress — were apparently not ready. And the external environment was unusually volatile: the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, shifting US-China dynamics, the incoming Trump administration’s uncertain posture toward Pyongyang, and an unresolved dispute with Seoul over drone incursions all factored into Kim’s calculus.
By late January 2026, the congress machinery was visibly moving: Rodong Sinmun reported that grassroots party organization meetings and county-level delegate conferences were underway. Experts noted that based on the Seventh and Eighth Congress timelines, about seven to ten days separated the announcement of county-level conferences from the opening of the full congress. That timing pointed to an early February opening — roughly February 6–10 — which became the dominant analytical prediction.
But Kim waited. On February 7, the Politburo met and announced that the Ninth Congress would open in the second half of February. On February 8, KCNA reported the decision. The congress opened February 19.
The decision to push to late February, rather than early February, reflected Kim’s deliberate pace. He had additional preparation time for sector-specific targets, could observe how the drone dispute with Seoul developed before the South Korean government’s investigation concluded, and could monitor early signals from Washington ahead of any potential US-China summit.
The Congress: Three Agenda Items, Seven Days
The Ninth Party Congress addressed three formal agenda items:
1. Work review of the Party Central Committee — Kim Jong Un’s comprehensive report on the preceding five years, covering achievements, shortcomings, and strategic direction for the next five years.
2. Revision of the Party Rules — Amendments to the party’s foundational governing document, codifying Kim’s ideological innovations.
3. Election of new central leadership organs — Selection of the Party Central Committee and its subordinate bodies.
The Work Review: Kim’s Victory Lap — and a Warning to Seoul
Kim Jong Un’s report was the ideological centerpiece of the congress, but its detailed contents were not released until the final day — a deliberate tactic designed to maximize suspense and impact. The report was organized into four sections: achievements of the past five years; measures to strengthen national power and improve living standards; expanding and strengthening external relations; and deepening party construction and party work.
The tone was triumphalist. Kim pointed to the consolidation of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent, the deployment of troops to Russia, the Local Development 20×10 policy (a rural infrastructure initiative), and the principle of self-reliance as evidence that his “head-on breakthrough” strategy had succeeded despite severe external pressure.
For the next five years, the direction Kim outlined was more of the same, but intensified: further development of nuclear capabilities, deepening self-reliance, bloc-based diplomacy centered on China and Russia, and permanent severance of relations with South Korea under the framework of the “hostile two-state theory” (적대적 2국가론) — Kim’s December 2023 declaration that North and South Korea are not one nation but two permanently hostile states.
On the United States, Kim struck a dual tone. The DPRK would maintain its “maximum hardline posture” toward Washington, he said, but left the door open to engagement — provided the US recognized North Korea’s constitutional status as a nuclear-armed state and abandoned its “hostile policy.” That formulation was designed to apply pressure on the Trump administration while preserving optionality.
On South Korea, Kim was unambiguous and harsh. He declared that Pyongyang had nothing to discuss with Seoul, that South Koreans would be permanently excluded from the category of “compatriots,” and that the only path to South Korean security was to refrain entirely from any action that might disturb the status quo. Any attempt to change current conditions, he said, would accelerate South Korea’s destruction. North Korea would treat the ROK as “a thoroughly hostile state, a permanent enemy.” The language reflected Kim’s structural anxiety about Korean Wave cultural influence eroding ideological control in the North — and his determination to eliminate even the conceptual framework of shared nationhood.
Party Rules Revision: Codifying the Break from the Past
The party rules revision was perhaps the most politically significant agenda item, yet also the one handled with the most opacity. North Korea confirmed that the rules had been revised and that Kim Jong Un’s “five major lines for new-era party construction” had been formally codified. Beyond that, details were not released.
The decision not to publish the revised text was read as deliberate caution. Fully codifying the “hostile two-state theory” — which necessarily means deleting the concepts of “nation” and “unification” from foundational party documents — carries significant risks if announced abruptly. With Seoul making repeated diplomatic overtures, a drone incident investigation still unresolved, US-China summit talks pending, and the March joint US-ROK military exercises approaching, Kim opted for a low-key approach: inform party members through internal education channels first, then formalize the changes gradually through the Supreme People’s Assembly and mass meetings over the following months.
