As accomplished Pyongyang-watchers have already figured out, the North Korean New Year’s Common Editorial was empty of real content.
Some say that the expression “denuclearization on the Chosun (Korea) Peninsula” hinted at the North’s desire to conduct nuclear negotiations with the U.S., but there is not much of a basis for saying that; Pyongyang has been shouting about “denuclearization of the Chosun Peninsula” for years, like a broken record player.
To whit, North Korea always tries to take the negotiated course with a new U.S. administration, from negotiating disarmament and denuclearization, on to ratifying a peace agreement to end the Korean War, withdrawing U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and finally concluding a friendship treaty.
By proposing this course again, North Korea is ultimately trying to make the U.S. Forces in Korea withdraw, as well as to gain acknowledgement as a nuclear state from the U.S. It has been heard, and seen, before. Therefore, it is not news.
We can’t conceive of a North Korea without slogans such as “Withdraw U.S. Forces in Korea,” and “Abolish the National Security Law and the National Intelligence Service of South Korea.” These slogans are inevitable background noise coming from North Korea.
North Korea states in its New Year’s editorial that, “Eventually, we can enter the gate of a utopian society.”
The main purpose of the slogans, and the editorial, is domestic propaganda.
Previous years’ common editorials could have provided the people with pipe dreams, at least. For instance, in 1998, when a new word, which translates as “the strong and prosperous state,” appeared in the common editorial, it was fresh, although no one believed that North Korea would actually become a “strong and prosperous state.”
However, this year’s editorial was so feeble that they wheeled out the recurrent slogan, “Chollima Spirit,” yet again.
The most outstanding part of the Common Editorial was its criticism of and petulance towards South Korea, calling it a “fascist dictatorship.” That, though, is not so outstanding.
Simply put, it does not seem to be a key document for predicting North Korean foreign policy in 2009, and it is more productive to analyze the North’s strategy through their normal activities, as South Korea experts generally do.
We have to take an interest in the inside of North Korea.
The main targets of our observations should be changes in the awareness of North Korean people, the ways they live, and changes in ideology, politics, the military, the system and inner circle surrounding Kim Jong Il.
I suggest roughly five parts of North Korean society that we need to understand in order to make predictions for the future of North Korean societal direction.
1. Ideological and political field: the degree of North Korean people’s reliance on Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and the Workers’ Party; changes to citizens political lives and organizational lives; changes in people’s demands or levels of awareness; direction and contents of the authorities’ education or propaganda.
Right now, people’s reliance on Kim Jong Il and the Party has largely disappeared, and party organizations like the provincial party organizations are little more than a name. Therefore, the authorities are likely to focus on straightening the party organizations out and clawing back influence.
In this field, one needs to observe cases or incidents of broken idolatry, such as Kim family portraits or statues, conflicts between the Party and administrative organs, small-scale public rebellion, fights, or other group activities in markets or open spaces.
2. Economics field: amount and availability of food, oil or dollars; tendency of the military-industrial economy, like sales of missiles or conventional weapons; state of the people’s economy and market situation.
The targets of observation in this field should be market expansion or reduction, degree of governmental regulation of the people’s lives, scale of private economic activities like handicrafts or private trade, and price trends.
The basic character of the North Korean system is the relationship between master and servant which exists between the leaders and the people, and the only way to make this relationship more equitable is via the proliferation of markets. The most significant requirement is proliferation of private trade with foreign countries, and increasing amounts of handicraft through private employment.
3. Military field: amount of provisions for the army through condition of the so-called “No. 2 Storage;” corruption level of officials and generals in the military; dollars or material embezzlement cases; systems for bribery; relations between the military, the Party and the National Security Agency; and the military situation, including Pyongyang Defense Command.
Since late the 1990s, it has been practically impossible to fill up the “No. 2 Storage,” which stores spare provisions for the military, and distribution for families of soldiers has not been carried out.
Sourced from within the military field, Kim Jong Il’s being overthrown or a coup d’état before Kim’s death is impossible. Therefore, the only thing you need to observe closely is the appearance of ambitious generals in charge of corps or brigades if the succession system remains uncertain for a long period of time, or if conflict among military authorities continues after Kim dies.
4. Systemic efficiency field: degree of implementation of Kim Jong Il’s instructions or orders; changes among Kim’s close associates or official structures; degree of corruption in administrative organizations, the Cabinet and the Party; and failure of mobilization orders.
5. The inner circle of power: Kim Jong Il’s health problems; the succession issue, satisfaction of the Central Committee of the Party, the Guidance Department, and Escort Bureau; and changes in Kim Jong Il’s private funds (the Court economy).
In this field, the most key points are surely Kim Jong Il’s health and the succession issue. To catch the main flow of this issue, you need to watch closely the power of Kim Jong Nam, Jong Cheol and Jong Woon, Jang Sung Taek and Kim Kyung Hee, and the power of Jang Sung Taek over the Guidance Department.
Overall, we have to make plans for the future of the Korean Peninsula with a national strategy based on these observations, not by being sucked into worthless debate about the empty New Year’s Common Editorial.
