The collapse of the
Soviet Union occurred in three stages: the first was the death of Stalin, which was followed by the weakening of class and Suryeongist dictatorship and the
failure of socialist/communist economic construction in the 1960s; the second was the Helsinki Accords
and the human rights investigations of the 1970s; and the last was the President Reagan-led
American 1980s strategy of inciting Soviet collapse through economic warfare projects like the Strategic Defense Initiative (aka “Star
Wars”).
At the core of all three stages was the fundamental failure of Socialist economics. The result was the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s.
North Korea’s Chollima Movement of the Kim
Il Sung era was also initially successful (in the late 1950s–1960s). Then, from the mid-1960s, the Byungjin Line of
simultaneously focusing on national defense and the economy took over. Kim Il Sung managed to attain only one of these goals, succeeding
in the defense sector but failing in economic construction. Thus, the proper
foundation for future economic development was never set. Kim Jong Il succeeded
in developing nuclear weapons and managed to prop up the regime via his military-first
survival strategy between 1998 and 2011, but it brought about economic
devastation.
Kim Jong Eun has opted for a second
Byungjin Line (2013-?), this time featuring the simultaneous development of nuclear
weapons and the economy. Will he succeed? All the available indicators
point to failure.
In the Kim Il Sung era, the East Asian security environment was one of “security amidst the Cold War,” a function of being wedged
between the diplomatic blocs of East and West. The charisma of the Suryeong,
Kim Il Sung was absolute. In the Kim Jong Il era, Eastern Europe
collapsed and North Korea suffered food shortages on a massive scale, but the regime was
preserved by nuclear development and aid from China and South
Korea.
In the Kim Jong Eun era, however, the international
community is demanding human rights improvements, while South Korea, the United
States, Japan and China are now ranged in opposition to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs.
Marketization has progressed apace, and information from the outside has
mushroomed. Horizontal exchanges of information have become possible
thanks to 2.5 million mobile phones, meaning that the people of Chongjin know
immediately if something occurs in Pyongyang. The Stone Age, that time when North Korea relied solely on a single state source for all its information, is long gone.
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il
built up their “Suryeongist charisma” over multiple decades. Kim Jong Eun has no hope of achieving the same in just a few short years.
If we assess the durability of the North
Korean regime through its various stages, we find that there was a 90% likelihood of success under Kim
Il Sung’s “total Chollima line;” just 40% under Kim Jong Il’s “military-first line;”
and perhaps just 20% under the rule of Kim Jong Eun. There is not a glimmer
of hope to be found anywhere. If it were to happen quickly, the Kim regime could be
cornered, mired in crisis and rife with internal bickering starting by 2014. This situation could then continue until 2018.
Accordingly, here are the things to look
out for as North Korean goes into 2014, any or all of which could have a
decisive impact on the future of the regime: 1) A
fourth nuclear test or long-range missile launch and subsequent pushback from
South Korea, the United States, Japan and China, or a military provocation
against the South and subsequent pushback from South Korea; 2) A backlash from the persistence of “Fearpolitik” across society; 3) Rising levels of doubt due to Kim Jong
Eun’s constant political reshuffling, leading to unexpected elements within the Party and military; 4) The fate of North Korea’s existing special economic zones
and 13 other areas slated for economic development; and/or 5) Most vitally, the
success or failure of South Korean government policy toward the North.
The 2015-2018 period will see the
disintegration of Kim Jong Eun’s reign. The Byungjin Line of simultaneous
nuclear and economic development will fail, and there will be a life-or-death
struggle for power and the very existence of military and Party. As a
result, various unforeseen incidents and mishaps could occur,
indicative of the terminal symptoms of a totalitarian dictatorship. These will
include political calamity for Kim Jong Eun, characterized by inconsistent decision-making. Decisions made in the morning could be reversed or overturned by
evening.
South Korea’s fate for the next 50-100 years will be determined by this three-year period.
And what may occur if the people of South
Korea fail to deal appropriately with this issue, thus allowing the Kim
Jong Eun regime to muddle through until 2020? What if China provided economic and
diplomatic assistance to the Kim Jong Eun regime as part of its America policy,
with North Korea playing the “bad guy” role instead of China in the Northeast
Asian security sphere, all in the midst of a “new East Asian Cold War” featuring
the U.S., Japan, and China?
Should this transpire then the Kim Jong Eun
regime could indeed survive as a “nuclear power state.” Needless to say, this
would endanger the sustainable development of South Korea. In fact, it
may well present a serious challenge to South Korean liberal democracy itself.
In a given historical period, the total
strength of a community of nations is the aggregate strength of each individual within each nation. It is the role of politics to generate this strength. The fate of
a nation may be radically different depending on the manner in which this
combined “people power” is exhibited during crucial periods of opportunity and
crisis.
What can the
current generations of South Koreans do to secure the wellbeing and happiness of their
children and their children’s children? The answer is the swift overturn
of North Korea’s totalitarian Suryeongist dictatorship. This would be a
step in the right direction, portending a new dawn of prosperity for the 75 million
people on the Korean Peninsula.