Leadership Changes: Generational Turnover, Kim Yo Jong Returns
The leadership overhaul confirmed a pattern Kim has pursued for years: systematic replacement of the old guard with a new generation of technocratic loyalists.
The congress presidium — the 39-person executive body whose composition signals the power hierarchy — saw 23 of its 39 seats (59%) turn over from the Eighth Congress. Veterans including Kim Yong Chol, Pak Pong Ju, O Su Yong, and Choe Hwi were dropped. Joining the presidium were current senior figures including Premier Pak Thae Song, Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, Defense Minister No Kwang Chol, and others now at the apex of their respective domains.
The full presidium ranking, as announced:
- Kim Jong Un (Party General Secretary)
- Pak Thae Song (Cabinet Premier)
- Choe Ryong Hae (Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium Chairman)
- Jo Yong Won (Party Secretary, Organization and Guidance)
- Ri Il Hwan (Party Propaganda Secretary)
- Pak Jong Chon (Party Secretary, Military Affairs)
- Ri Hi Yong (Party Secretary, Cadres)
- Jo Chun Ryong (Party Secretary, Munitions Industry)
- Kim Tok Hun (Party Secretary, Economy)
- Choe Tong Myong (Party Secretary, Science and Education)
- Choe Son Hui (Foreign Minister)
- No Kwang Chol (Defense Minister)
- Ri Pyong Chol (Party Munitions Policy Advisor)
- Jong Kyong Thak (KPA General Political Bureau Director)
- Ri Yong Gil (KPA Chief of the General Staff)
- Kim Jae Ryong (Party Discipline Investigation)
- Pak Jong Gun (Vice Premier, State Planning Commission)
- Kim Jong Gwan (Vice Premier)
- Ju Chang Il (Party Propaganda and Agitation Department Director)
- Kim Hyong Sik (Party Legal Affairs)
- Han Kwang Sang (Party Light Industry)
- Ju Chol Gyu (Party Agriculture)
- Kim Song Nam (Party International Affairs)
- Ri Chol Man (Vice Premier, Agricultural Commission)
- Ri Chang Tae (State Security Minister)
- Bang Tu Sop (Social Safety Minister)
- Kim Chol Won (Chief Prosecutor)
- Kim Su Gil (Pyongyang City Party Secretary)
- Kang Yun Sok (SPA Presidium Vice Chairman)
- Jon Sung Guk (Vice Premier)
- Kim Myong Hun (Vice Premier)
- Jong Myong Su (Vice Premier)
- Kim Jong Sun (Party Workers’ Organizations)
- O Il Jong (Party Civil Defense)
- Kim Jong Sik (Munitions Industry First Vice Director)
- Kim Yo Jong (Party Department Director)
- Ko Pyong Hyon (Second Economy Commission Chairman)
- Jang Gi Ho (State Inspection Commission Chairman)
- Choe Kun Yong (Supreme Court President)
Several points from this ranking warrant attention.
Kim Yo Jong’s return. Kim Jong Un’s younger sister had been dropped from the Politburo candidate membership during the Eighth Congress — apparently as part of accountability measures following the Hanoi summit failure, given her role in managing inter-Korean and foreign affairs at the time. She had since held only the title of “Party Vice Department Director.” At the Ninth Congress, she was elevated to full “Party Department Director” — a minister-equivalent rank — and restored to Politburo candidate membership. Her ranking of 36th in the presidium, lower than her 20th position at the Eighth Congress, reflects her official title rather than her actual influence; that influence has never diminished.
Her formal portfolio was subsequently announced as Party General Affairs — making her responsible for the party’s internal administrative functions, which places her in constant proximity to Kim Jong Un. This, combined with her continued operational role overseeing inter-Korean and external affairs, positions her as what one might describe as a powerful libero: she can operate across all domains.
The Kim-Kim-Choe foreign policy troika. The promotions of Kim Yo Jong and Kim Song Nam (elevated to Party Secretary from his previous role as International Affairs Department Director, signaling a push to accelerate China engagement) alongside the continued Politburo standing of Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui formalized what had previously been an informal arrangement. These three figures now constitute North Korea’s public-facing foreign policy leadership axis: Kim Yo Jong handling the overall direction (particularly inter-Korean affairs), Kim Song Nam managing China and the socialist bloc, and Choe Son Hui covering the US and Russia.
Kim Jae Ryong’s rise. The Party Discipline Investigation Department head was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee — the apex body — filling the seat vacated by Choe Ryong Hae’s demotion to a more ceremonial role.
Jo Yong Won’s apparent transition. Jo did not appear on the announced lists of party secretaries or department directors, leading to speculation that he may be moving to the Supreme People’s Assembly in the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium Chairmanship — a role with ceremonial external-facing functions — when the SPA convenes in March. This would represent a lateral move that honors his seniority while freeing up space in the party secretariat.
Choe Ryong Hae’s twilight. The formal head of state was ranked third in the presidium but seated to Kim Jong Un’s left, behind Pak Thae Song on the right. Given that North Korean protocol places greater weight on physical positioning than nominal rank, this signaled clearly that Choe is now an elder statesman without real power.
Kim Ju Ae absent. Despite South Korean intelligence having recently upgraded its assessment of Kim Jong Un’s daughter from “successor training” to “designated successor,” Kim Ju Ae did not appear at the congress sessions. She appeared only briefly at the closing night parade. No title was conferred, no role announced, no text accompanied her photo. At 13 years old, she is below the age of party membership (18) and her public appearances continue to serve a symbolic rather than political function — humanizing Kim Jong Un as a family man and normalizing dynastic succession as a concept, without yet bestowing formal status.
After the Congress: What Comes Next
The congress formally closed on February 25. A nighttime military parade followed on the same day.
North Korea will now translate congress decisions into law and policy through the Supreme People’s Assembly, which is expected to convene in March 2026. The current 14th SPA will likely handle this session before new delegate elections are announced for a reconstituted assembly.
On the diplomatic front, the prospect of a Trump-Kim meeting in the near term is limited. The fundamental gap between Pyongyang’s condition — recognition of its nuclear-armed status and abandonment of US “hostile policy” — and Washington’s stated preference for unconditional dialogue has not narrowed. Kim will likely watch how US-China summit dynamics develop and calculate that his leverage with Washington grows as the November 2026 US midterm elections approach, at which point Trump’s political needs may make some form of engagement more attractive.
On inter-Korean relations, the picture is bleak. Kim’s statements at the congress left no ambiguity: South Korea is now categorized permanently as a hostile foreign state, not a fellow Korean entity, and Pyongyang intends to maintain that posture. The Southern government’s outreach will continue to be ignored or instrumentalized. South Korean analysts should not mistake Kim Yo Jong’s new formal prominence — or any tactical softening in tone — for a genuine opening. The “hostile two-state theory” is a structural commitment driven by Kim’s deep fear of the Korean Wave’s ideological effects on North Korean society, not a negotiating position.
Assessment
The Ninth Party Congress was, as Kim Jong Un clearly intended it to be, a turning point — but one of consolidation rather than transformation. Kim used it to formally shed the legacy of his father and grandfather, declare his own ideological and political era open, and install the people he trusts to execute his vision for the next five years. The new party badge worn by congress delegates — bearing Kim Jong Un’s image alone, without the traditional dual portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il — captured the moment perfectly.
The three pillars of what follows are clear: nuclear capability will continue to develop; economic self-reliance will be pursued under tight ideological controls; and North Korea will deepen its alignment with China and Russia while keeping the door to the US ajar under conditions it knows Washington currently cannot accept. South Korea will remain a hostile neighbor to be managed, not a partner to engage.
This article synthesizes analysis from the “Reflections on the Ninth Party Congress” series by Kwak Gil-sup, a former North Korea intelligence officer for the National Intelligence Service, published on Daily NK’s Korean website between December 24, 2025 and March 4, 2026. The views expressed in the original series are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial positions of Daily NK.
